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The major concern of this study was to examine the 
United States foreign policy toward South Africa with a view 
to determining in whose interest the policy is pursued. With 
this basic theme in mind: (1) we evaluated United States 
foreign policy toward South Africa from 1969 to 1985 under 
the administrations of Presidents Nixon, Ford, Carter and 
Reagan, (2) we critically analyzed the United States economic, 
political and military-strategic interests in South Africa, 
and (3) we assessed the impact of public opinion on the United 
States policy toward South Africa. 
Widely differing perceptions exist regarding the poli¬ 
cy of the United States toward South Africa. Some observers 
argue that United States policy of engagement with South Africa 
reinforces the conviction of the apartheid regime that its 
domination of South African 80 percent population is not only 
viable but necessary. Other observers see the American foreign 
1 
2 
policy toward South Africa as enhancing the "desired" non¬ 
violent change. Our position is that the United States pol¬ 
icy toward South Africa serves the interest of the United 
States multinational corporations in South Africa rather than 
the American public. 
In order to substantiate the thesis, we applied a 
combination of quantitative and qualitative data research 
techniques in retrieving relevant information regarding the 
American public opinion and the operations of United States 
corporations in South Africa. Our findings in the three 
areas investigated, among other things, revealed that: (1) 
even though the United States policy toward South Africa under 
the administrations of Presidents Nixon, Ford, Carter and 
Reagan has shown some changes in approach, there has been a 
continuity in its basic principle of engagement with the 
apartheid regime, (2) the United States government and its 
multinational corporations' pursuit of economic and strategic 
interests override the moral and humanitarian concerns for 
the oppressed in South Africa, and (3) a greater percentage 
of the American public would like the United States govern¬ 
ment to take stiffer measures against South Africa. 
While concluding that the United States foreign poli¬ 
cy toward South Africa serves the interest of its multi¬ 
national corporations (class interest) rather than the Ameri¬ 
can public, we have recommended that there should be active 
assistance (moral, technical and financial) rendered to the 
South African national liberation movements by the United 
States anti-apartheid groups. 
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The purpose of this research is to carry out a study 
of the United States foreign policy toward South Africa with 
a view to determining in whose interest the policy is pur¬ 
sued. With this underlying theme in mind, our basic objec¬ 
tives are three-fold: (1) to evaluate U.S. foreign policy 
toward South Africa between 1969-1985 under the administra¬ 
tions of Presidents Nixon, Ford, Carter, and Reagan, (2) to 
analyze U.S. economic, political, and military-strategic 
interests in South Africa, and (3) to assess the impact of 
public opinion on U.S. policy toward South Africa. 
Statement of the Problem 
We begin with the racial and class struggle in South 
Africa. The Union of South Africa rules on the basis of the 
doctrine of "apartheid," which literally means separateness, 
but which, in fact, is the political, economic, and social 
domination of the black majority by a white minority. Under 
apartheid, the freedom of movement and the political socio¬ 
economic rights of non-whites are sharply curtailed. Most of 
the land, including the major mineral areas, is set aside 
for the white minority and the black majority are set apart 
1 
2 
on reserves.1 The overwhelming majority of blacks belong 
to the working class. The basic function of townships like 
Soweto is to serve as dormitories for the black workers who 
keep the economy running; they are economic appendages of 
the "white" cities. The exploitation of this work force is 
the source of the country's extensive wealth, the bulk of it 
concentrated in the hands of a tiny class of white capitalists 
2 
who live and prosper off the labor of others. 
The white majority regime in South Africa dominates 
the black majority through police power and military force as 
3 
well as a policy of divide-and-rule. Inside and outside 
South Africa people seek to understand the obstacles to free¬ 
dom and the extent to which their own actions can contribute 
, 4 
to sustaining or removing these obstacles. Hence, there has 
been a debate within the United States over whether to con¬ 
tinue to invest or withdraw investments from South Africa.^ 
1The Kissinger Study of Southern Africa, National 
Security Study Memorandum 39, ed. Mohamed A. El-Khawas and 
Barry Cohen (Westport, Connecticut: Lawrence Hill and Company, 
1976), pp. 173-174. 
2 
Ernest Harsch, South Africa: White Rule, Black 
Revolt (New York: Monad Press, 1980), pp. 13-14. 
1South Africa: Challenge and Hope (Philadelphia: 
American Friends Service Committee, 1982), p. 1. 
^Ibid., pp. 1-2. 
^Desaix Myers et al., U.S. Business in South Africa 
(Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1980), p. 
xiii. 
3 
South Africa remains a major concern for institu¬ 
tional investors in the U.S. In particular, educational 
institutions and religious groups continue to respond to the 
question of American corporate involvement in South Africa. 
Many colleges and universities are looking at the South Africa 
issue in response to pressure from students who are angry 
about the investments made by their schools in companies that 
profit from the South African apartheid system.^ During the 
1978-79 academic year, small but vocal activist groups chal¬ 
lenged university administrations and trustees. A coordinated 
"Week of Action Against Apartheid" in early April 1979 saw 
students on a number of campuses holding rallies, occupying 
building and boycotting classes to dramatize their cause. As 
in previous years, these protests occurred at some of America's 
most prestigious and well-endowed colleges and universities, 
including Amherst, Brandeis, Dartmouth, Columbia, Harvard and 
7 
Oberlin. 
Student activists, labor unions, black organizations 
and some church groups insist on the withdrawal of U.S. enter¬ 
prises from South Africa. They argue that the presence of 
American corporations in South Africa gives legitimacy to the 
white minority regime, and that it creates a vested American 
interest in the status quo and the stability of the existing 
^Myers et al., U.S. Business in South Africa, p. 275. 
7Ibid. 
4 
political system. They contend that the supply of capital 
by American banks and businesses eases South Africa's foreign 
exchange problems and makes the country less vulnerable to 
international pressures that would stimulate reform. Sales 
of certain products, they believe, contribute directly to 
South Africa's military and security forces, and investments 
in the homelands that the white government has set aside for 
blacks or adjoining border areas contribute to the South 
African government's policy of separate development. In their 
view, the withdrawal of investment and a moratorium on loans 
would deal a severe psychological blow to the morale of the 
white regime in South Africa. They believe that these pres¬ 
sures, coupled with increasing international isolation of 
South Africa, would force the government to abandon its dis¬ 
criminatory practices and come up with a system for sharing 
g 
power with other racial groups. 
In contrast, the majority of American institutional 
investors as well as corporations operating in South Africa 
disagree with the position that economic disengagement would 
hasten the dismantling of apartheid. While they share the 
concern about the oppression of blacks under the current 
political system, they argue that progress can best be 
achieved through gradual changes. Advocates of investment 
assert that corporations - by liberalizing employment prac¬ 
tices in their South African operations - set a positive 
example for other employers in that country and contribute 
8Ibid., pp. 275-276. 
5 
to the well-being of all races in South Africa. They main¬ 
tain that by increasing economic opportunities for blacks - 
thus elevating their standard of living and security in the 
labor market - companies are contributing to a process that 
will lead eventually to the full integration of blacks into 
the society on all levels. In their view, economic disengage¬ 
ment would only aggravate unemployment of blacks and compel 
the whites to resist external pressures, and it probably would 
lead to increased repression of anti-apartheid activists and 
organizations because the government would feel in its growing 
isolation less constrained by world opinion in dealing harshly 
9 
with dissent. 
Every passing year, however, the racial and class 
struggle in South Africa deepens. The struggle between the 
white minority regime on one side and anti-apartheid forces 
on the other is akin to an immovable object confronting an 
irresistible force. As the government expands its military 
capacity, the opposition grows in size and intensity. South 
Africa's schools have‘been plagued by protests and police 
repression. Thousands of young blacks, frustrated by an 
inferior education system, and tired of trying to fight well- 
armed security agents with sticks and rocks, have fled the 
country to receive training for national liberation. Hun¬ 
dreds, perhaps thousands, have returned, intent on escalating 
the struggle against apartheid. 
^Ibid., p. 276. 
6 
In this racial and class struggle, the United States 
is deeply involved. As the leading capitalist world power 
and South Africa's top trading partner, the United States has 
a strong impact on the racial exploitation and oppression of 
blacks there. For over two decades, the U.S. policy toward 
South Africa has been contradictory. The U.S. leaders, in 
government and business, have denounced the system of apart¬ 
heid as repugnant, abhorrent, and antithetical to basic Ameri¬ 
can principles. Yet, the net effect of U.S. policy toward 
South Africa has been to sustain the white minority regime 
militarily, economically, and diplomatically. 
In the standard image of power and decision-making in 
the United States, no force is held to be more important than 
the great American public. The public is understood to be 
the seat of all legitimate democratic power. All official 
decisions are said to be made with the consensus of the public 
and hence these decisions are justified in the public welfare. 
"The Great American Public," as liberal theorists may have us 
believe, have voiced their opinion through protests, demon¬ 
strations, marches and so forth that the U.S. must cease its 
support of apartheid. Rather than disengagement, the U.S. 
has continuously tilted its policy in favor of the white mi¬ 
nority regime in South Africa. Thus, the thesis of this 
research is that U.S. foreign policy toward South Africa 
serves the interest of the United States multinational corpo¬ 
rations in South Africa rather than the American public. 
7 
Theoretical Framework 
To understand U.S. foreign policy toward South 
Africa, the research suggests the need to focus on the theory 
of economic imperialism. In applying this theory to U.S. 
foreign policy toward South Africa, we are convinced that 
imperialism is a projection of underlying economic forces. 
Political, cultural and even military-strategic motives for 
any kind of power relationship between a stronger and a weaker 
community are designed to disguise the economic sub-struc¬ 
ture. This has been essentially true throughout history, 
especially in the case of capitalism. As Marx and Engels 
declare : 
The bourgeoisie has left no other bond between man 
and man than naked self-interest, than callous cash 
payment... the bourgeoisie has stripped of its halo 
every occupation hitherto honored and looked up to 
with reverent awe. It has converted the physician, 
the lawyer, the priest, the poet, the man of science, 
into its paid wage-laborers.10 
The war in Vietnam brought an increasing number of Americans 
to the realization that the series of so-called foreign policy 
"mistakes" underlying the U.S. involvement may very well be 
no mistake at all, but rather part of a consistent policy to 
defend an empire. That the U.S. is an imperialist power, 
second to none in the world today, can no longer be dismissed 
as empty rhetoric or a mere piece of Communist propaganda. 
■*'^Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Communist Manifesto 
(New York: International Publishers, 1932), p. 11. 
.T. Fann and Donald C. Hodges, eds., Readings in 
U.S. Imperialism (Boston: Porter Sargent Publishers, 1971), 
p. v. 
8 
The nature of this imperialism, however, is still a much 
debated issue. There is an urgent need for the anti-apartheid 
movement in the United States to gain a clear understanding 
of the operation of U.S. imperialism in order to resist it 
more effectively. 
Prior to World War II, the major European powers were 
annexationists, which is to say that military and political 
domination were inseparable from economic and cultural impe¬ 
rialism. Increasingly, however, this old model of imperial¬ 
ism is being replaced by a new one, the economic domination 
of foreign countries by multinational corporations. The U.S. 
has shown the European powers that political annexation is 
now an obsolete form of domination. The advantage of U.S. 
imperialism over the old model is that it permits economic 
domination within the scope of international laws, yet with- 
12 out strict legal accountability or instruments of redress. 
Marxist's theory of imperialism survives even though 
it is constantly being intellectually battered from all sides 
of liberal thoughts. Marxists attribute their theory of 
imperialism to Karl Marx. Marx evolved a theory of history 
based on dialectical materialism, in which the system of eco¬ 
nomic production determines the institutional and ideologi¬ 
cal structures of society. He who controls the economic sys- 
13 
tern controls the political system. Marx did not use the 
12 Ibid., p. vi. 
3 . 
Anthony Brewer, Marxist Theories of Imperialism: A 
Critical Survey (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980), p. 
27. 
9 
term imperialism, nor is there anything in his work that 
corresponds exactly to the concept of imperialism advanced 
by later writers in the Marxist tradition. He did, of course, 
have a theory of capitalism, and of its development. Marxists 
have, in general, based their analysis of imperialism on 
14 
Marx's theory of capitalism. 
According to Lenin, imperialism is monopoly capitalism 
which involves the competitive quest for sources of raw mate¬ 
rials, the development of banking oligarchies, the concentra¬ 
tion of production in combines, cartels, syndicates, and trust, 
and the transformation of the "old" colonial policy into a 
struggle for spheres of economic interest in which the richer 
and the more powerful nations exploit the weaker ones.^ He 
notes : 
Imperialism is capitalism in the stage of development 
in which the domination of monopolies and finance 
capital has established itself; in which the export 
of capital has acquired pronounced importance; in 
which the division of the world among the interna¬ 
tional trusts has begun; in which the division of 
all territories of the globe among the great capi¬ 
talist powers has been completed.16 
Lenin sees imperialism as a special stage of capital¬ 
ism. In capitalist systems, competition is eventually re¬ 
placed by capitalist monopolies. Lenin insists that imperial¬ 
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capital, he argues, arises from diminishing investment oppor- 
17 tunities in capitalist countries themselves. He continues: 
The export of capital to achieve a higher rate of 
investment return hastens the development of capi¬ 
talism elsewhere in the world. The countries that 
are the principal exporters of capital are able to 
obtain economic advantages based on the exploita¬ 
tion of people abroad. Moreover, the greater the 
development of capitalism, the greater the need 
for raw materials and markets.... The establish¬ 
ment of political control over overseas territo¬ 
ries is designed to provide a dependable source 
of raw materials and cheap labor to guarantee 
markets for the industrial combines of advanced 
capitalist countries. ® 
Lenin believes that imperialist policies would enable capital 
ist powers to stave off the inevitable revolution, since con¬ 
ditions of the domestic proletariat would be ameliorated by 
the exploitation of the working class in colonial territories 
He explains that because of the ultimate dependence of capi¬ 
talist economic systems upon natural resources and markets, 
international conflict is endemic in a world of capitalist 
states. The elimination of capitalist states, Lenin con¬ 
cludes, becomes the essential precondition to abolishing 
19 
international conflict. The analysis of Lenin's position 
on imperialism therefore tends to indicate a relationship 
between the structure of a country's domestic political and 
economic systems and its foreign policy. 
^Quoted in James E. Dougherty and Robert L. 
Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Contending Theories of International Rela¬ 
tions (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, Inc., 1981), 
p. 222. 
"^Ibid., pp. 222-223. 
19Ibid., p. 223. 
11 
A non-Marxist writer, John Hobson, expresses a simi¬ 
lar view. He sees imperialism as "the endeavor of the great 
controllers of industry to broaden the channel for the flow 
of their surplus wealth by seeking foreign markets and foreign 
investments to take off the goods and capital they cannot sell 
20 
or use at home." During the Boer War, Hobson, an English 
economist, went to South Africa as a correspondent for The 
Manchester Guardian. Already a critic of capitalism, his 
coverage of that conflict, which he saw as a concoction of 
diamond monopolists and other economic exploiters, moved him 
further in the direction of an anti-capitalist. In Hobson's 
view, imperialism results from maladjustments within the 
capitalist system, in which a wealthy minority oversaves 
while an impoverished or "bare subsistence" majority lacks 
the purchasing power to consume all the fruits of modern 
industry. He believes that capitalist societies are thus 
faced with the critical dilemma of overproduction and under¬ 
consumption. If capitalists are willing to redistribute 
their surplus wealth in the form of domestic welfare measures, 
he contends, there would be no serious structural problems; 
but the capitalists seek instead to reinvest their surplus 
21 
capital in profit-making ventures abroad. 
20Ibid., pp. 218-219. 
21 
Ibid. , p. 21.9. 
12 
Hobson is aware that there were non-economic factors 
at work in late nineteenth century European expansion abroad 
— forces of a political, military, psychological, and reli¬ 
gious-philanthropic character. He insists, however, that the 
essential ingredient in imperialism is finance capitalism, 
which galvanizes and organizes the other forces into a coher¬ 
ent whole: 
Finance capitalism manipulates the patriotic forces 
which politicians, soldiers, philanthropists and 
traders generate; the enthusiasm for expansion 
which emanates from these sources, though strong 
and genuine, is irregular and blind; financial 
interest has those qualities of concentration 
and clear sighted calculation which are needed 
to set imperialism at work.22 
Hobson argues that groups benefiting from imperialism are 
well organized for advancing their interests through poli¬ 
tical channels, and that imperialism involves enormous risks 
and costs to the nation compared to its relatively meager 
results in the form of increased trade. In demonstrating the 
mechanisms which these groups apply in achieving their objec¬ 
tives, he cites, for example, Great Britain's imperialism: 
To a large extent, every year Great Britain is 
becoming a nation living upon tribute from abroad, 
and the classes who enjoy this tribute have an ever 
increasing incentive to employ the public policy, 
the public purse, and the public force to extend 
the field of their private investments.23 
22Ibid., pp. 219-220. 
23 Ibid., p. 220. 
13 
Thus, Hobson concludes: 
Imperialism is a depraved choice of national life, 
imposed by self-seeking interests which appeal to 
the lusts of self-seeking acquisitiveness and of 
forceful domination surviving in a nation from 
early centuries of animal struggle for existence. 
Its adoption as a policy implies a deliberate 
renunciation of that cultivation of the higher 
inner qualities which for a nation as for an 
individual constitutes the ascendancy of reason 
over brute force. It is the besetting sin of all 
successful states and its penalty is unbearable 
in the order of nature. 4 
Clearly, Hobson's analysis of imperialism encompasses 
the economic motivations. He suggests an analysis that 
extends far beyond one based on economic motivations and 
draws our attention to the political aspects of imperialism. 
However, he says, the economic motivations were clearly 
important because the political system was not based on popu¬ 
lar democracy, and this would not occur until man cultivated 
the higher inner qualities which ensured that reason triumphed 
over brute force; the economic motivations were so important 
because the political system was inadequate to control them 
and this, in turn, was a consequence of man's uncivilized 
nature. Whether he meant to or not, Hobson was really arguing 
that the economic motivations were subservient to both the 
political and psychological aspects. Actions based on indivi¬ 
dual self-interest did not naturally lead to a harmony of 
interests. The development of a more civilized society which 
24 Quoted in Alan Hodgart, The Economics of European 
Imperialism (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1977), 
p. 29 . 
14 
involved a more democratic political system would ensure that 
these brute economic motivations were suppressed or controlled. 
Hobson's economic theory of imperialism, the most lasting ele¬ 
ment of his work, was an outcome of his belief about human 
. 25 nature. 
Another writer, Rosa Luxemburg, developed her theory 
of imperialism within the context of Marxian analysis, speci¬ 
fically based on the problem of the realization of surplus 
value, i.e., on the need for the capitalist to sell what had 
26 been produced if the system was to continue. Luxemburg con¬ 
tends that consumption demand would grow less rapidly than 
output because: (1) the working class' income was limited by 
the actions of capitalists and therefore its consumption demand 
was also limited; and (2) capitalists' consumption was limited 
by their desire to accumulate. Continued accumulation would 
only be possible, she says, if the proportion of realized sur¬ 
plus value going into producing capital goods was increasing. 
This means that the capital goods' percentage of total output 
would increase and eventually more capital goods would be con¬ 
structed to build more capital goods, and so on. Luxemburg 
^Ibid., pp. 29-30. 
2 c. 
Rosa Luxemburg, The Accumulation of Capital (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1951), Chapter 25. Although Luxem¬ 
burg's analysis pre-dates that of Lenin, the order is reversed 
here because of the connection (both actual and supposed) 
existing between the works of Hobson and Lenin. 
15 
maintains that this was not a likely solution to the reali¬ 
zation prohlem, the incentive for further investment would 
• 27 dwindle along with the sluggish demand for consumer goods. 
Foreign trade, she argues, was not a solution because 
it merely shifted the problem of realization from one country 
28 to another. The capitalist system as a whole faced a con¬ 
tradiction between production and the realization of surplus 
value potentially available from that production; this was a 
result of the system itself, the mode of production. The 
, 29 
only solution lies outside the system. A demand for con¬ 
sumption goods had to be created from outside the capitalist 
system, i.e., in the non-capitalist sector of the world. This 
world division into capitalist and non-capitalist, in her 
view, was conceptual rather than geographical, so that one 
country could contain both sectors, i.e., a dual economy.^ 
Luxemburg's analysis is a sophisticated under consump¬ 
tion model, akin to that of Hobson. Given factors which would 
hold down the growth of consumption demand, the growth of 
total output could only continue if more and more capital goods 
could be absorbed. She insisted that the incentive to absorb 
these goods within the system would decline and capitalism as 
27Ibid., p. 346. 
2^Ibid., p. 136. 
29 3Ibid., pp. 137-138. 
2^Hodgart, The Economics of European Imperialism, p. 
37. 
16 
a whole would pass through successive crises, finally col- 
, . 31 lapsing. 
Luxemburg further argues that expansion into the non¬ 
capitalist sections of the world offers temporary relief. A 
backward country would be taken over so that capitalism could 
control the natural resources; the peasants would be separated 
from the means of production and become wage laborers and the 
implementation of a commodity economy would follow. This 
'take over' involved the export of capital and commodities, 
capital was required to open up the primitive economy and to 
impose the capitalist mode of production, while the dis¬ 
possession of the peasants from the means of production created 
32 a market for consumer goods. 
Clearly, Luxemburg's analysis also has an affinity 
with Lenin's, although not specifically in terms of under¬ 
consumption. They analyze the development of capitalism and 
conclude that the collapse of capitalism would occur when the 
world was divided up among the capitalist powers, because then 
the contradictions within the system could not be avoided. 
Nevertheless, they differ on two points: 
1. Lenin stressed the expansion of capitalism 
into backward countries via the necessity 
of raising the rate of surplus value in the 
face of falling profits, but his was essen¬ 
tially a supply-oriented analysis, centering 
on cheaper costs; and 
32 
Luxemburg, The Accumulation of Capital, Chapters 
27 and 28. 
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2. In contrast, Luxemburg analyzed the problem 
from the side of demand. She viewed 
imperialism as the absorption of non-capi¬ 
talist sector into the world capitalist 
system, thereby creating new capitalist 
areas of production and leading to further 
long-run problems in terms of realization 
within the system.^3 
Another classical Marxist writer, Rudolf Hilferding, 
analyzes the theory of imperialism in his work, Finance 
Capital. Hilferding's treatment of the joing stock company 
was really the first serious treatment of this very important 
aspect of imperialism in the Marxist tradition. He emphasizes 
that the formation of the joint stock company could assemble 
capital from many small shareholders. This permits an enor¬ 
mous acceleration in the centralization of capital, the amal¬ 
gamation of many capitals into one. He stresses the oppor¬ 
tunity for owners of large blocks of capital to use the joint 
stock form of organization to gain control of the capital of 
many small shareholders. The rise of the joint stock company 
represents a massive concentration of economic power as well 
34 as a concentration of production. Hilferding's analysis of 
joint stock companies was a fairly common theme among left- 
wing writers of the time; it was, after all, the time when 
magnates like Rockefeller and Carnegie were demonstrating the 
full possibilities of these financial manipulations in practical 
33 Hodgart, The Economics of European Imperialism, 
pp. 37-38. 
34 Quoted in Anthony Brewer, Marxist Theories of 
Imperialism: A Critical Survey (London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1980), pp. 81-82. 
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35 terms. He asserts that: "In the relations of mutual depen¬ 
dence between capitalist enterprises, it is financial strength 
which determines which enterprises will become dependent on 
3 6 others." He contends that as bank deposits grow and oppor¬ 
tunities for investment in commerce decline because of the 
rise of monopolies which take direct control of buying and 
selling activities, the banks are effectively forced into in¬ 
vesting directly in production. He writes: 
The dependence of industry on the banks is ... the 
consequence of property relations. A growing frac¬ 
tion of the capital of industry does not belong to 
the industrial capitalists who use it. They only 
get the use of it through the bank, which stands to 
them in the relation of a proprietor ... I call bank 
capital, consequently capital in money form, which 
is in this way transformed in practice into indus¬ 
trial capital, finance capital.37 
Hilferding would like us to understand finance capital as that 
fraction of capital in which the functions of financial capital 
and industrial capital are effectively united, in which the 
assembly of funds from a variety of sources is carried out by 
the same enterprise as that which effectively controls the 
38 
productive use of these funds. This definition of finance 
capital opens the way to regarding the large multinational 
35Ibid., p. 82. 
36 
Rudolf Hilferding, Finance Capital (Paris: Editions 
de Minuit, 1970), p. 315. 
37Ibid., pp. 317-318. 
38 Brewer, Marxist Theories of Imperialism, p. 97. 
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corporations of today as part of finance capital. These 
corporations are not certainly under the control of banks, 
but their head offices do perform many of the functions of 
financial capital in raising money from many sources (in¬ 
cluding shareholders, by means of share issues), and also 
channel flows of capital from one subsidiary enterprise to 
another. Hilferding recognizes the analogy between joint 
stock companies and banks, in that both can assemble a large 
capital from many sources, and thus he notes: 
Finance capital marks the unification of capital. 
The previously distinct spheres of industrial 
capital, commercial capital and bank capital are 
henceforth under the control of high finance, in 
which the magnates of industry and the banks are 
closely associated. This association, which is 
founded in the suppression of competition among 
capitalists by the great monopolistic combines, 
has, of course, the effect of changing the rela¬ 
tions between the capitalist class and the state.39 
He aptly states that the rise of finance capital led 
to the creation of a ruling class relatively unified in poli¬ 
tical affairs under the leadership of the 'magnates of finance 
capital.' Hilferding insists that possessing classes are 
united politically by the fact that they face a common enemy, 
the working class; and he asserts that a change in the struc¬ 
ture of the ruling class naturally involved a change in its 
relation to the state, a relation which became much more close 
and direct. He stresses that finance capital needed the power 
of the state. For example, tariff protection was needed to 
39 
Hilferding, Finance Capital, p. 407. 
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gain the benefits of monopoly. Given protection, finance 
capital presses for territorial expansion, and this requires 
40 a powerful state. Hilferding concludes: 
The demand for an expansionist policy overthrows 
the entire world view of the bourgeoisie. It 
ceases to be pacific and humanitarian. The old 
free-traders saw in free trade not only the most 
just economic policy, but also the basis for an 
era of peace. Finance capital gave up this 
belief long ago. It does not believe in the 
harmony of capitalist interests, but knows that 
the competitive struggle becomes more and more 
a political struggle. The ideal of peace fades, 
and idea of humanity is replaced by the idea of 
the grandeur and power of the state ... the ideal 
is to insure for one's own nation the domination 
of the world ... founded in economic needs, it 
finds its justification in this remarkable rever¬ 
sal of national consciousness ... racial ideology 
is thus a rationalization, disguised as science, 
of the ambitions of finance capital.^1 
There can be no classical Marxist theory of imperial¬ 
ism fully analyzed without a consideration of the contribution 
of Nicolai Bukharin. Although it is difficult to convey 
either the quality or the importance of Bukharin's writing on 
imperialism, since his originality was not essentially in pro¬ 
ducing new ideas, but rather in putting existing ideas together 
to make a coherent and cohesive whole, suffice it to say that 
he saw imperialism as the internationalization and nationali¬ 
zation of capital. Bukharin defines imperialism as follows: 
We speak of imperialism as a policy of finance 
capital. However, one may speak of imperialism 
as an ideology. In a similar way liberalism is 
on the one hand a policy of industrial capitalism 
4 0 
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(free trade, etc.) and on the other hand it denotes 
a whole ideology (personal liberty, etc.)42 
Bukharin sees imperialism as the reproduction of capitalist 
competition on a larger scale. His argument moved from 
imperialism as a policy and as an ideology to imperialism 
as a characteristic of the world economy at a particular 
stage of development. 
In analyzing the cleavage between the developed and 
the underdeveloped countries, Bukharin cites Marx: 
The foundation of all highly developed division 
of labor that are brought by the exchange of 
commodities is the cleavage between town and 
country. We may say that the whole economic 
history of society is summarized in the develop¬ 
ment of this cleavage. 3 
He then continues : 
The cleavage between 'town and country' as well 
as the development of this cleavage, formerly 
confined to one country alone, are now being 
reproduced on a tremendously enlarged basis. 
Viewed from this standpoint, entire countries 
appear today as 'towns,' namely, the industrial 
countries, whereas entire agrarian territories 
appear to be 'country.'44 
He contends that international division of labor is growing 
because of the great improvements in transport, continued 
unevenness of development, and the simple fact of general 
economic development. The factors that underlie it are not 
42 
Nicolai Bukharin, Imperialism and World Economy 
(London: Merlin, 1972), p. 110. 
43 JIbid., p. 2. 
44 
ibid., p. 21. 
22 
accidental and will not go away. The internationalization 
of economic activity is a fundamental fact. Bukharin aptly 
remarks : 
The international division of labor, the difference 
in natural and social conditions, is an economic advan¬ 
tage which cannot be destroyed, even by the World 
War. This being so, there exist definite value 
relations, and, as their consequence, conditions 
for the realization of a maximum profit in inter¬ 
national transactions. Not economic self-sufficiency, 
but an intensification of international relations ... 
such is the road of future evolution. 5 
He notes that the movement of capital will be from the more 
developed to the less developed countries, because there is 
'overproduction' of capital in the former and the organic 
46 composition of capital is lower in the latter. The process 
of concentration and centralization of capital, the tendency 
towards monopoly, is going on at a tremendous pace. At the 
stage where monopolistic control of markets becomes possible, 
the formation of cartels and trusts, what Bukharin called 
the 'organization process,' proceeds very rapidly. But why 
should the 'organization process' proceed on a national basis? 
This is a question that is of great relevance today, because 
there is a tendency to assume the irrelevance of the nation 
state in spite of the internationalization of capital. 
Bukharin has these answers: 
The organization process ... tends to overstep 
the 'national' boundaries, but it finds very 
substantial obstacles on this road. First, it 
is much easier to overcome competition on a 
'national' scale than on a world scale ...; 
^Ibid. , p. 148 . 
^Ibid., pp. 45-46. 
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second, the existing difference of economic 
structure and consequently of production costs 
make agreements disadvantageous for the advanced 
'national' groups; third, the ties of unity with 
the state and its boundaries are in themselves an 
ever-growing monopoly which guarantees additional 
profits. Among the factors of the latter cate¬ 
gory ... is ... the tariff policy.47 
Bukharin postulates that monopolies take the form of cartels. 
He contends that these cartels are sometimes weakened by the 
desire of one member to break away for economic advantage. 
The cartels can be sustained if members remain loyal, i.e., 
if there is no member that believes it could increase its 
economic surplus by withholding its membership. Bukharin 
notes that a cartel is bound to disorganize as soon as the 
competitive strengths of its members become unequal because 
the strong members of the cartel will think that they will 
make more profits by breaking up the cartel. These factors, 
48 he believes, inhibit the smooth operation of a cartel. 
Bukharin notes, however, that since cartelization and 
formation of monopolies are aimed for super-profits and for a 
competitive advantage in the world market, the cartels are 
more likely to stick together than to break up. He states 
two processes that result from the cartelization and formation 
of monopolies: "nationalization and the internationalization 
of economy and the internationalization of capital are linked 
together"; he believes that the result is "the creation of 
national blocks of capital set in the contest of a world eco¬ 
nomy" in which: 
4^Ibid., p. 74. 
48 
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... various spheres of concentration and organization 
process stimulate each other, creating a very strong 
tendency towards transforming the entire national 
economy into one gigantic combined enterprise under 
the tutelage of the financial kings and the capital¬ 
ist state, an enterprise which monopolized the 
national market ... it follows that world capitalism, 
the world system of production, assumes in our times 
the following aspect: a few consolidated, organized 
economic bodies ('the great civilized power') on the 
one hand, and a periphery of underdeveloped countries 
with a semi-agrarian or agrarian system on the other. * 
In Bukharin's vision, the anarchy of capitalist competition 
is entirely suppressed at the national level, only to re- 
emerge in an even more disruptive form at the world level. 
On a world scale, no state exists to suppress the threats to 
stability that competitive anarchy generates. He maintains 
that the tendency towards monopoly does not represent a steady 
decline in competition; on the contrary, the tendency towards 
monopoly implies an intensification of competition as the few 
remaining businesses slug it out for the prize of complete 
monopoly. However, Bukharin never expects total monopoly 
which might end competition because capitalism, in his view, 
would perish first. He adds that the concentration and cen¬ 
tralization of capital therefore produces, not an end to com¬ 
petition, but a change in its form."^ 
Summing up the views of these classical Marxists thus 
far, it is generally agreed that imperialism is monopoly capi¬ 
talism. The need to expand by capitalists is to prevent the 
system from collapsing and, above all, to prevent falling prof¬ 
it rate. The argument of Hobson, as earlier pointed out, is 
49 
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not Marxist; he sees capitalism running into trouble because 
of expansion. The major point of disagreement between Hobson 
and the Marxist theoreticians (Lenin, Luxemburg, and Bukharin) 
is that Hobson believes in the survival of capitalism under a 
more equitable distribution of wealth and income while the 
classical Marxists reject the notion of reform as a remedy 
to the evils of capitalism. They believe that reform could 
not prevent capitalists from expanding and appropriating the 
benefits created, for without this the system would collapse. 
Any reform that did occur would only be abandoned in the face 
of a falling profit rate. They agree that the only solution 
to imperialism was to end capitalism, because imperialism was 
a result of the inherent conflict and contradiction with 
capitalism. 
Building upon the theory of imperialism enunciated by 
Marx and Lenin, a host of neo-Marxists led by Paul Baran have 
expanded this theory in examining the relationship between the 
developed and underdeveloped countries better known as "center- 
periphery" syndrome. The neo-Marxists interpretations of eco¬ 
nomic imperialism have some general points of agreement. Their 
analyses center on the development of productive forces and 
production relations within capitalism. Imperialism is seen 
as an inherent part of capitalism and is attributed to a 
specific stage in capitalist development.^ Imperialism in¬ 
volves domination, primarily economic, but overlapping into 
the political and social structures of backward by advanced 
"^Hodgart, The Economics of European Imperialism, p. 54. 
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nations. The terms 'advanced' and 'backward' refer to the 
relative levels of development between the areas, specifically 
52 in productive forces and production relations. Contemporary 
imperialism is based on the exercise and extension of control 
by economic means rather than by formal political control, and 
while some development may occur in the dominated regions, it 
will be a dependent rather than independent development. Capi¬ 
talism will generally ensure that the present uneven level of 
53 development in the world is preserved. 
The features of contemporary imperialism which find 
general agreement among neo-Marxist scholars are : 
1. the further concentration and centralization 
of capital'and the integration of the world 
capitalist economy into the structures of 
the giant United States-based multinational 
corporations, or integrated conglomerate 
monopolistic enterprises; and the accelera¬ 
tion of technological change under the aus¬ 
pices of these corporations; 
2. the abandonment of the "free" international 
market, and the substitution of administered 
prices in commodity trade and investment; and 
the determination of margins through adjust¬ 
ments in the internal accountings schemes of 
the multinational corporations; 
3. the active participation of state capital in 
international investment; subsidies and 
guarantees to private investment; and a 
global foreign policy which corresponds to the 
global interests and perspective of the multi¬ 
national corporations; 
52 
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4. the consolidation of an international ruling 
class constituted on the basis of ownership 
and control of the multinational corporations 
and the concomitant decline of national rival¬ 
ries initiated by the national power elites in 
the advanced capitalist countries; and the inter¬ 
nationalization of the world capital market by 
the World Bank and the other agencies of the 
international ruling class; and 
5. the intensification of all of these tendencies 
arising from the threat of world socialism to 
the world capitalist system.^4 
Paul Baran's work is unique in that it marks an 
important shift in Marxist theory, both in its theoretical 
content and in the problems to which it addresses. Baran 
stigmatizes monopoly capital as a cause of stagnation in both 
the advanced and the underdeveloped countries. He notes that 
rivalry and war had receded into the background in the new 
American dominance. He is the first Marxist theorist to 
treat underdeveloped countries as worthy of study in their 
55 own right. The central debates of neo-Marxists are two¬ 
fold : 
1. as predicted by Marx, the capitalist mode of 
production has extended into many parts of the 
world, but the surplus generated by this has 
been appropriated by the advanced nations. 
This notion does not deny that a resource re¬ 
allocation from the advanced to the backward 
nations can promote development, but on one 
hand any real development seems unlikely 
because the advanced countries drain the sur¬ 
plus off from the backward countries, while on 
the other hand, any development that might occur 
would be of a dependent type; 
"^Ibid., pp. 43-44. 
55For a detailed analysis, see Paul Baran, The 
Political Economy of Growth (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973), 
pp. 198-199. 
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2. that the spread of capitalism has not occurred 
at the level of production, but only at the 
exchange level. Therefore, no real development 
has occurred in the backward nations. The 
advanced nations, by virtue of their monopoly 
power or greater productivity and better markets, 
drain off the natural resources of these countries 
and leave them with insufficient resources to 
generate development.®® 
Baran differs from his predecessors essentially in regarding 
the development of capitalism in underdeveloped countries as 
a process different from that which the advanced countries 
had gone through in an earlier period of history.^ This 
approach has since become fundamental to subsequent Marxist 
thinking about underdevelopment. 
Baran argues that it is individual multinational cor¬ 
porations that decide to invest abroad in trying to maximize 
profits. He contends that these corporations call for, and 
get, government support for their activities abroad, in the 
form of pressure on the government of the "host" country by 
military, economic and diplomatic means, and that this re¬ 
quires massive spending on the maintenance of a military 
establishment, on foreign aid, technical assistance and so 
on. It is this, he insists, that is the real significance 
58 
of imperialism. He remarks: 
r ç. 
°These debates are highlighted by A. Hodgart, The 
Economics of European Imperialism, p. 62. 
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Baran, The Political Economy of Growth, p. 241. 
His analysis of imperialism is clearly a radical departure 
from his predecessors. Thoroughly elucidated, a complete 
new insight is brought to the phenomenon of imperialism. 
58 Ibid., p. 245. 
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What matters here is not whatever increases in 
income and employment in an imperialist country 
may derive from foreign trade and investment. 
These need not be very large, even if of vast 
importance to the individual corporations in¬ 
volved and the groups associated with them. In 
fact, as long as the advantages immediately re¬ 
lated to foreign economic activities represented 
the major consideration promoting imperialist 
policies, their political foundations as well as 
their ideological justification were inevitably 
somewhat shaky. 
The issue appears in an altogether different 
perspective when not merely the direct advantages 
of imperialist policies to the society of an 
advanced capitalist country are taken into 
account, but when their effect is visualized in 
its entirety. The loans and grants to so-called 
friendly governments, the outlays on the military 
establishment .. all assume prodigious magnitudes 
.... Thus the impact of this form of utilization 
of the economic surplus on the level of income 
and employment in an advanced capitalist country 
transcends by far the income and employment gener¬ 
ating effect of foreign economic activities them¬ 
selves. The latter assume actually only incidental 
significance compared with the former - an errant 
stone setting in motion, a mighty rock.59 
In another work Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy argue that 
capitalism has an inherent tendency to stagnation as a result 
of lack of demand, a problem exacerbated by the rise of 
monopoly, and they trace the lack of demand to the low level 
of consumption of the mass of the population.®® This 1under- 
consumptionist' argument is not a new phenomenon to Marxist 
scholars. The Marxist theoretician, Rosa Luxemburg, earlier 
59Ibid., pp. 245-246. 
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discussed in this literature, elucidated on this concept. 
It is, however, important to stress that Baran and Sweezy 
provided a starting point, especially among Marxist scholars 
in America and in the underdeveloped countries. They argue 
that capitalist economies are characterized by a chronic lack 
of demand because of the restricted purchasing power of the 
workers. They also contend that it is unlikely that monopoly 
enterprises would carry out enough investment to sustain 
demand.®^ 
Baran and Sweezy develop the notion of economic "sur¬ 
plus" in preference to "profit," for they contend that the 
former is a more useful analytical concept in capitalism 
today. This surplus, they say, can be seen broadly as net 
profits plus selling costs and taxes, and is defined as ... 
"the difference between what a society produces and the cost 
6 2 of producing it." This economic surplus represents an 
attempt to measure the socially necessary cost of producing 
what consumers really need; this surplus can be absorbed by: 
(1) capitalists consumption and investment; (2) transfers to 
6 3 
the government sectors; and (3) militarism and imperialism. 
Basing their analysis on a monopolistic market structure, 
Baran and Sweezy add that the capitalist system has a tendency 
^Ibid., pp. 22-23. 
62Ibid., p. 23. 
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towards stagnation, because consumption expenditure will not 
expand with total output and it is inconceivable that domestic 
investment will continue to absorb this surplus in the long 
64 run. Capitalism can then reduce costs and expand its sur¬ 
plus again, because capital exports allow cheaper raw materials 
and cheaper labor to be secured.^ 
This argument is analogous to that of Ernest Mandel 
who favors the falling profit rate hypothesis as the motivating 
force for imperialism. Mandel believes that the development 
of productive capacity shifts the organic composition of capi¬ 
tal to a higher level, and the consequent fall in the profit 
rate can only be arrested by exporting commodities and capital 
into less development economies with a lower organic composi¬ 
tion of capital. 
In contrast, Harry Magdoff rejects an analysis of 
economic imperialism based on the falling profit rate hypothe¬ 
sis because that hypothesis does not sufficiently explain the 
motives for modern capitalist expansion. With regard to 
foreign investment, a firm might invest abroad even if the 
marginal rate is even lower. Magdoff argues that the marginal 
rather than the average profit rate is the determining factor 
in foreign capital movements. The basic drive for expansion 
stems from the capitalists' desire to accumulate. To do this, 
64Ibid., p. 56. 
^Baran and Sweezy, Monopoly Capital, p. 23. 
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he must seek out profits and power. The greater the power of 
the capitalist over his markets, raw material sources and 
foreign investments, the greater will be his profits, and so 
6 7 
the greater his accumulation. 
The difference among these writers is one of degree 
than of substance. They agree about the basic features of 
capitalist imperialism and analyze it in terms of a developing 
capitalist mode of production which faces inherent contradic¬ 
tion. In fact, the differences which emerge in these neo- 
Marxist explanations of imperialism occur because of a dif¬ 
ferent emphasis given to the basic conflicts within capitalism, 
not because of any real disagreement over these conflicts or 
6 8 
over the operation of the capitalist system itself. As 
Hodgart concludes: 
Whether the main goal of the capitalist is a 
higher profit rate, the absorption of the sur¬ 
plus created, or accumulation, the process is 
the same; he will be forced to reallocate 
resources both domestically and internationally, 
and to extend control over the economic structure 
in his attempt to achieve this aim.^9 
Therefore, despite minor differences in the neo-Marxists analy¬ 
ses, their critiques of capitalism retain the same fundamental 
economic analysis that underpins classical Marxist writers of 
economic imperialism. 
67Harry Magdoff, The Age of Imperialism (New York: 
Monthly Review 1969), pp. 155-156. 
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Now, what really is imperialism? For purposes of this 
research, imperialism is defined as the political, military, 
and economic domination of a stronger nation over a weaker one 
in which multinational corporations act as agents for the 
former. In trying to measure the extent of U.S. imperialism, 
therefore, an assessment of the U.S. multinational corporations 
in South Africa will be made in terms of annual capital accumu¬ 
lation since their primary goal is the maximization of profits 
or surplus values which are generated from the commodities pro¬ 
duced from the cheap labor of black people in South Africa. 
In addition, the involvement of these corporations in the 
political and military needs of South Africa will be discussed. 
Review of the Literature 
U.S. Foreign Policy 
The basic thesis of this research is that there exists 
a fundamental clash between U.S. foreign policy toward South 
Africa and the interest of American public. To highlight the 
roots of this conflict of interest, we must be clear of what 
U.S. foreign policy is. In this research, U.S. foreign policy 
is defined as a strategy or planned course of action developed 
70 
by the ruling class to strengthen their class interest. 
7®This definition rejects the notion that U.S. foreign 
policy serves to protect "national interest." This writer 
believes that the idea of "national interest" is ambiguous and 
is aimed to blanket the reality of U.S. foreign policy. 
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Even though the day-to-day policy decisions are the 
product of numerous, and not necessarily consistent, politi¬ 
cal, military and economic variables, and even though these 
decisions are made by diverse human beings, some competent, 
others incompetent, a clearly discernible trend of foreign 
policy nevertheless exists. As Magdoff reminds us, the major 
drift of U.S. foreign policy has two clearly related components 
1. a drive to maintain private trade in the world. 
Subsumed under this are such considerations as: 
(a) the prevention of competitive empires from 
acquiring privileged trading and investment 
preserves to the disadvantage of U.S. business 
interest, and (b) wherever feasible, the attain¬ 
ment of a preferred trading and investment posi¬ 
tion for U.S. business; and 
2. the promotion of counterrevolution. This, too, 
is composed of several elements: (a) abortion 
of incipient social revolutions; (b) suppression 
of social revolutions in progress; and (c) counter¬ 
revolution against established socialist societies 
- through war, economic pressure, or corruption 
of leaders and nations in the socialist fold.^i 
Magdoff applies historical materialism to link imperialism 
closely with American foreign policy. Magdoff challenges 
those who will have us believe that political aims and national 
security, rather than economic imperialism, have been the 
prime motivations of United States foreign policy. Dismissing 
the bourgeois argument that trade and investment make up such 
a small part of the GNP of the United States (less than 5 per¬ 
cent in the case of total exports) that economic factors could 
not possibly determine American foreign policy, he denies that 
71 Magdoff, The Age of Imperialism, pp. 214-215. 
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such a ratio is by itself an adequate indicator of what 
motivates foreign policy. He further argues that the stake 
of American business abroad is many times larger than the 
volume of merchandise exports. He estimated that the size 
of the foreign market for United States firms (domestic and 
those owned abroad) comes to about two-fifths of the domestic 
output of all farms, factories, and mines. He sees foreign 
economic activity as of growing importance to the U.S. and 
its national security policy, usually justified in political- 
military terms, as being designed to protect economic interest 
of giant corporations which act as agents of imperialism. 
Magdoff concludes: 
The widespread military bases, the far-flung mili¬ 
tary activities, and the accompanying complex of 
expenditures at home and abroad serve many purposes 
of special interest to the business community: (1) 
protecting present and potential sources of raw 
materials; (2) safe-guarding foreign markets and 
foreign investments; (3) conserving commercial sea 
and air routes; (4) preserving spheres of influence 
where United States business gets a competitive edge 
for investment and trade; (5) creating new foreign 
customers and investment opportunities via foreign 
military and economic aid; and more generally (6) 
maintaining the structure of world capitalist markets 
not only directly for the United States, but also 
for its junior partners among the industrialized 
nations. . . . 2 
In his contribution, Gabriel Kolko postulates that 
"to understand U.S. foreign policy, one must know the policy¬ 
makers - the men of power - and define their ideological view 
and their backgrounds." He argues that men of power come 
7 9 
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from specific class and business backgrounds and ultimately 
have a very tangible material interest in the larger contours 
of policy. Concentrating mainly on the economic strength of 
the United States in its relationship with the underdeveloped 
countries, he contends that any assessment of the future of 
American society which fails to relate power and class, do¬ 
mestic and foreign policy, does not do justice to the inte¬ 
grated nature of the existing social system. Citing the case 
of Vietnam as an example, Kolko explains that it is a futile 
effort to contain the irrepressible belief that men can con¬ 
trol their own fates and transform their own societies, a 
notion that is utterly incompatible with an integrated world 
7 3 system ordered to benefit the United States material welfare. 
He writes: 
Vietnam is both the most dramatic reflection and a 
cause of the United States present malaise. It 
sharpens the character and reveals the potential 
danger and inhumanity of American globalism .... 
In the context of what the United States has to 
lose should its immense undertaking fail, Vietnam 
grotesquely highlights, as does no other events, 
the interests and objectives of those men of power 
who today direct this nation's foreign policy.74 
In addressing the question of who makes American 
foreign policy, Kolko examines the personnel of state, defense, 
treasury, and commerce departments based on survey methods, 
and considered only those with the highest ranks which 
73Gabriel Kolko, The Roots of American Foreign Policy 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), pp. vii-xviii. 
74 Ibid., p. xviii. 
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included 234 individuals with all their positions in govern¬ 
ment during 1944-60; as a total, these key leaders held 678 
posts and nearly all of them were high level and policy¬ 
making in nature. His study reveals: 
that foreign policy decision-makers are in 
reality a highly mobile sector of the American 
corporate structure, a group of men who fre¬ 
quently assume and define high level policy 
tasks in government, rather than routinely 
administer it, and then return to business. 
Their firms and connections are large enough 
to afford them the time to straighten out or 
formulate government policy while maintaining 
their vital ties with giant corporate law, 
banking, or industry. The conclusion is that 
a small number of men fill the large majority 
of key foreign policy posts. Their many diverse 
posts make this group a kind of committee govern¬ 
ment entrusted to handle numerous and varied 
national security and international functions at 
the policy level. Even if not initially connected 
with the corporate sector, career government offi¬ 
cials relate in some tangible manner with the pri¬ 
vate worlds predominantly of big law, big finance, 
and big business.75 
Echoing the view of Kolko is Richard Barnet, a co¬ 
founder and co-director of the Institute for Policy Studies. 
Barnet, who, during the Kennedy Administration, served as an 
official of the State Department and the U.S. Arms Control 
and Disarmament Agency, was also a consultant to the Depart¬ 
ment of Defense. Relying on primary and secondary data which 
included his conversations with well-meaning government offi- 
7 6 
cials over a number of years, Barnet marshalls overwhelming 
^ibid., pp. 16-17. 
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data in his study of the men and institutions behind U.S. 
foreign policy. His main thesis is that war is a social 
institution, that America's permanent war can be explained 
primarily by looking at American society, and that America's 
77 
wars will cease if that society is changed. 
According to Barnet, the United States government uses 
a variety of techniques for protecting its expansionist 
process - the granting and withholding of aid, the protec¬ 
tionist policies aimed at excluding goods from other coun¬ 
tries supported by American corporations working closely 
with government, the export of American tastes and fashions 
through magazines, movies, TV programs, educational curricula 
and, of course, the ubiquitous activities of U.S. intelligence 
7 8 
agents. This is essentially true. As George Lichtheim 
notes, "an empire is not complete without an imperial creed 
79 
held by its governing class." From the days of "manifest 
destiny," the empire of the United States has been well 
supplied with such a creed. America's imperial creed since 
World War II has been "world responsibility." This reality 
was enunciated in 1946 by Leo D. Welch, then treasurer and 
later chairman of Standard Oil of New Jersey, who declared: 
^Ibid. , p. 5 . 




American private enterprise is confronted with 
this choice: it may strike out and save its 
position all over the world, or sit by and 
witness its own funeral. That responsibility 
requires positive and vigorous leadership in 
the affairs of the world - political, social 
and economic - and it must be fulfilled in 
the broadest sense of the term. As the largest 
producer, the largest source of capital, and 
the biggest contributions to the global mecha¬ 
nism, we must set the pace and assume the 
responsibility of the majority stockholder in 
this corporation known to the world .... Nor 
is this for a given term of office. This is a 
permanent responsibility.®® 
In his examination of the men and institutions behind 
U.S. foreign policy, Barnet notes that between 1940 and 1967, 
all the first and second-level posts in a large national 
security bureaucracy were held by fewer than four hundred 
individuals who rotated through a variety of key posts, and 
that seventy of the ninety-one people who had held the very 
top jobs - secretaries of defense and state, secretaries of 
three services, chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and 
the director of the CIA - had all been businessmen, lawyers 
for businessmen, and investment bankers. He described this 
small, durable, and exclusive club as the men behind U.S. 
81 
foreign policy for a generation. 
Another illuminating analysis of American government 
is the work of Michael Parenti. In answering the question, 
"Who governs?" Parenti argues: 
80Ibid., p. 19. 
81 Ibid., pp. 48-49. 
40 
While the less glorious tasks of vote herding 
have fallen to persons of modest class and ethnic 
origins, the top state and federal offices and 
party leadership positions, to this day, have 
remained largely in the hands of white, Protestant, 
middle-aged, upper-income males of conventional 
political opinion, drawn from the top ranks of 
corporate management, from the prominent law and 
banking firms of Wall Street, and less frequently, 
from the military, the elite universities, the 
foundation of scientific establishment.82 
In his contribution, Alan Wolfe insists that "the ruling 
class in America contains the politicized members of the 
class." He writes: 
They are all either businessmen or descendants of 
businessmen. They are born to power and grow up 
in an atmosphere that cultivates power. They are 
chairmen, directors, trustees, vice-presidents, 
consultants, partners, secretaries, advisors, 
presidents, ... and relatives. They, in other 
words, are the 'they' that people (with acute 
perception) blame for their troubles. And the 
blame is deserved, for they have taken the respon¬ 
sibility of shaping the society in their interest. 
They are conscious of that responsibility ... for 
amusement, they read books (often written with 
support from their foundations) which 'prove' that 
no ruling class exists in the United States.88 
If the foregoing revelations are insufficient, let us 
crown it all by quoting from the'horse's mouth." In one of 
his more revealing moments, Woodrow Wilson, who served as 
president of the U.S., pointed our bluntly: 
Suppose you go to Washington and try to get at 
your government. You will find that while you 
are politely listened to, the men really con¬ 
sulted are the men who have the big stake - the 
St. 
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Michael Parenti, Democracy for the Few (New York: 
Martin's Press, 1980), pp. 205-206. 
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big bankers, the big manufacturers, and 
the big masters of commerce ..• the masters 
of the government of the United States. 4 
Having the advantage of pursuing their interests within the 
framework of a capitalist system, capitalists can predeter¬ 
mine and control the range of solutions including foreign 
policy formulation. 
In his contribution to our understanding of American 
foreign policy, M. J. Akbar, the editor of Sunday, a leading 
weekly news journal published in India, asserts that American 
policy, particularly toward underdeveloped countries is not 
as idealistic as claimed. Rather, he assails American arro¬ 
gance and states that the real objective of American foreign 
policy is to prevent dictatorship only when they challenge 
8 5 American interests. This is echoed by Lance Morrow in his 
article in Time, January 14, 1980: 
Much of the Third World believes that U.S. foreign 
policy seeks repressive stability in regimes round 
the world so that American business can accumulate 
maximum profit. Even U.S. foreign aid is taken not 
as charity, but as a kind of reparations fund for 
offenses past and future. Aside from the usual 
resentment human nature feels at another's generosity, 
there is a Third World conviction that the U.S. is 
impurely promoting its own interests with aid. Few 
in the Third World believe that the U.S. values 
humanity more than money.86 
84Ibid., p. 216. 
8 5 M. J. Akbar, "The Arrogance of American Policy," in 
American Foreign Policy, ed. David L. Bender (Minnesota: 
Greenhaven Press, 1981), pp. 121-122. 
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Nevertheless, there are some liberal apologists who 
will have us believe that the U.S. involvement abroad is 
designed to promote peace and stability. Basing his argument 
on a case study of El Salvador, Walter Stoessel, Jr., who 
served as U.S. Ambassador to Poland and the Federal Republic 
of Germany, contends that U.S. involvement promotes peace and 
stability. Currently Under Secretary of State for Political 
Affairs under the Reagan Administration, he insists that: 
the United States cannot stand idly by while a 
reformist government comes under attack by ex¬ 
ternally advised and armed guerrilla groups that 
lack popular support. If we fail to make clear 
that the external encouragement of violence and 
instability in El Salvador will have serious 
costs, we insure that other countries seeking 
domestic solutions to domestic problems will find 
their efforts thwarted by guerrilla groups advised 
and armed from abroad.87 
The significance of Stoessel's argument is that it confirms 
rather than denies the Marxist position that American foreign 
policy is aimed to suppress social revolutions in progress 
and to support counterrevolutions against established social¬ 
ist societies. This viewpoint is well expressed in the work 
of Eldon Kenworthy, who concludes that "the external force 
eroding democracy in Latin America is the United States - its 
8 8 
government and several of its large corporations." 
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There are contending views on the role of public 
opinion in the field of foreign policy. On the one hand, it 
is argued that public opinion is a crucial element in the 
field of foreign policy, both in the development of domestic 
support for foreign policies and in the efforts to influence 
publics in other states; and, on the other hand, public opin¬ 
ion, it is argued, is an elusive concept which is manipulated 
by men of power to enhance their class interest. The thesis 
of this research supports the latter position, which argues 
that American foreign policy toward South Africa does not 
serve the interest of American public, but rather the United 
States multinational corporations in South Africa (class 
interest) . 
What really is public opinion? For purposes of this 
research, public opinion is defined as individual beliefs 
and preferences in a nation-state with regard to certain 
fundamental issues. It can be identified and measured through 
polls, protests and through editorials, articles and letters 
89 in major newspapers. 
Arguing that the mass public influences foreign poli¬ 
cy-makers, Jack C. Plano and Roy Olton postulate: 
The mass public, far from being a cohesive unity 
with common attitudes, prejudices, and views, 
consists of many publics holding diverse, often 
8 9 
This writer will apply these indicators of 
measuring public opinion. 
44 
conflicting, opinions. The views of the mass 
public on specific issues may be expressed or 
divulged in various ways, but they are usually 
most effectively presented in democratic states 
through the electoral process or in polls.... 
The role of mass public opinion in influencing 
the policy-making process is typically more 
effective in domestic matters than in foreign 
affairs. Still, no political leader - certainly 
not in democratic states - can ignore the atti¬ 
tudes of the general public if they are clearly 
and actively hostile toward the means or objec¬ 
tives of a long-range foreign policy program. ® 
Supporting the thesis that public opinion influences 
U.S. foreign policy, Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. 
Wittkopf contend that "the nature of American public opinion 
as it affects the nation's conduct beyond its national bor¬ 
ders is certainly one variable." In analyzing public impact 
of American foreign policy, they state: (1) public opinion 
frequently places constraints on foreign policy innovation; 
(2) under certain conditions, however, public opinion can 
stimulate policy innovation; (3) public opinion can serve as 
a resource for decision makers in international bargaining; 
and (4) many a leader has failed to make changes in foreign 
policy out of a presumed capacity of the public to mobilize 
91 itself in outrage. Kegley and Wittkopf note that the exis¬ 
tence of a fairly constant and fixed set of public beliefs 
makes it difficult for policy makers to think in terms of 
Q Q 
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policy innovation. Sophia Peterson agrees that, in this 
sense, public opinion acts as a brake on policy change, not 
by stopping innovations but by restricting "foreign policy 
modifications because of the perceptions which decision 
makers have as to the inflexibility of public opinion and 
92 
its unpredictability." Thus, Kenneth Waltz adds: "Fear 
of electoral punishment serves to limit what decision makers 
are likely to do."93 
In his own analysis, K. J. Holsti explains the inter¬ 
action between public pressure and official decisions. He 
points out that: 
It would be omitting an important part of the 
relationship between opinion and foreign policy 
if we suggested that policy makers only respond 
to public pressures. In fact, the relationship 
in democratic societies involves complex inter¬ 
action in which officials and the public or its 
component groups react to each other's behavior, 
values, and interests. If in some cases govern¬ 
ment officials feel constrained to choose policy 
goals and actions consistent with prevailing 
public moods, it is no less true that they spend 
considerable time advocating their own position 
and characterization of a situation to the 
population. Because of superior knowledge and 
access to information, governments occupy a 
position from which they can interpret reality 
to the population and actually create attitudes, 
opinions and images where none existed before. 4 
Holsti further remarks that recent empirical studies demon¬ 
strate that changes in public attitudes follow government 
92 Quoted in Kegley and Wittkopf, 
Policy, p. 215. 
93Ibid. 
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actions, which implies that government is instrumental in 
creating the "mood" that also constrains it. Such "moods," 
he concluded, while not suggesting concrete foreign policy 
objectives, at least set limits around the theoretical 
95 policy alternatives of policy-makers. 
Commenting on the problem of popular support of 
foreign policy, Hans J. Morgenthau, a liberal realist, ex¬ 
plains : 
Confronted with this dilemma between a good 
foreign policy and a bad one that public opinion 
demands, a government must avoid two pitfalls. 
It must resist the temptation to sacrifice what 
it considers good policy upon the altar of public 
opinion, abdicating leadership and exchanging 
short lived political advantage for the permanent 
interests of the country. It must also avoid 
widening the unavoidable gap between the require¬ 
ments of good foreign policy and the preferences 
of public opinion. It widens the gap if, shunning 
tolerable compromise with the preferences of public 
opinion, it sticks in every detail to a foreign 
policy it considers to be right, and sacrifices 
public support to the stubborn pursuit of that 
policy. 
Morgenthau further argues that even a world public opinion 
does not exert a restraining influence upon the foreign 
policies of national governments. He insists that modern 
history has not recorded an instance of a government having 
been deterred from some foreign policy by the spontaneous 
. 97 reaction of a supernational public opinion. 
95Ibid., p. 342. 
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As C. Wright Mills notes, the most important feature 
of public opinion which the rise of democratic middle class 
initiates is the free ebb and flow of discussion. The opin¬ 
ion that results from public discussion is understood to be 
resolution that is then carried out by public action; it is 
in one version, the 'general will' of the people which the 
legislative organ enacts into law, thus lending to it legal 
9 8 
force. Observing the images of the public of classic 
democracy which are still used as the working justifications 
of power in American society by liberal theorists, Mills 
explains : 
In the standard image of power end decision, no 
force is held to be as important as the great 
American public. More than merely another check 
and balance, this public is thought to be the 
seat of all legitimate power. In official life 
as in popular folklore it is held to be the very 
balance wheel of democratic power. In the end, 
all liberal theorists rest their notions of the 
power system upon the political role of this 
public; all official decisions, as well as private 
decisions of consequence, are justified as in the 
public's welfare; all formal proclamations are in 
its name.99 
Mills warns us that the liberal descriptions of the American 
system are inadequate even as an approximate model of how the 
system really works. He believes that in the democratic 
society of publics it is assumed that there is harmony of 
interests; that after determining what is true and right, and 
just, the public would act accordingly or see that its 
qq 
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representatives did so and that in the long run, public 
opinion will not only be right, but public opinion will pre¬ 
vail. Mills aptly and succinctly remarks: 
In the democratic society of publics it was 
assumed that among the individuals who composed 
it there was a natural and peaceful harmony of 
interests. But, this essentially conservative 
doctrine gave way to the utilitarian doctrine 
that such a harmony of interests had first to 
be created by reform before it could work, and 
later to the Marxian doctrine of class struggle, 
which surely was then, and certainly is now, 
closer to reality than any assumed harmony of 
interests. 
Another significant analysis on the theoretical impact 
of public opinion on U.S. foreign policy is elucidated in the 
work of Richard Barnet. Analyzing "the manipulation of public 
opinion," Barnet writes: 
Though the world of national security is an elite 
preserve, it is evident that those who make foreign 
policy decisions always have one eye on the public 
reaction. Although such decisions are seldom made 
in response to public opinion, the national security 
bureaucracy is constantly taking the public's pulse. 
There are even rare cases when officials tactics 
are directly influenced by a public outcry .... In 
most cases, the American public is just another 
audience to be discreetly handled....^1 
Contending that the impact of adverse public reaction to the 
direction of policy is depressingly slow and weak, Barnet 
cites the case of the Vietnam war: 
The Vietnam conflict dragged on more than a year 
after a clear demonstration that over 70 percent 
of the public was for an immediate end to the war 
through the withdrawal of all U.S. troops. Both 
100Ibid., p. 300. 
■'■^■'"Barnet, The Roots of War, p. 266. 
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President Johnson and his successor used to brag 
in public speeches about their willingness to 
risk unpopularity in the pursuit of "right course." 
In mustering public support for national security policy, 
Barnet insists, national security managers find it necessary 
to frighten, flatter, excite, or calm the American people. 
He concludes that they have developed the theater of crisis 
into a high art.'*'^ 
Elaborating on the manipulation of public opinion, 
Michael Parenti argues that the mass media define the scope 
of respectable political discourse, channeling public atten¬ 
tion in certain directions and determining - in ways that 
are essentially supportive of the existing socioeconomic 
structure - what is political reality. Parenti dismisses 
the notion that the United States is endowed with a free 
press. He believes that the control exerted over the media 
by the giant corporations leaves the public with a press 
that is far from "free" by any definition of the word. He 
states that the primary function of the media is not to keep 
the public informed, but like any business, to make money for 
their owners, a goal seldom coinciding with the need for a 
104 
vigilant, democratic press. As one group of scholars 
has noted after a study: "Protection against government is 
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to say shall have a chance to say it. The owners and managers 
of the press determine who has something to say, which facts, 
which version of the facts, and which ideas shall reach the 
public 
H 105 
In his examination of the impact of public opinion on 
U.S. foreign policy, Kolko reminds us that the primary fact 
of the American social system is that it is a capitalist 
society with an inherently class nature. He argues that the 
dominant class, above all else, determines the nature and 
objectives of power in America. For tiiis reason, he contends, 
no one can regard the giant corporations as just another 
interest group in American life, but must see them as the key¬ 
stone of power which defines the essential preconditions and 
functions of the larger American social order.He writes: 
Yet, even if the social and power weight of 
specific opinion and class interests, as opposed 
to its existence among all sectors of society, is 
primary, it is still vital to comprehend the elu¬ 
sive character of what is now called "public opin¬ 
ion" or "concensus." What is more significant 
than opinion is the ultimate implications of apathy 
and ignorance of elite-sanctioned policies, a condi¬ 
tion that reveals the limits of the integrative 
possibilities of elite controlled 'mass culture' 
from above. For the most part, in matters of 
foreign affairs, workers are not more or less 
belligerent or pacifistic than executives and pro¬ 
fessionals when they are forced to register an 
opinion. The theory of public attitudes as the 
fount of the decision-making process reinforces a 
democratic legitimacy, which, for reasons of senti¬ 
mental tradition at home and ideological warfare 
105Ibid., p. 170. 
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51 
abroad, is a useful social myth. But, the 
close and serious students of modern American 
foreign relations will rarely, if ever, find 
an instance of an important decision made with 
any reference to the alleged general public 
desires or opinions.10? 
It is important to note that Barnet's analysis is very rele¬ 
vant to this research because he not only analyzes the dyna¬ 
mics of the American capitalist system including the role of 
the bourgeoisie, or in his words, "the men of power," but 
also he elucidates on the unorganized, inarticulate, and 
powerless masses in the formulation of foreign policy. More 
importantly, his basic contention is that it is the struc¬ 
tural limits and basic economic objectives of policy that 
define the thrust of American power nationally and inter¬ 
nationally. Far from being the reality, Barnet believes that 
the liberal notion of "public opinion" is an illusion of power. 
As we have seen from the literature on public opinion 
as a source in the making of foreign policy, two juxtaposed 
arguments are presented: on the one hand, the liberal schol¬ 
ars' contentions of Jack Plano and Roy Olton, Charles Kegley, 
Jr. and Eugene Wittkopf, K.J. Holsti, and Hans Morgenthau 
supported the thesis that public opinion has an adverse im¬ 
pact in influencing foreign policy, while on the other hand, 
the postulations of C. Wright Mills, Michael Parenti, Richard 
Barnet and Gabriel Kolko that foreign policy is decidedly an 
elite preserve support the central thesis of this research 
which argues that U.S. foreign policy toward South Africa 
107 
Ibid., pp. 12-13. 
52 
serves the interest of U.S. multinational corporations in 
South Africa rather than the American public. In order to 
assess the mechanisms in which the U.S. policy serves the 
interest of the corporations, a succinct review of the litera 
ture on the United States-South African diplomacy is impera¬ 
tive . 
United States-South African Relations 
An overall examination of the literature on U.S. 
diplomatic relations with South Africa leads to several obser 
vations. First, among those who have written on the subject, 
some writers stand out because of their broad knowledge of 
South Africa and their accessibility to the inner circle of 
policy-makers in Washington. Some of these writers are 
radical and others are liberal; some are right-wing liberal 
scholars and others are left-wing. Seven such writers are 
Mohammed El-Khawas, Barry Cohen, Gwendolyn M. Carter, Ann 
Seidman, Neva Seidman, Bernard Magubane and Michael T. Klare, 
who have been publishing books and or articles on South 
Africa. Gwendolyn Carter has served on the U.S. Department 
of State Advisory Council on African Affairs. 
A second observation regarding the available litera¬ 
ture is that a substantial portion of the material on South 
Africa exists as part of the much larger body of literature 
on Southern Africa and on the whole of Africa, often taking 
the form of a chapter or a section in a book. 
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A third observation to emerge from an examination of 
the literature is that many documents have corporate authors 
(that is, private and public organizations). These publica¬ 
tions vary in nature and scope as well as in point of view: 
some support the present U.S. policy stance toward South 
Africa, whereas others lobby for change. One example is 
American Committee on Africa, one of the leading private 
groups which generally takes the latter position. Similarly, 
several U.S. government agencies responsible for the conduct 
of foreign policy regularly issue publications that contain 
material on South Africa. Examples of such publications are 
U.S. Department of State Bulletins, which report and inter¬ 
pret American policies and actions; the Congressional Record, 
which contains testimony by representatives of the Executive 
Branch including federal agencies, and also present findings 
of field investigations conducted to gather information per¬ 
tinent to legislation. 
A fourth observation regarding the available litera¬ 
ture on U.S.-South African relations is that there are large 
numbers of pamphlets, articles, and books written by South 
Africans who speak out openly against apartheid and American 
policy toward South Africa. There are also publications by 
South African nationalists and liberation organizations which 
often touch on certain aspects of U.S. policy and which criti¬ 
cally evaluate the impact of this policy on the black popula¬ 
tion in South Africa. An example is Sechaba, the official 
periodical of South Africa's African National Congress (ANC). 
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Other materials are periodicals and newspapers which help to 
provide information on the nature and scope of the Washing¬ 
ton-Pretoria relations. 
Finally, the South African government itself issues 
numerous publications including South African Panorama, South 
African Digest, South African Summary, and Business Report. 
The abundance of literature on Nixon-Ford South Afri¬ 
can policy is attributable in part to Henry A. Kissinger's 
position as chief architect of American foreign policy under 
the two presidents. The leak of National Security Study 
Memorandum 39 in 1969 provides both scholars and activists 
with a unique opportunity to examine a government document 
before its declassification. The NSSM 39, published under 
the title, The Kissinger Study of Southern Africa, and edited 
by Mohammed El-Khawas and Barry Cohen, covers sensitive 
ground, providing a valuable perspective on South Africa's 
place in U.S. global strategy as a reliable ally, indispen¬ 
sable to Western interests, and as a cornerstone of U.S.- 
Southern African policy. The most important section of NSSM 
39 is the range of policy options. Although the Republican 
administration denied adopting any of the options listed, 
El-Khawas and Cohen suggest that Option Two was used by Nixon 
108 
and Ford, a view supported by another writer, Edgar Lock- 
wood, in his "National Security Study Memorandum 39 and the 
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109 future of United States Policy Toward Southern Africa." 
The Nixon policy of increased communication received 
widespread attention. Issue (Fall 1975) contains the testi¬ 
mony of six Africanists before the Senate Subcommittee on 
African Affairs of the Foreign Relations Committee, as well 
as a statement of official U.S. policy toward South Africa, 
prepared by David E. Easum, former Assistant Secretary for 
African Affairs.'*’'^ 
Rene Lemarchand's edited volume, American Policy in 
Southern Africa: The Stakes and the Stance, contains much 
valuable information on the Republican policy toward Southern 
Africa. The authors provide a thorough marshalling of evi¬ 
dence to illustrate the "backward shift" of the Nixon-Ford- 
Kissinger policy compared to previous Democratic policies. 
They document that a decade of dialogue accompanied with a 
substantial increase in American investment in South Africa 
did not bring about any change in the apartheid system but 
to the contrary the oppressive laws were increased in number 
and vigorously enforced. Part two of this work presents 
opposing views on the controversial subject of U.S. strategic 
and economic interests in South Africa and the constraints 
they place on policy makers in Washington. William Foltz's 
109 Edgar Lockwood, "National Security Study Memorandum 
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Africa," Issue 4 (Fall 1974): 63-72. 
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article, "U.S. Policy Toward Southern Africa: Economie and 
Strategie Constraints," presents evidence to demonstrate 
that such interests are marginal and consequently, there are 
no serious constraints in formulating U.S. policy toward South 
Africa.Hunt Davis, Jr., on the other hand, in his arti¬ 
cle, "U.S. Policy Toward South Africa: A Dissenting View," 
argues that "even though the inhibitions on American policy 
... may not be tied exclusively to economic and strategic 
considerations of the sort which Foltz describes, they are 
112 nonetheless real." Both writers agree, however, that these 
interests will best be served by "working with, rather than 
against, the indigenous African forces of change. ^ In 
his contribution, "The Future of the Carter Policy Toward 
South Africa," Edgar Lockwood argues that the Carter Adminis¬ 
tration seemed to espouse once more American ideals and prin¬ 
ciples allegedly in eclipse during the Nixon and Ford years: 
open diplomacy for announced clearly-stated objectives, and 
decision-making by consent. Lockwood consents that closer 
examination shows us what is involved is reversion to the 
'*'^'*'William Foltz, "U.S. Policy Toward Southern Africa: 
Economic and Strategic Constraints," in American Policy in 
Southern Africa: The Stakes and Stance, ed. Rene Lemarchand 
(Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1978), p. 
247. 
112 Hunt Davis, Jr., "U.S. Policy Toward South Africa: 
A Dissenting View," in American Policy in Southern Africa: 
The Stakes and Stance, ed. Rene Lemarchand (Washington, D.C.: 
University Press of America, 1978), p. 296. 
Foltz, "U.S. Policy Toward Southern Africa," p. 
268. 
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active use of ideology and salesmanship to defend America's 
mission, as it sought to justify its economic and political 
expansion and domination. "Like Kissinger who stressed 
America's tangible interests, sought alliances with ideolo¬ 
gical "enemies" to advance or at least to protect those inter¬ 
ests, and operated a clever, manipulative and secretive diplo¬ 
macy with calculated ambiguity," Lockwood concludes, "Carter's 
pursuit of American idealism, in this context, should then 
be seen, not as an abstract philosophical preference, but as 
an ideological weapon in a very real conflict in which the 
114 United States acts to protect very material benefits. 
Another insightful work on President Carter was done 
by Barry Cohen. In this work, "U.S. Imperialism and Southern 
Africa," Cohen criticizes Carter's administration's tendency 
to equate the problems of Southern Africa with the civil 
rights struggle in the U.S. Cohen views Andrew Young's posi¬ 
tion on Africa as the most sophisticated brand of imperialist 
thinking. A left critique of U.S. foreign policy, he describes 
Carter's policy toward Southern Africa as traditional imperi¬ 
alist goals wrapped in new 'human rights' ideology and attacks 
the belief of Carter/Young in corporations as a progressive 
force in Southern Africa.''''^ 
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Edgar Lockwood, "The Future of the Carter Policy 
Toward South Africa," in American Policy in Southern Africa: 
The Stakes and Stance, ed~ Rene Lemarchand (Washington, D.C.: 
University Press of America, 1978), pp. 435-437. 
115 Barry Cohen, "U.S. Imperialism and Southern Africa," 
Review of African Political Economy 9 (May/August 1978): 82- 
84. 
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The work of Werner Biermann is quite illuminating. 
Examining "U.S. Policy Towards Southern Africa in the Frame¬ 
work of Global Empire," Biermann suggests broad-ranging 
discussion and puts U.S. policy toward Southern Africa in 
the context of global strategy in the post-war period. He 
contends that the collapse of Portuguese colonialism neces¬ 
sitated U.S. intervention to protect corporate and security 
interests. He maintains that the shift in U.S. policy was 
tactical. "The utmost aim of U.S. policy-making ... is to 
prevent the emergence of socialist countries" possessing 
relative autonomy from the capitalist world market. Biermann 
expresses a pessimistic view regarding the ability of revolu¬ 
tionary regimes to break free of Western domination.'*''''*’ 
Thomas Karis' "United States Policy Toward South 
Africa" describes U.S. policy from Truman to Carter. A 
former employee of the State Department and the Rockefeller 
Foundation, Karis argues that a negotiated settlement in 
South Africa "is surely an unrealistic prospect if white 
South Africa faces only moderate and not overwhelming pres¬ 
sures from outside to reinforce the black struggle inside 
117 
the country for radical change." In another article, 
"Revolution in the Making: Black Politics in South Africa," 
'*''*'^Werner Biermann, "U.S. Policy Towards Southern 
Africa in the Framework of Global Empire," Review of African 
Political Economy 17 (January/April 1980): 1-15. 
117 Thomas G. Karis, "United States Policy Toward 
South Africa," in Southern Africa: The Continuing Crisis, 
eds. Gwendolyn M. Carter and Patrick O'Meara (Bloomington, 
Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1979), pp. 1-49. 
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Karis gives a well-informed analysis of African National 
Congress (ANC), its ideology and operations. He criticizes 
U.S. policy for rhetorically supporting peaceful change while 
depending on "unilateral change by a minority government 
based upon institutionalized violence." Karis urges greater 
no 
U.S. contact with ANC. 
Another writer, David Ottaway, argues that although 
the Carter administration "had begun by explicitly rejecting 
Kissinger's globalist approach ... in favor of an African 
regional perspective," during 1979, Carter's policy (toward 
Southern Africa) was lapsing into a Cold War mode. He warns 
that an East-West emphasis "would serve to alienate most of 
Africa, including those countries the United States has 
relied on most closely in furthering its economic and politi¬ 
cal interests. 
Another significant work of great relevance is that 
of Winston Nagan, "The U.S. and South Africa: The Limits of 
Peaceful Change." In it, Nagan argues that although the 
Carter administration rejected the principle of open communi¬ 
cation with South Africa by Nixon's administration, there was 
no fundamental change in American policy. He cites the 
118 Thomas G. Karis, "Revolution in the Making: Black 
Politics in South Africa," Foreign Affairs (Winter 1983/84): 
1-28. 
119 David Ottaway, "Africa: U.S. Policy Eclipse," 
Foreign Affairs, Special Annual, "America and the World - 
1979, " (1980) : 1-22. 
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fundamental rethinking of the American stance in South Africa 
in a statement issued by Secretary of State Cyrus Vance on 
July 1, 1977 as illustrative: 
We have expressed to the South African government 
our firm belief in the benefits of a progressive 
transformation of South African society. This 
would mean an end of racial discrimination and 
the establishment of a new course toward full 
political participation by all South Africans. 
Nagan raises a critical question: "Why does the U.S. con¬ 
sider peaceful change to be necessary in the context of South 
Africa?" He asked: "How can one assume that blacks in South 
Africa will commit themselves to peaceful change when the 
Terrorism Act makes the advocacy of social change an act of 
statutory terrorism, punishable by death?" Nagan therefore 
concludes that American commitment to peaceful change is being 
primarily aimed at: (1) preservation of the status quo, and 
(2) the prevention of revolution. The implication, he adds, 
is that South Africa will remain in the orbit of special 
interest groups whose perception of world order is defined 
121 in either geoeconomic terms or bipolar, cold war paradigm. 
There are writers who have examined the administra¬ 
tion of President Reagan: some with praises and others with 
remarkable reservations. In his article, "Reagan's Policy 
Toward South Africa: Constructive or Destructive?", Mohammed 
El-Khawas argues that Reagan's friendly policy toward the 
120 Quoted in Winston Nagan, "The U.S. and South 
Africa: The Limits of 'Peaceful Change'," in American Policy 
in Southern Africa: The Stakes and Stance, ed. Rene Lemarchand 
(Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1978), p. 206. 
121 Ibid., pp. 105-106. 
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white regime has facilitated Pretoria's regional aggression, 
done nothing to encourage internal reform, assisted Pretoria 
in its search for nuclear weapons capability, and reduced U.S. 
122 credibility in Africa to its lowest ebb since 1977. As 
Richard Deutsch writes, "The African Problem is a Russian 
Weapon Aimed at Us" is Reagan's simplistic formula. Deutsch 
explores the views of Reagan's top advisors as well. He cites 
the dominant themes of Reagan's policy: competition with 
Moscow, the importance of economic and strategic interests, 
and sympathy for white South Africans rather than the oppressed 
123 blacks. Another writer, Henry Jackson, "Reagan's Policy 
Rupture," presents a concise overview of postwar U.S. policy 
regarding strategic/military cooperation with South African 
government; Reagan has moved much closer to South Africa than 
any previous administration since the 1950s. Jackson calls 
for reduction of U.S. governmental and corporate ties to the 
. .. .. . 124 white minority regime. 
Thomas Conrad examines how the Reagan administration 
gutted U.S. restrictions on trade with South Africa, and 
facilitated contacts between police/military leaders of U.S. 
122 
Mohammed A. El-Khawas, "Reagan's Policy Toward 
South Africa: Constructive or Destructive Engagement?" The 
International Journal of World Studies 1 (Winter 1984): 1-19. 
123 Richard Deutsch, "Reagan's African Perspectives," 
Africa Report (July/August 1980): 1-4. 
124 Henry F. Jackson, "Reagan's Policy Rupture," Africa 
Report (September/October 1981): 1-5. 
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and South Africa. Conrad argues that "the volume of arms 
trade between the two countries is greater than it has ever 
been." He notes that in Reagan's first three years, he 
authorized over $28.3m worth of exports of Munitions List 
Commodities - "one and a half times the total value of com¬ 
mercial military equipment exported to Pretoria during the 
previous thirty years." Conrad concludes that there is little 
125 hope for enforcement of an arms embargo under Reagan. 
In contrast, Chester Crocker in his article, "South 
Africa: Strategy for Change," asserts that "white politics 
are demonstrating a degree of fluidity and pragmatism that 
is without precedent in the past generation." Crocker, the 
main architect of Reagan's policy of "constructive engage¬ 
ment," sees great potential for evolution away from apartheid, 
if only the whites are given more time. He elaborates his 
notion of "constructive engagement" (i.e., all carrots, no 
sticks) in U.S. diplomacy. Crocker concludes that "construc¬ 
tive engagement" is the only hope for a meaningful change in 
126 South Africa. In another work, L. Gann and Peter Duignan 
give a classic restatement of the right-wing position of U.S. 
policy toward South Africa. They argue that blacks in South 
Africa are better off than the rest of Africa. They note 
125 Thomas Conrad, "Legal Arms for South Africa," The 
Nation, 21 January 1984, p. 4. 
126 Chester Crocker, "South Africa: Strategy for 
Change," Foreign Affairs (Winter 1981/82): 29. 
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"white fears are not unreasonable and should be treated with 
respect," "sanctions would not work," "we should press for 
minor reforms in the hope that piecemeal changes will have a 
multiplying effect," and if blacks insist on fighting for 
127 power, "the ultimate result can only be disaster." 
Other writers examine the economic, military and 
political implications of U.S. policy toward South Africa. 
As Lawrence Litvak and others have noted, American investment 
in South Africa is enormous. Although their work lacks sta¬ 
tistical data, suffice it to say that their analysis of U.S. 
investment in South Africa produces an organizing tool for 
the divestment movement, a thorough critique of opponents of 
the sanctions thesis. Relying on information from the United 
Nations and other independent sources, they argue that U.S. 
corporations do not threaten the status quo in South Africa, 
rather the corporations give economic support which provides 
apartheid officials with greater resources for repression. 
Dismissing the argument that economic growth accompanying 
continued investment will inevitably undermine and destroy 
128 
the system of apartheid, Litvak and others believe that a 
U.S. economic boycott would support black efforts to transform 
apartheid by encouraging concessions from the South African 
127 
L. Gann and Peter Duignan, South Africa; War 
Revolution or Peace? (Stanford, California: Hoover Institu¬ 
tion Press, 1978), p. 85. 
128 Lawrence Litvak et al., South Africa: Foreign 
Investment and Apartheid (Washington! Institute of Policy 
Studies, 1978) , p. IT! 
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regime. They add that concessions provide greater resources 
129 for black resistance. A respected Senator, Dick Clark, in 
his report, U.S. Corporate Interests in Africa, argues that 
U.S. corporations in South Africa "have made no significant 
impact on either relaxing apartheid or in establishing company 
policies which would offer a limited but nevertheless impor¬ 
tant model of multinational responsibility." He includes 
study of U.S. loans to South Africa from 1974-1976 ($2.2b), 
roughly the equivalent of South Africa's military and oil 
expenditures. Listing U.S. corporations in South Africa, 
Senator Clark concludes that the corporations assist the 
apartheid regime.130 
A similar but somewhat distinctive study was con¬ 
ducted by Ann and Neva Seidman on the role of United States 
multinational corporations in South Africa. They argue that 
the corporations support the apartheid regime economically. 
Marshalling statistical data, they insist that the corpora¬ 
tions provide not only valuable capital and technological 
know-how but also military assistance.. They reveal: 
The action of the Western powers, under U.S. 
leadership, displayed a cynical disregard for 
the fact that multinational corporate invest¬ 
ments in South Africa had already built the 
advanced industrial base needed to produce all 
but the most sophisticated weapons. United States 
129 Ibid., see Introduction. 
130Senator Dick Clark, U.S. Corporate Interests in 
Africa, Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. 
Senate (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978), 
pp. 1-232. 
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multinationals, assisted by their government, 
had enhanced South Africa's capacity to pro¬ 
duce nuclear 
available for 
They document with extensive data on minerals, manufacturing, 
oil, finance, etc., how the corporations that dominate U.S. 
economy are also crucial for the perpetuation of inequality 
in South Africa. The work examines the underlying charac¬ 
teristics of South Africa's political economy and the rapidly 
growing U.S.-based multinational corporate investment in South 
Africa. More importantly, the work explores the underlying 
and contradictory reality of the Southern African political 
economy and its growing ties with the U.S. multinational 
corporations (MNCs). While the U.S. MNCs' role in South 
Africa's political economy is the foundation of the "tangible 
U.S. interests" as Ann and Neva Seidman have contended, they 
failed, however, to analyze the U.S. domestic impact of the 
U.S. and South African symbiotic relations. It is this short¬ 
coming that has drawn our attention for investigation. 
Another book edited by the Western Massachusetts 
Association of Concerned African Scholars discloses United 
States military assistance to Pretoria. The central argument 
of the research is that the United States military involve¬ 
ment in Southern Africa could not be perceived narrowly as 
merely the shipment of conventional arms; nor could the growth 
of the white military machine be analyzed in isolation; 
■'■^■'"Ann Seidman and Neva Seidman, South Africa and 
U.S. Multinational Corporations (Westport, Connecticut: 
Lawrence Hill and Company, 1977), p. xvii. 
weapons, which may already be 
use. 
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rather, they exist within the framework of, and assist in 
strengthening the South African state-capitalist regime which 
seeks to dominate the entire region. These scholars docu¬ 
ment strategic significance of corporate investment in oil, 
electronics, and motor industry. They examine the role of 
mercenaries, nuclear cooperation of South Africa with the United 
States, CIA, arms embargo, U.S. Indian Ocean Strategy, among 
132 other topics. They conclude that pressure must be exerted 
on the U.S. government by the American public to demand an 
end to all corporate and government support for the exploita- 
. . . . . 133 tive white-minority regime in South Africa. 
Raimon Varyrnen's "Transnational Corporations in the 
Military Sector of South Africa" provides an extensive dis¬ 
cussion of South Africa's arms procurement, research and 
development, computers, weapons production, and how U.S. and 
other western companies fit into this scheme. Varyrnen 
argues that U.S. transnationals are active in the production 
of military weapons. He discusses military aspects of stra- 
134 tegic minerals, oil, nuclear power, and bank loans. In 
his article, "Embargo on South Africa Called Farce," published 
132 Western Massachusetts Association of Concerned 
African Scholars, ed., U.S, Military Involvement in Southern 
Africa (Boston: South End Press, 1978), p. 13. 
133Ibid., p. 248. 
134 Raimon Varyrnen, "Transnational Corporations in 
the Military Sector of South Africa," Journal of Southern 
African Affairs 2 (April 1980): 199-246. 
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in Washington Post, 30 May 1981, Jack Anderson enumerates 
cases of U.S. corporate violations of the embargo on sale of 
computers and other sophisticated technology to South African 
police and military. Anderson argues that "slipshod or non¬ 
existent enforcement by the U.S. Commerce Department permits 
U.S. companies to ignore the ban with impunity." He cites 
confidential cables from the U.S. embassy in South Africa 
explaining how "most firms have been able to continue sales." 
Among the offending companies, he cites, are IBM, General 
Electric and RCA. 
Michael Klare's "The Corporate Gunrunners: South 
Africa's U.S. Weapons Connections" documents efforts by cor¬ 
porations to channel guns, ammunition, computers, helicop¬ 
ters, etc. to the apartheid regime. Klare concludes that 
"U.S. officials have been inexcusably negligent in their 
enforcement of the embargo on South Africa," and advocates 
"a full-scale investigation by Congress or the Justice Depart¬ 
ment."''"'^ In another article, "Evading the Embargo: Illicit 
U.S. Arms Transfers to South Africa," Klare gives a detailed 
examination of lax U.S. enforcement of U.N. arms embargo. He 
cites three main ways to transfer U.S. arms to South Africa: 
illegal corporate transfers, third country transfers, and 
"gray area" sales (i.e., equipment such as planes and heli¬ 
copters that can be designated civilian but also have military 
135 Michael Klare, "The Corporate Gunrunners: South 
Africa's U.S. Weapons Connections," The Nation, 28 July - 
4 August 1979), pp. 75-77. 
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136 uses). Yet in another work, "Getting Arms to South Africa," 
Michael Klare and Eric Prokosch examine the various means - 
"legal and illegal, direct and indirect, covert and overt" - 
by which U.S. corporations, with tacit or explicit U.S. 
government support, have circumvented the U.N. embargo on 
. . . 137 arms deliveries to South Africa. 
In their article, "Smuggling Arms to South Africa," 
David C. Martin and John Walcott trace the intricate connec¬ 
tions through which "an American-Canadian munitions firm with 
close Pentagon ties has illegally supplied the apartheid 
government of South Africa with special 155-mm shells that 
have 20 percent greater range than standard ammunition and 
no less accuracy." They reveal U.S. collaboration in the 
138 smuggling operation. Another writer, Agrippah T. Mugomba, 
examines the history of Western military collaboration with 
South African government. He explains South Africa's role 
as militarized "sub-imperialist" power of the West, and the 
implication of this collusion. He documents Western support 
for the South African government which allows further en¬ 
trenchment of minority power, and greater frustration among 
^Michael Klare, "Evading the Embargo: Illicit U.S. 
Arms Transfers to South Africa," Journal of International 
Affairs 35 (Spring/Summer 1981): 3. 
137 Michael Klare and Erich Prokosch, "Getting Arms to 
South Africa," The Nation, 8-15 July 1978, p. 8. 
138 David C. Martin and John Walcott, "Smuggling Arms 
to South Africa," The Washington Post, 5 August 1979, pp. 1- 
B2. 
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139 blacks, thus increasing chances of violent revolution. 
In a radical analysis of "The Political Economy of 
United States Policy in Southern Africa," Rukudzo Murapa 
places U.S. policy toward South Africa within the context of 
the "Nixon Doctrine" alignment with regional powers like 
Brazil, Iran, Indonesia, and Israel. He views South Africa 
as a "deputy peacekeeper" for the United States in the region. 
Murapa stresses the importance of U.S. corporate investment 
14 0 as an influence on U.S. policy. 
Regarding the political role of U.S. policy toward 
South Africa, Camille A. Bratton, in his work, "A Matter of 
Record: The History of the United States Voting Pattern in 
the United Nations Regarding Racism, Colonialism and Apar¬ 
theid, 1946-1976," details a succinct and critical analysis 
of the U.S. government's pro-South African voting record. 
Providing through documentation, he argues that the U.S. 
government has supported the apartheid regime by voting 
against resolutions aimed to help eradicate the apartheid 
141 system. 
139 Agrippah T. Mugomba, "The Militarization of the 
Indian Ocean and the Liberation of Southern Africa," Journal 
of Southern African Affairs 4 (July 1979): 27-41. 
140 Rukudzo Murapa, "The Political Economy of United 
States Policy in Southern Africa," The Review of Black 
Political Economy 7 (Spring 1977): 77-96. 
141 
Camille A. Bratton, "A Matter of Record: The 
History of the U.S. Voting Pattern in the U.N. Regarding 
Racism, Colonialism and Apartheid, 1946-1976," Freedomways 
17 (1977): 159-163. 
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While there are substantial materials dealing with 
the United States policy toward South Africa in general, there 
are few specifically with regard to American public opinion 
on the U.S. policy toward South Africa. However, Deborah 
Barron and John Immerwahr, in their work, examine American 
public attitudes toward South Africa. They reveal that "... 
by almost a two-to-one margin (46-26 percent), Americans favor 
the United States and other nations putting pressure on the 
South African government to give blacks more freedom." They 
note that actions such as arms embargo and halting new in- 
142 vestment are supported by "large segments of the public." 
In another survey, James Baker and others assert that "in 
response to a general description of the situation in South 
Africa, an overwhelming majority of the public (86 percent) 
condemned the present system," majority support for the U.S. 
"doing something" about the situation and "plurality support 
for a range of activities including supporting black organi- 
143 
zations ... seeking peaceful change." 
In another major work, Alfred Hero, Jr. and John 
Barrat thoroughly examine the U.S. policy and the American 
public behavior toward South Africa. They note that the 
central issue for the majority of aware American public, 
'*'4 ^Deborah Dur fee Barron and John Immerwahr, "The 
Public Views South Africa: Pathways Through a Gathering 
Storm," Public Opinion (January/February 1979), p. 54. 
1 J <5 
JJames E. Baker et al., Public Opinion Poll on 
American Attitudes Toward South Africa (Washington, D.C.: 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1979), pp. 3-10. 
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especially the intellectuals, blacks, church leaders, uni¬ 
versity communities and political activists, is race rela¬ 
tions. Their study reveals that: 
Concerns about access to raw materials and 
other economic considerations, naval and 
military consideration, and/or potential 
influence of governments and ideologies hostile 
to American interests are of lower priority 
among the general public and most groups within 
the population other than some of those who are 
actively involved in economic relations with 
South Africa or U.S. defense and security 
policy.... Most Americans who follow foreign 
affairs think that Communist and other radical 
influences inimical to American interests are 
more likely to develop due to resistance of 
the South African government to racial change 
than if it accepts concessions toward meaning¬ 
ful black political participation.... Most of 
those Americans regard eventual control of the 
South African government by the black majority 
as inevitable.... Thus, Americans holding views 
tend to be more sympathetic with African blacks 
than with the government and its supporters.144 
Although the work of Hero and Barrat is fascinating and rele¬ 
vant to the central concern of this research, it has some 
shortcomings. It neither includes an analysis of the U.S. 
economic and strategic interests nor encompasses an examina¬ 
tion of the U.S. policy toward South Africa. It is safe to 
say that the expressed American public opinion should not be 
analyzed in a vacuum, but in relations to the American "vital 
interests" which enhance our understanding of the contradic¬ 
tions between the U.S. government and the American public. 
144 Alfred 0. Hero, Jr. and John Barrat, The American 
People and South Africa: Publics, Elites, and Policymaking- 
Processes (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1981), pp. 
163-165. 
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Summing up the literature on United States-South 
African relations, it is clear that some authors/writers have 
examined the U.S. foreign policy toward South Africa from the 
same perspective in some cases; in other cases, there are 
sharp disagreements on what should be the fundamental U.S. 
policy toward South Africa. Scholars like Henry Jackson, Ann 
and Neva Seidman, Mohammed El-Khawas, and Michael Klare have 
exhaustively examined how the United States assists South 
African government economically and militarily, but only 
to simply suggest that such support should end. Others like 
Chester Crocker, Richard Duignan and L. Gann insist that the 
best hope for constructive change in South Africa is through 
"constructive engagement." 
Despite the illuminating and insightful works on the 
U.S. foreign policy toward South Africa vis-a-vis the American 
public opinion toward the apartheid regime, the debate on the 
U.S. policy toward South Africa goes on. The literature 
review fails to adequately determine if the U.S. is a product 
of the problem or is a partner to the solution. We argue not 
against a wishful thinking of American voluntary disengagement 
with the apartheid regime because of human rights principle 
or for its continued engagement in a vague notion that blacks' 
conditions will improve; rather, our stated position is that 
the United States policy toward South Africa serves the 
interest of its multinational corporations rather than the 
American public. Thus, in contributing to the existing litera¬ 
ture, we will document the U.S. economic and military-strategic 
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interests; we will analyze its political support of the 
apartheid regime at the United Nations, and we will link the 
U.S. policy toward South Africa with the American public 
opinion. 
Methodology 
Since our stated hypothesis is that the United States 
foreign policy toward South Africa serves the interest of 
the United States multinational corporations in South Africa 
rather than the American public, we have to concretize the 
hypothesis by raising three basic questions: (1) Is the 
United States government committed to compel the white minor¬ 
ity regime in South Africa to change its apartheid policy? 
(2) What are the specific objectives of the United States 
policy toward South Africa? and (3) What is the impact of 
American public opinion on the United States policy toward 
South Africa? 
Gathering a variety of data sources including his¬ 
torical materials, government documents, newspapers, United 
Nations publications, scholarly journals, independent reports 
and, to a lesser extent, published interviews, the following 
methodological approaches will be utilized in answering the 
questions raised: historical, explanatory and content analysis. 
Historical 
In addressing the first question: Is the United 
States committed to compel the white minority regime in 
South Africa to change its apartheir policy, our objective is 
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to historically analyze the period under study (1969 to 1985), 
that is the administrations of Presidents Nixon, Ford, 
Carter and Reagan in order to determine if there has been 
any radical departure from the fundamental principle of U.S. 
business engagement with the apartheid regime. Using histori¬ 
cal and government materials, including congressional records, 
the policy declaration of "open communication or dialogue" 
by the Nixon-Ford administration, Carter's "African regional 
perspective," and Reagan's "constructive engagement" in 
United States-South African relations are subjected to the 
test of empirical study. In elucidating the gulf between 
the rhetoric of policy-as-preached and the reality of policy- 
as-practiced, we will document United States government 
activities. 
This historical approach has grown out of a convic¬ 
tion that we cannot understand the events of today unless we 
are aware of yesterday. Therefore, highlighting what existed 
yesterday and linking the present to the past, it is our 
belief that the future of United States policy cannot be pre¬ 
dicted without the historical perspective which places the 
United States policy toward South Africa in the specific con¬ 
text in which it is formulated. 
Explanatory 
The research goes beyond mere description and seeks 
to explain the roots of United States policy toward South 
Africa. Therefore, in answering the second question: What 
are the specific objectives of the United States policy toward 
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South Africa, our aim is to critically analyze the United 
States economic, political, and military-strategic interests 
in South Africa. 
Relying essentially on independent reports and, to 
some degree, congressional documents, we will marshall a body 
of statistical data to measure the economic leverage of 
United States involvement in South Africa. In doing so, we 
will examine the twelve major United States companies in 
South Africa which include General Motors, Mobil, Texaco, 
Standard Oil of California, Ford, ITT, General Electric, 
Chrysler, Firestone, Goodyear, Minnesota Mining and Manu¬ 
facturing Company, IBM and Caterpillar. We will provide data 
showing hourly employment by work grade classification and 
race at General Motors South Africa, and show Mobil's work 
force indicating skilled and unskilled workers with blacks 
dominating the latter category. We will also give a general 
overview, through statistical data, of South African mineral 
reserves, the degree of United States import dependency, and 
the significance of South Africa as a supplier. The extent 
of United States investment and income in South Africa will 
equally be documented. 
In order to substantiate that the United States 
supports the apartheid regime politically, we will take a 
look at its diplomatic records. At the United Nations there 
have been a series of resolutions in both the General Assembly 
and the Security Council on the issues of racism and apar¬ 
theid. We will examine the United States voting pattern on 
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resolutions on racism and apartheid. 
In marshalling empirical evidence of the United States 
military assistance to South Africa in violation of the United 
Nations Security Council adopted resolution 418 (1977) estab¬ 
lishing a mandatory embargo on arms to South Africa which is 
binding on all members of the U.N., we will document a series 
of revelations by news reports, namely the Washington Post, 
The Nation, Africa Report and Africa Confidential as well as 
a publication by the U.N. Center of Transnational Corpora¬ 
tions, The Activities of Transnational Corporations in the 
Industrial Mining and Military Sectors of Southern Africa. 
In our analysis, we will specifically examine the illegal 
sales of arms to South Africa by American corporations such 
as Colt Firearms - a Division of the Ohio Corporation, Space 
Research Corporation, and Sanders Associates of Nashua, N.H. 
Content Analysis 
In answering the third question: What is the impact 
of public opinion on the United States foreign policy toward 
South Africa, we will utilize content analysis to retrieve 
relevant information from two newspaper reports : the Washing¬ 
ton Post and New York Times. We will specifically study the 
editorials, articles and letters in these newspapers in order 
to determine the expressed public opinion. According to 
Bernard Berelson, "Content analysis is a research technique 
for the objective, systematic, and quantitative description 
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145 of the manifest content of communications." This 
methodological approach will be applied because it provides 
an important procedural check that aims at maximizing scien¬ 
tific objectivity. As Earl Babbie lucidly concludes: "Con¬ 
tent analysis has the advantage of providing a systematic 
examination of materials that are typically evaluated on 
impressionistic basis." 
Public opinion (individual beliefs and preferences 
in a nation-state with regard to certain fundamental issues) 
will be measured with three indicators - polls, protests, and 
individual expression of opinion through the mass media: 
the Washington Post and New York Times. As Kenneth Bailey 
writes : 
The basic goal of content analysis is to take 
verbal, nonquantitative document and transform 
it into quantitative data. The results of 
content analysis can generally be presented in 
tables containing frequencies or percentages, 
in the same manner as survey data. How does 
one perform this marvelous social alchemy that 
can turn words into numbers?-*-^ 
In answering this question, we will refer to the 
Washington Post and New York Times. We will study the media 
opinion on the United States-South African relations by 
examining the editorials, articles and letters in these two 
145 Quoted in Smith Johnson et al., Political Research 
Methods: Foundations and Techniques (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Company, 1976), p. 205. 
146 Earl R. Babbie, Survey Research Methods (Belmont, 
California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc., Ï973), p. 35. 
147 Kenneth D. Bailey, Methods of Social Research 
(New York: The Free Press, 1982), p. 312. 
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newspapers from 1969 to 1985 under the administrations of 
Nixon, Ford, Carter and Reagan. The media opinion of each 
administration will be analyzed. Also, a comparative analysis 
of the two newspapers' attitudes on the U.S.-South African 
relations will be undertaken. Examining these qualitative 
data, we will "turn words into numbers" by categorization. 
We will provide a table showing value labels (pro, con or 
neutral), frequencies, and valid percentages. The valid per¬ 
centage will be computed by observing the frequency of each 
category, i.e., pro, con or neutral over the sampling size. 
Frequency—T  x = valid percentage. 
Sampling size 1 r ^ 
We will also utilize secondary survey data in study¬ 
ing the impact of public opinion on the United States policy 
toward South Africa. The survey upon which our analysis will 
be based was conducted by Response Analysis Corporation 
(Princeton, New Jersey) at the request of the Carnegie Endow¬ 
ment for International Peace. It is based on telephone inter¬ 
views conducted February 15 to March 16, 1979, with 1,000 
adult men and women around the United States. We will ana¬ 
lyze the Gallup Reports of August and October 1985 in which 
1,009 and 1,540 Americans respectively were polled with regard 
to their perceptions of President Reagan's handling of the 
situation in South Africa. In addition to these quantitative 
data, the tense protest movement in the United States will be 
examined. 
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In our application of quantitative/qualitative data 
techniques, we will not conduct a survey of public opinion 
of the United States policy toward South Africa because of 
two imposing methodological constraints: (1) the selection 
of sampling size that will adequately represent a cross- 
section of the American public; by a "cross-section" we mean 
a broad sampling of persons of different ages, different 
educational and income levels, different races, different 
religions, and more importantly different cities and states; 
and (2) the collection of such data will be equally difficult. 
To conduct a survey of the citizens in the city of Atlanta, 
Georgia, for example, would be inadequate. Atlanta is a 
predominantly black populated city. Predictably, the blacks 
are much likely to be sympathetic to the oppressed South 
African blacks. Therefore, such a survey of the citizens of 
Atlanta on public opinion of the United States policy toward 
South Africa would raise the question of validity; rather, a 
combination of quantitative and qualitative techniques, as we 
have outlined, are much more appropriate for substantiating 
the thesis and enhancing scientific objectivity. 
Significance of the Study 
This research might be described as holistic; it 
recognizes rather than denies the linkages between relevant 
components of the whole of the United States foreign policy 
toward South Africa. The research recognizes United States 
policy as a system in which everything relates to every other 
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thing. So, when we study any one part of that system, be 
it economic, military, political, we will see how that part 
reflects the nature of the whole and how it serves to main¬ 
tain the larger system, especially the system's overriding 
class interest. We will see that issues and problems are 
not isolated; rather, they are interrelated, being the causes 
and effects of each other in direct and indirect ways. 
In this work, a relationship is drawn between class 
and state; in other words, between owners of the United States 
multinational corporations in South Africa and the United 
States government. This existing relationship between 
property and power is ignored by positivists; and the ten¬ 
dency to avoid critical analysis of American capitalism and 
its impact in the world persists to this day among opponents 
of the Marxist tradition of analysis. 
Specifically, the significance of this study is three¬ 
fold: (1) educating the general readers that the United 
States foreign policy from Nixon to Reagan has changed in 
basic strategy without a fundamental change in its mission; 
(2) throwing more light on the United States government's 
economic, political and military-strategic interests in South 
Africa and its symbiotic relations with the apartheid regime; 
and (3) contributing to the existing knowledge of the United 
States involvement in South Africa by linking public opinion 
with the class interest of American foreign policy. 
CHAPTER II 
U. S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD SOUTH AFRICA 
Over the years, the U.S. government has utilized 
specific rationales in its involvement with the apartheid 
regime. Every passing administration designed a policy 
option to strengthen rather than weaken apartheid. Yet, 
some liberal critics have charged that the United States has 
no coherent foreign policy toward South Africa, that deci¬ 
sions relating to that country are made on an ad hoc basis 
in an attempt to strike a balance between the conflicting 
and irreconcilable objectives of the black majority and the 
white-minority regime. The U.S. government officials insist 
that policies like Nixon-Ford's "open communication," "Car¬ 
ter's "African regional perspective," and Reagan's "construc¬ 
tive engagement" are all part of the network of ameliorating 
black conditions in. South Africa. 
This chapter subjects each of these policies in the 
U.S.-South African relations to the test of empirical evi¬ 
dence and logical plausibility. It illuminates the gulf 
between the rhetoric of policy-as-preached and the reality 
of policy-as-practiced. In doing so, the chapter examines 
the ways in which the U.S. policy (1969-1985) has had an 
anti-democratic effect both at home and abroad: abroad, by 
sustaining apartheid regime, and at home, by deceiving 'the 
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great American public.' 
Background 
The case of the United States foreign policy toward 
South Africa is of special interest because of America's 
pre-eminence in the Western alliance. During the Eisenhower 
administration, the United States joined in the verbal criti¬ 
cism of South Africa's racial policies but continued to 
cooperate with South Africa, even in military matters. The 
United States warships called frequently at South African 
ports, and in 1957 the United States and South Africa signed 
a twenty-year agreement for cooperation in energy research, 
including the development of nuclear power. Furthermore, 
the 1954 decision of the United States Supreme Court in the 
Brown vs. Board of Education case, rejecting the concept of 
"separate but equal," was pregnant with implications for 
American policy toward South Africa. Thereafter, American 
rhetoric became increasingly strident, especially after the 
Sharpeville shootings in 1960. Nevertheless, the Kennedy 
and Johnson administrations did nothing to check American 
industrialists and bankers from becoming more and more deeply 
enmeshed in the South African economy as it boomed through¬ 
out the 1960s, and they offset the public rhetoric with 
economic support and friendly private signals to Pretoria. 
In 1961, the United States government helped South Africa to 
overcome the effects of the massive outflow of capital 
following Sharpeville massacre by approving loans through 
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the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund."*- 
On July 20, 1963, Secretary of State Dean Rusk 
actually endorsed the South African government's embryonic 
policy of separate development (Bantustans) in a long dis¬ 
cussion with Willem Naude, the South African Ambassador to 
Washington. After Naude had outlined the policy, Rusk 
suggested that: 
The entire Southern African region might become a 
confederation of six or eight states largely black 
and possibly three states largely white. The 
whites would provide management, investment and 
various kinds of assistance, the blacks would 
provide labor as well as other things. 
The delighted ambassador replied: "The Secretary had pre¬ 
cisely, almost word for word, expressed the intent of the 
3 
South African government." 
Nixon Administration 
In 1969, the incoming Nixon administration made a 
series of reviews of the United States policy in different 
parts of the world. The Southern African policy review ini¬ 
tiated by National Security Study Memorandum 39 (NSSM 39) 
in 1969 ended in a decision to "relax political isolation 
and economic restrictions on the white states" of Southern 
Africa. The NSSM 39 was a change in basic approach, but 
■'"Leonard Thompson and Andrew Prior, South African 
Politics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), p. 224. 
^Ibid., p. 225. 
3Ibid. 
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certainly not in substance from Kennedy-Johnson administra¬ 
tion of outward condemnation of apartheid while inwardly 
supporting it. The stated purpose for this change was to 
increase communication with the white minority governments 
in order to convince them ultimately to alter their internal 
policies toward blacks. The underlying premise of NSSM 39 
Option Two adopted by Nixon administration now appears to 
have been extremely myopic: 
The whites are here to stay and the only way that 
constructive change can come about is through them. 
There is no hope for the blacks to gain the politi¬ 
cal rights they seek through violence, which will 
only lead to chaos and increased opportunities for 
the communists. We can, by selective relaxation of 
our stance toward the regimes, encourage some modi¬ 
fication of their current racial and colonial poli¬ 
cies and through more substantial economic assistance 
to the black states (a total of five million dollars 
annually in technical assistance to the black states) 
help to draw the two groups together and exert some 
influence on both for peaceful change. Our tangible 
interests form a basis for our contacts in the region, 
and these can be maintained at an acceptable politi¬ 
cal cost.^ 
Clearly then, the United States openly tilted toward 
the white minority governments, as in previous years, in a 
manner that meant an acceptance of and accommodation with 
the status quo in the region on the vague notion that peace¬ 
ful change would take place as a result. As Sean Gervasi 
has noted, those who have advocated this theory of peaceful 
change (which in actuality amounts to only a set of slogans) 
4 
The Kissinger Study of Southern Africa: NSSM 39, 
pp. 105-106. This book contains a complete and unabridged 
text of the study by the National Security Council Inter¬ 
departmental Group for Africa that resulted from NSSM 39. 
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"seem to be lost in a wilderness of confusion, vagueness, 
and wishful thinking." What lay behind the advocacy of 
peaceful change was a political campaign, in concert with 
other Western powers, to shore up the white governments of 
Southern Africa by convincing the world at large that evolu¬ 
tionary change was both possible and far preferable to the 
supposed chaos that would stem from success on the part of 
the liberation movements.^ Indeed, the American government 
was seeking to undercut the liberation movements because it 
believed that American interests were best served by white 
minority rule in South Africa. 
Although NSSM 39 was intended to cover the entire 
region of Southern Africa, its attention was concentrated 
primarily on U.S. interests in South Africa, an emphasis 
which suggests that South Africa was the cornerstone of 
U.S.-Southern African policy. The study not only accepted 
Pretoria's central role in shaping the destiny of Southern 
Africa, but apparently also considered it a reliable ally, 
indispensable to Western interests. Whatever its public 
posture to the contrary, the U.S. was determined to use 
South Africa as its "proxy" in Southern Africa, and, perhaps, 
central Africa, thereby making South Africa a subimperialist 
and deputy peace keeper. 
^Sean Gervasi, "The Politics of Accelerated Economic 
Growth," in Change in Contemporary South Africa, eds. 
Leonard Thompson and Jeffrey Butler (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1975), pp. 366-367. 
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The study argued that Western interests were best 
served by a policy of "open communication" with white 
minority regimes carried out at "an acceptable political 
price." In reaching this conclusion and thus rationalizing 
the policy tilt in favor of the white minority regimes, NSSM 
39 cited the following considerations. First, because of its 
growing dependency on black labor, Pretoria would soon be 
forced to develop more acceptable racial policies. Second, 
the U.S. was not forced to take an active role since there 
was not immediate challenge to Pretoria's power. South Africa 
was judged to be militarily and economically strong and 
fully capable of avoiding or moderating any potential violence 
within its borders. In addition, Africans and black Americans 
were too preoccupied with their own internal problems to 
oppose vigorously the policy of 'open communication.'^ 
The Nixon administration apparently accepted these 
arguments and decided to proceed with the new policy, whose 
object was to encourage orderly and evolutionary change in 
South Africa. The administration used the news column of 
Ken Owen, Washington-based representative of South Africa's 
Argus news chain, as one vehicle for relaying this new 
policy stance to Pretoria. Beginning in 1970, his column 
reflected the clear message that the Republican administra¬ 
tion wanted to improve relations with South Africa.7 Other 
^Donald F. McHenry, "Statement on South Africa and 
Namibia," Issue 5 (1975): 61. 
7See The Kissinger Study of Southern Africa, p. 31. 
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ample empirical evidence of the Nixon administration's 
cooperation with South Africa exists. For instance, the 
U.S. stance in the United Nations also became more sympa¬ 
thetic to South Africa. Previously, U.S. votes on racism, 
colonialism, and apartheid at the U.N. had frequently been 
abstentions, showing a mixed feeling toward the apartheid 
system that is, in the words of U.S. officials, "abhorrent 
and antithetical to basic American principle." However, 
under Nixon (see a detailed analysis of U.S. votes in U.N. 
in Chapter III), "the balance of U.S. voting . . . tipped 
g 
to the negative." The voting pattern was not necessarily 
a shift in policy, but rather an increase in U.S. support 
of the apartheid regime. 
Further, when Kissinger became the Secretary of 
State, he chose to overrule Africa Bureau recommendations 
to deny private visits by South African officials. In 
January 1974, Kissinger permitted a U.S. visit by Pretoria's 
Minister of Information, Cornelius Mulder, over the direct 
objection of the Bureau. Mulder met with Vice President 
Gerald Ford and such senior Pentagon official as Vice 
Admiral Ray Peet, who was in charge of International Security 
Affairs and the Indian Ocean. In May, Admiral Hugo Biermann, 
the Chief of the South African Defense Forces, held meetings 
in the Pentagon with Admiral Thomas Moorer, Chairman of the 
8 George M. Houser, United States Policy and Southern 
Africa (New York: The Africa Fund American Committee on 
Africa, 1974), p. 5. 
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U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, and with J.W. Middendorf, Acting 
9 
Secretary of the Navy. But, how did apartheid regime 
respond to this 'open communication' policy thus far? A 
delighted Ken Owen commented in the Johannesburg Star in 4 
January 1974, "The Democratic administration's drift towards 
a policy of isolating South Africa has been checked and, in 
marginal areas where it was politically feasible, re¬ 
versed."^ This is obviously an overstatement in terms of 
the difference between Republican and Democratic parties. 
Nevertheless, Owen's observation was a testimony of Pre¬ 
toria's pleasure toward the Nixon administration's policy 
of 'open communication.' 
Leading department of state officials denied that 
any tilt had taken place in U.S. policy toward the white 
regimes of Southern Africa, even after NSSM 39 had been made 
public.H Such disavowals, however, have a hollow ring, 
especially when contrasted with statements such as the one 
by Goler Butcher that the relevance of NSSM 39 "showed little 
that the watches of U.S. policy were not aware of; namely, 
that since 1969, U.S. policy—whatever the verbal pronounce¬ 
ments on abhorrence of apartheid and support of majority 
9 
Edgar Lockwood, "National Security Memorandum 39 
and the Future of the United States Policy Toward Southern 
Africa," Issue 4 (1974): 63. 
^The Kissinger Study of Southern Africa, p. 31. 
■'■^'Testimony of Nathaniel Davis, Assistant Secretary 
of State for African Affairs, U.S. Policy Toward Southern 
Africa, Hearings before the Subcommittee on African Affairs, 
Senate, 94th Congress, 1st Session, 1975, p. 347. 
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rule may have been—has been supportive of the status 
12 quo." In fact, several critics of U.S.-South African 
policy including Willard Johnson and Congressman Charles C. 
Diggs believed that Nixon's policy was indeed based not only 
on NSSM 39 in general, but also, more specifically, on 
Option Two as outlined in the document. Donald F. McHenry 
commented that "we have seen a coincidence between the 
recommendations contained in that study and United States 
13 
actions." Empirical evidence supports the position of 
these advocates of the anti-apartheid case. A few examples 
will suffice to illustrate this point. 
The U.S. vetoed an Afro-Asian motion in the U.N. 
Security Council that would have extended the general manda¬ 
tory sanctions against Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) to South 
Africa. Nixon's choice of a conservative businessman, John 
Hurd, as ambassador to South Africa, was in complete conso¬ 
nance with the "open communication," and he was callous 
enough to accept an invitation to join a South African cabi¬ 
net minister in hunting small game on Robben Island, with 
. 14 
the black political prisoners serving as beaters. 
12 Testimony of Goler Teal Butcher m U.S. Policy 
Toward Southern Africa, Hearings before the Subcommittee on 
African Affairs, Senate, 94th Congress, 1st Session, 1975, 
p. 265. 
13 
McHenry, "United States Policy Toward Africa," 
pp. 70-71. 
14 Thompson, South African Politics, pp. 225-226. 
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One of the proposals of Option Two of the NSSM 39 
generated study was that the United States should continue 
to enforce its arms embargo against South Africa. However, 
there should be a "liberal treatment of equipment which 
could serve either military or civilian purposes." Subse¬ 
quently, in February 1970, the U.S. government authorized 
the sale of ten Lockheed "Hercules" C-130 transport aircraft 
to a South African charter air firm. Later, Department of 
State reports showed that the firm had contracted out the 
15 
planes to the South African military. The sale of Cessna 
and Piper light planes similarly helped South Africa to up¬ 
grade its military capabilities through the development of 
commando units composed of volunteers who use their own 
planes. Another Option Two suggestion was that the U.S. 
expand Export-Import Bank facilities for South Africa, 
actively encourage exports to South Africa, and facilitate 
American investment in that country. In January 1972, the 
Bank guaranteed a ten-year loan to South Africa amounting 
to $48.6 million dollars for the purchase of diesel locomo¬ 
tives. This action constituted a reversal of a policy 
established in 1964 to limit Ex-Im Bank loans to South 
African military. The visit of South African Admiral Bierman 
to the United States in May 1974 to hold meetings with Joint 
Chiefs of Staff Chairman Admiral Thomas H. Moorer and other 
top military and civilian officials provided highly visible 
■^For a comprehensive review of U.S. military support 
of apartheid, see Chapter III. 
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evidence that the administration was implementing yet 
another Option Two recommendation."^ Even some liberal and 
many black leaders sharply denounced the sale of aircraft 
to South Africa, arguing that the distinction between the 
civilian or military use of aircraft was unrealistic. 
Jennifer Davis, Director of American Office on Africa, 
questioned the judgment of the Nixon policy-makers in 
approving the sale of several hundred aircraft to South 
Africa in view of Pretoria's "contingency legislation to 
enable the Government to commandeer all civil aircraft in 
the event of an emergency, and . . . (its) special facili¬ 
ties for converting civil aircraft to various military uses 
17 aimed at internal repression." 
If there was any question about Nixon's direct deal 
with Pretoria, Table 2.1 shows that he sold $219 million in 
aircraft to South Africa during his first term in the White 
House. This was in contrast to a total of $93 million 
between 1965 and 1968. However, Nixon authorized the sale 
of fewer planes (743) than the number sold by the Johnson 
administration (1,076). 
Testimony of Jennifer Davis, U.S. Policy Toward 
South Africa, Hearings before the Subcommittee on African 
Affairs, Senate, 94th Congress, 1st Session, 1975, pp. 372- 
374; Bruce Oudes, "Southern African Policy Watershed," 
African Report (November-December 1974): 47-48. 
17 Testimony of Jennifer Davis, implementation of the 
U.S. Arms Embargo, Hearings of the Subcommittee on Africa, 
House Committee on African Affairs, 93rd Congress, 1st 
Session, March 20, 22 and April 6, 1973 (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973), pp. 42 and 59. 
92 
TABLE 2.1 
THE NUMBER AND THE VALUE OF AIRCRAFT 
SOLD TO SOUTH AFRICA, 1965-1972 
Year Number Value 
1965 235 $34,548,530 
1966 208 4,519,595 
1967 333 23,438,380 
1968 200 30,398,139 
TOTAL 1,076 $92,904,644 
1969 284 $42,503,604 
1970 180 25,627,562 
1971 135 70,357,608 
1972 144 80,485,712 
TOTAL 743 $218,974,486 
Source: Implementation of the U.S. Arms Embargo. Hearings 
of the Subcommittee on Africa, House Committee on 
African Affairs, 93rd Congress, 1st Session, March 
20, 22 and April 6, 1973. 
The Nixon administration also provided South Africa 
with spare parts, repairs and other services related either 
to existing contracts by the Defense Department or the 
commercial contracts for C-130 transport planes sold to 
South Africa prior to 1963. As Table 2.2 indicates, the 
value of these services totalled $11,005,991 between 1968 
and 1972, compared to $8,284,085 in the previous five years. 
U.S. trade in communication equipment for South Africa also 
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increased substantially between 1968 and 1972. For example, 
the sale of electrical navigational aids doubled and sales 
of communications equipment more than tripled during this 
period. These two categories represented approximately 75 
percent of the South African purchases in communications 
equipment. 
TABLE 2.2 
C-130 AIRCRAFT/SAFF SUPPORT PROGRAM 
I. Licensed export of spare parts, associated ground 











1973 (Through April 4, 1973) 92,387 
Center Wing Repair Program (April 1970-June 1971) 
Program Price, $3,472,000. 
III. T-56 Engine Overhaul Program (engines to be imported 
into U.S. for overhaul and re-exported upon comple¬ 
tion) . 
1. Total of engine repair program: 
a. Forty-six T-56 engines to be imported, 
$552,000 




2. Portion of total program in (1) achieved up to 
April 4, 1973: 
a. Ten T-56 engines imported 1972, $720,000 
b. Twelve T-56 engines imported 1973, $144,000 
c. Ten T-56 engines re-exported 1973, $351,870 
Source: Implementation of the U.S. Arms Embargo. Hearings 
of the Subcommittee on Africa, House Committee on 
African Affairs, 93rd Congress, 1st Session, March 
20, 22 and April 6, 1973. 
Given the green light by the Nixon administration, 
U.S. corporations supplied equipment that could be easily 
applied to military purposes. For example, IBM supplied at 
least four computers to the South African Department of 
Defense, while ITT equipment and expert knowledge have been 
applied to the regime's communications system. General 
Electric, through its South African subsidiary, supplied 
about 95 percent of the diesel locomotives for South African 
18 railways. In addition, the maintenance of space tracking 
stations and close assistance to the South African nuclear 
energy program by the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission are two 
important examples of the close scientific-military ties 
19 
between the two states. 
More importantly, Nixon's policy toward South Africa 
followed the emphasis of NSSM 39, which had placed far 
18 
Houser, United States Policy and Southern Africa, 
p. 5. 
19 The Kissinger Study of Southern Africa, p. 39. 
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greater weight on American economic interest, the corner¬ 
stone of U.S. foreign policy, than on the merits of political 
issues in South Africa. Like his predecessors, he continued 
to oppose any coercive measures against South Africa and 
refused to comply with U.N. resolutions calling for sanctions. 
During the Nixon years, U.S. investment in South Africa ex¬ 
panded substantially. Although its official policy was to 
"neither encourage nor discourage investment," the adminis¬ 
tration made available certain facilities of the Export-Import 
Bank and gave government-supported loans for investment in 
South Africa. The Commerce Department supplied information 
and other services to U.S. firms considering investment in 
South Africa. Notwithstanding, in a reversal of policy 
dating back of 1964, the Nixon administration in 1972 
authorized the Export-Import Bank to guarantee a ten-year 
loan of $48.6 million to South Africa for the purchase of 
diesel locomotives.^ 
In subverting the political and social interests of 
the national liberation movements to what were perceived as 
tangible economic and strategic interests, the administra¬ 
tion could put aside human rights for business and invest¬ 
ment privacy. Using the state as their instrument of coer¬ 
cion, the U.S.-based multinational corporations lobbied with 
the Nixon administration to encourage U.S. trade with South 
Africa. This has been observed. 
20 Ibid., p. 32. 
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Undoubtedly, the Nixon administration was under a 
great deal of pressure to encourage U.S. exports 
and to facilitate American investment in South 
Africa. U.S. corporations with investments there 
held strong views on the matter and vigorously 
opposed any governmental action to cut down on 
their investment. In all, more than 350 American 
firms were engaged in business in South Africa. 
They formed a strong lobby that was active in 
persuading policy-makers against any kind of 
economic disengagement. U.S. arms manufacturers 
lobbied to lift the arms embargo, for instance, 
because they were losing some of their South 
African market to France, which had continued 
the sale of arms to Pretoria.21 
Ford Administration 
The abrupt departure of President Nixon from the 
White House in the aftermath of the Watergate scandal did 
not result in any change in U.S. policy strategy toward 
Southern Africa, largely because Kissinger continued to 
dominate policy decision-making in the new Ford administra¬ 
tion. However, the Portuguese coup of April 1974 reduced 
the tenets of NSSM 39 Option Two which had served as the 
basis for policy in Southern Africa under the Nixon adminis¬ 
tration. It could no longer be argued that the whites were 
in Southern Africa to stay and that blacks could not gain 
political rights through liberation movements. Yet, the 
U.S. was reluctant to admit that the coup had triggered a 
series of events which undercut the premise of Option Two. 
This failure to come to grips with the reality of Southern 
Africa led the Ford administration into its disastrous 
Angola venture. 
21 Ibid., p. 33. 
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President Ford continued the Nixon policy of 'open 
communication' with white regimes in Southern Africa. 
William Bowdler, his appointee as U.S. Ambassador to South 
Africa, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in March 
1975, that they anticipated no major changes in U.S. policy 
toward Pretoria because "our policy of communication and 
22 
dialogue is of great importance to us." Like Nixon, 
President Ford also continued to permit visits by top South 
African officials to Washington. In June 1975, South Africa's 
Minister of Information, Mulder, met with Assistant Secretary 
Nathaniel Davis and with several Congressmen sympathetic 
toward South Africa. En route home, Mulder made an unexplained 
stopover in Honolulu at the headquarters of CINPAC, the U.S. 
Navy's Pacific Command which is responsible for Indian Ocean 
Security. Conversely, U.S. officials were also permitted to 
take South African sponsored trips to meet with top leaders 
there. For example, in March 1975, a delegation that in¬ 
cluded two members of the House Armed Services Committee met 
23 
with Mulder and various South African military commanders. 
A by-product of these visits had been a growing effort by 
various Congressmen to strengthen U.S.-South African rela¬ 
tions, especially in terms of the arms embargo. In May 1975, 
Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger proposed at a confer¬ 
ence of NATO defense ministers that NATO should make 
22Ibid., p. 53. 
2 3 
Maxine Isaacs Burns, "Visitors to Pretoria," Africa 
Report 20 (1975): 49-50. 
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arrangements to use the Simonstown base and establish a 
monitoring installation in South Africa for intelligence 
24 purposes. 
The political tie between Washington and Pretoria 
had its impact on U.S. voting behavior in the United Nations. 
On October 30, 1974, the U.S. and its European junior part¬ 
ners, Britain and France, in an unprecedented triple veto, 
rejected a Security Council resolution calling for the ex¬ 
pulsion of South Africa from the world body. This was 
followed a month later by another negative vote by the U.S. 
in the Special Committee on a resolution requesting the 
Security Council to meet on the race question in South 
Africa and to take mandatory action to halt all arms supplies 
to Pretoria. The U.S. was the only member casting a nega- 
25 
tive vote on the resolution. This voting pattern con¬ 
tinued throughout the Ford years. On June 6, 1975, the U.S. 
once again joined Britain and France in another triple veto 
on a Security Council resolution that would have imposed a 
mandatory arms embargo on South Africa in order to help 
bring about the independence of Namibia. In defending this 
position, Ambassador John A. Scali stated: 
24 The Kissinger Study of Southern Africa, p. 53. 
25 
Washington Post, 29 November 1974. For a detailed 
analysis of U.S. voting record in the U.N. on racism and 
apartheid, see Chapter III, "U.S. Political Support of 
South Africa." 
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We believe that mandatory sanctions ... should be 
reserved for the most acute and critical threats 
to ... peace. Although we fundamentally disagree 
with certain actions by South Africa, we do not 
consider that the situation has reached such a 
critical state.26 
In a shuttle diplomacy, Kissinger in Lusaka, Zambia 
on Spril 27, 1976, called for 'a peaceful end to institu¬ 
tionalized inequality in South Africa.' But, while he met 
with Prime Minister Vorster, he refused to meet the national 
ist leaders in South Africa who are seeking political rights 
"through violence." It was plain that Kissinger, under 
President Ford's instructions, hoped to recoup the fortunes 
of the administration in an election year. More importantly 
Kissinger's thinking was shaped by the desire to protect 
Western interests in the region which had suffered because 
of the demise of Portugal's presence, the establishment of 
anti-imperialist regimes in Mozambique and Angola and the 
deepening threat to the minority regimes in Rhodesia and 
South Africa. As Kissinger remarked: 
Our policy toward South Africa is based upon the 
premise that within a reasonable time we shall 
see a clear evolution toward equality of oppor¬ 
tunity and basic human rights for all South 
Africans. The United States will exercise all 
its efforts in that direction.2' 
2 fi 
U.S. Policy Toward Southern Africa, Hearings ..., 
June-July 1975, p. 343. 
27 U.S, Policy Toward Southern Africa, Hearings 
before the Subcommittee on African Affairs and the Sub¬ 
committee on Arms Control, International Organizations and 
Security Agreements and the Committee on Foreign Relations, 
U.S. Senate, 94th Congress, 2nd Session, 1976, p. 219. 
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Nothing could have been more unrealistic than to imagine that 
the strongly armed South African regime would be encouraged 
or persuaded to peacefully eliminate apartheid within a 
reasonable time. There was no evidence to establish such a 
prognosis. It is, therefore, impossible to escape the con¬ 
clusion that Kissinger was indulging in electoral rhetoric 
if indeed he was not demonstrating his absolute lack of 
knowledge of the subject. 
Following the failure of Kissinger-initiated inter¬ 
vention in the Angola Civil War in which agents of U.S. 
imperialism—the invisible government executives: the CIA 
men—helped by Zairean and South African troops to back the 
side he hoped would win, Kissinger exercised what Engels 
once described as "the highest form of freedom—recognition 
2 8 of necessity." For him, the necessity was to revise his 
tactics in Africa without altering his overall objectives. 
In a confidential memorandum dated October 31, 1976 which 
leaked out to the public, it stated: 
South Africa is now consolidating its position in 
Namibia. The major Western powers support its 
efforts to maintain control of the territory, for 
they believe that Namibia has assumed great impor¬ 
tance in the Southern African strategic balance. 
The occupation of Namibia enables South Africa to 
extend its defense perimeter far to the north.^ 
28 Quoted in Crisis in Africa: Battleground of East 
and West, ed. Arthur Gavshon (Boulder, Colorado: Westview 
Press, 1981), p. 157. 
29 Cited in Rukudzo Murapa, "The Political Economy of 
the U.S. Policy in Southern Africa," The Review of Black 
Political Economy 7 (Spring 1977): 262. 
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The memorandum argued that there was need to transfer power 
to the majority as long as there were assurances that those 
who assume power are "moderates." Further, the memorandum 
denounced "petty" apartheid in South Africa without tam¬ 
pering with the essentials of the system.^ In essence, the 
fundamental aim of the Kissinger plan in Southern Africa re¬ 
mained basically unchanged from that prescribed in the NSSM 
39. In U.S. perspective, South Africa remains not only an 
important bastion of capitalism, hence a dependable ideolo¬ 
gical ally, but also an important agent-nation whose respon¬ 
sibility is to police the whole of Southern Africa. 
Carter Administration 
The Carter administration came to office committed 
to offering a new orientation toward Southern Africa. Carter 
promised there would be an effort to build strong contacts 
with national liberation movements, particularly black 
leaders in South Africa. The black liberation movement in 
South Africa was equated with the civil rights movement of 
the 1960s in the U.S. South Africa was to be dealt with 
not as a part of the global rivalry with the Soviets, but 
instead in terms of its own reality. But, as we will see, 
the pursuit of American idealism wrapped in human rights 
doctrine by President Carter cannot be seen as an abstract 
philosophical preference but as an ideological weapon in a 




protect its material benefits. 
Carter's approach toward South Africa was based on 
"regionalist" or "Africanist" policy which favored an Africa- 
centered policy, and not a corollary of the kind of anti- 
Soviet strategy that produced the Angola fiasco. Like the 
hardline "globalists," who viewed the turmoil in South Africa 
as East-West confrontation, the regionalists gave high prior¬ 
ity to checking communism, but sought to reconcile U.S. 
economic and military interests in the white minority regime 
with international reputation on the race question camou¬ 
flaged in human rights. The regionalists—Andrew Young, 
Donald McHenry, Anthony Lake, Goler Butcher, and Ruth Schacter 
Morgenthau—gained ascendancy in the policy apparatus only 
once: during the first year of the Carter administration. 
By the beginning of Carter's second year in office, global¬ 
ists in Congress and the executive branch stepped up their 
attacks on an African policy that downplayed East-West 
rivalry. Consequently, by mid-1978, National Security Advis¬ 
or Zbigniew Brzezinski and other globalists gained the 
initiative on South Africa, and the administration's policy 
31 
returned to the traditional cold war paradigm. 
The most brilliant political choice of Jimmy Carter's 
career was his selection of Andrew Young as his Ambassador 
to the United Nations. A man of charismatic charm, aptitude, 
articulate and eloquent, Young was no mere preacher. He 
31Danaher, In Whose Interest?, pp. 80-81. 
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was a living advertisement that non-violent political 
struggle can advance blacks in America into the political 
elite. His main role was a pastoral ministry to under¬ 
developed countries in order to create trust in American 
sincerity. Carter put it this way: 
Third World nations now look on the United States 
as having at least one representative ... who 
understands their problems, who speaks their 
language ... I think we have a sense in the mind 
of those kinds of people of caring about them 
and to a major extent it is because of their 
trust in Andrew Young.3^ 
The way in which Young went about the creation of 
that trust was to use his own situation as proof that 
America's recent experiences have equipped it to lead a 
struggle for revolutionary ends. At the United Nations 
Conference on Zimbabwe and Namibia held in Maputo in mid- 
May 1977, he took the offensive. 
The United States had a policy which represented 
something of a revolution in the consciousness of 
the American people. We have known those struggles 
against racism, colonialism, and imperialism our¬ 
selves and somehow we have been able to come 
through them. 3 
In Young's view, the use of boycotts to fight racism 
ultimately succeeded because they affected and drew in the 
multinational corporations. Speaking in Johannesburg, he 
encouraged South African businessmen to believe in their 
32 
Quoted in Edgar Lockwood, "The Future of the 
Carter Policy Toward South Africa," in American Policy in 
Southern Africa: The Stakes and Stance, ed., Rene Lemarchand 





own power to overturn apartheid. Perhaps Young's apostle- 
ship for capitalism was based on a belief that it is so fun¬ 
damental, so irreversible, so pervasive and so powerful that 
it amounts to a law of nature, whose inevitability is also 
conveniently beneficial. He invoked: 
. . . when in Atlanta, Georgia, five banks 
decided that it was bad business to have racial 
turmoil, racial turmoil ceased. 
. . . the places where I see the naked being 
clothed, the places where I see the sick being 
healed are the places where there happens to be 
a free market system. When blacks became a part 
of the free enterprise system in the South . . . 
blacks had very much a stake in it. The tragic 
irony is that nothing was taken from the whites, 
but the income gap between whites and blacks 
actually expanded. But, blacks were so much 
better off than they ever thought that they 
would be. 
But, when we examine the domestic record of the United States 
we find, contrary to Young's advocacy of boycotts, black 
consumerism and non-violence, an insufficient nostrum for 
the ills of racism and capitalism. Covert and even overt 
racism against blacks is still pervasive in the United States 
In fact, the domestic priorities of Carter's administration 
did not reflect the demands of even those blacks who voted 
for him. Indifferent, insensitive, and unwilling to confront 
the depth and reality of South African situation, Young's 
apostleship for capitalism was the most sophisticated brand 
of imperialist thinking. A white South African professional, 
Ibid., pp. 4 39 and 445; 
Interest?, p. 124. 
see also Danaher, In Whose 
105 
who had heard Ambassador Young's address in South Africa, 
lamented, "I could not believe it. He was talking about 
things that were talked about in the twenties or in the time 
35 of Jabavu. Good will. Things like that." 
Both Carter and Young perceived the problems of 
South Africa as analagous to the struggle for black civil 
rights in the American south. Carter's publicized views are 
somewhat limited, but an interview with the Financial Mail 
of Johannesburg (at the end of 1976) succinctly captures 
this perspective: 
I think our businessmen can be a constructive force 
achieving racial justice within South Africa. I 
think the weight of our investments there, the 
value the South Africans place on access to American 
capital and technology can be used as a positive 
force in settling regional problems.^6 
Carter expected that increased corporate penetration would 
expand opportunities for blacks, raise their material stan¬ 
dard of living and reduce the structure of apartheid. Con¬ 
sequently, he supported further investment and continued 
loans to South Africa which can be explained, in part, by 
the philosophy of the Trilateral Commission. This multi¬ 
national institution was initiated by David Rockefeller. 
Among its members were President Carter, himself, along with 
35 Lockwood, "The Future of the Carter Policy Toward 
South Africa," p. 448. 
36Quoted in Barry Cohen, "U.S. Imperialism and 
Southern Africa," Review of African Political Economy 9 
(May-August 1978): 82. 
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Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and the U.S. Ambassador to 
the United Nations, Andrew Young, plus twenty other members 
of the administration. A top Carter advisor, Zbigniew 
Brzezinski, was Chief Executive. The Commission reports 
argued: 
On the one hand, that the U.S., Western Europe and 
Japan increasingly need the developing countries 
as sources of raw materials, as export markets, 
and most important of all, as constructive part¬ 
ners in the creation of a workable world order. 
On the other hand, the Commission held that ad¬ 
vanced capitalist countries suffered from an 
excess of democracy.37 
The idea that the advanced capitalist countries suffer from 
an excess of democracy appears to suggest that the South 
African regime's coercion of the black population into one 
of the world's cheapest labor forces, and its constant cam¬ 
paign to retain the status quo throughout Southern Africa, 
may outweigh all violations of the rights of the black ma¬ 
jority. Faithful to his trilateralist assumptions, Carter 
insisted on business as usual with apartheid regime. 
In a Vienna meeting with South African Prime Minister 
John Vorster, Vice President Walter Mondale warned that unless 
Vorster initiated a "progressive transformation" of South 
Africa's apartheid policies to allow full political and social 
equality for the black majority, the Carter government would 
be compelled to begin diplomatic steps against Pretoria. 
Without specifying what the steps would be, Mondale indicated 
37 Quoted in Ann Seidman and Neva Seidman, South African 
and U.S. Multinational Corporations, p. xviii. 
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that a new American policy toward South Africa was definitely 
in progress. He said: 
I do not know what conclusions the South African 
government will draw. It is my hope that (the 
talks) will lead to a change of course. But I 
cannot rule out the possibility that the South 
African government will not change, that our 
paths will diverge and our policies come into 
conflict.38 
But five months later, leaders in the Carter administration 
completely turned away from rhetoric. In an October 1977 
interview with the Rand Daily Mail, a major South African 
newspaper, Mondale now stated that "we want a good relation¬ 
ship with South Africa," explaining that the United States 
had never proposed a plan for change in the apartheid country 
39 because Washington did not have one. A closer look at 
Mondale's arguments shows that, as in the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger 
era, no fundamental change was envisioned in the U.S. policy 
toward South Africa. 
In his visit to the U.S. in 1977, a black leader, 
Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, met with Carter and Young and they 
agreed on two basic positions: "peaceful change" and con- 
40 tmued U.S. investment in South Africa. While Chief 
Buthelezi may not be a stooge of apartheid regime, his 
position of leadership is clearly a direct result of the 
38 Henry F. Jackson, From the Congo to Soweto: U.S. 
Foreign Policy Toward Africa Since 1960 (New York: William 
Morrow and Company, Inc., 1982), p. 277. 
39Ibid., p. 278. 
40 Danaher, In Whose Interest?, p. 123. 
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apartheid bantustan policy. By asserting that the majority 
rule should be achieved by a process of "peaceful change" 
within the existing South African economic structure, it is 
implicit that Carter and his aides were suggesting that 
effective economic and political power remain in the hands 
of the white settler minority and their external economic 
allies. Both Carter and Young opposed pressuring South 
Africa with economic sanctions and efforts to have American 
corporations withdraw their investments, arguing instead 
that American investment could play an important role in pro 
moting change. As President Carter told a group of editors 
and news directors gathered at the White House: 
We are maintaining communications with the South 
African leadership . . . because to a major degree 
the South African government is a stabilizing in¬ 
fluence in the southern part of that continent 
and they have a major role to play in the peaceful 
resolution of Rhodesia (now independent Zimbabwe) 
and Namibia, and also to see that the United States 
and Western Europe retains access to the mineral 
wealth of Southern Africa. 1 
Contrary to the policy rhetoric of Carter administra 
tion, empirical evidence exists to substantiate its support 
of apartheid. 
1. On December 14, 1977, State Department announced 
the approval for the sale of six Cessna planes 
worth $500,000 to South Africa. Cessna Company 
then planned to sell additional forty-four planes 
worth three million dollars to South Africa. 
41 
Mohamed El-Khawa, "Partners in Apartheid: U.S. 
Economic and Military Linkages with South Africa," Journal 
of Southern African Affairs 11 (July 1977): 338-339. 
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2. On December 16, 1977, UN General Assembly voted 
113 to zero, with ten abstentions, to impose an 
oil embargo on South Africa. U.S. and its NATO 
allies were among those that abstained. 
3. On January 29, 1978, Carter rejects recommenda¬ 
tion for higher tariffs on the import of chrome 
alloys from South Africa. 
4. On May 18, 1980, Sunday Post (Johannesburg) 
reported that South Africa in the previous year 
became the leading exporter of coal (ahead of 
Poland and Australia) to the U.S. South Africa 
data cited 1,130,900 tons sold to U.S. companies. 
5. On September 26, 1980, SASOL announced a contract 
to act as consultant and co-licenser for syn¬ 
thetic fuel project in North Dakota. SASOL's 
annual report states that "of the first $100 
million allocated by U.S. Department of Energy 
for design work on synfuel projects, sixty 
million dollars will go to projects with which 
SASOL was involved either as consultant or poten¬ 
tial licenser.42 
All of this happened under the guise of 'human rights' ide¬ 
ology. Carter's foreign policy toward South Africa was 
consistent with traditional imperialist goal of economic 
advantages. When once asked whether there might be a future 
Marxist government in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), Carter's disciple, 
Young replied: "I don't know what a Marxist government means 
anymore. If Angola is a Marxist government and its main 
trading partner is the United States, then that doesn't worry 
42 
Danaher, In Whose Interest?, pp. 129-148. 




The election of President Ronald Reagan increased 
the anti-communist content of U.S. policy toward South Africa 
to its highest level. The African policy paper by Reagan's 
transition team at the State Department accused the Carter 
administration of suffering from a "severe case of regional¬ 
ism," i.e., viewing Africa in terms of its particularity 
rather than focusing on the rivalry with the Soviet Union. 
44 With scanty knowledge about African affairs, Reagan made 
his belief known. 
The African problem is a Russian weapon aimed at 
the U.S. The Soviet Union underlies all the unrest 
that is going on. If they weren't engaged in this 
game of dominoes there wouldn't be any hotspots in 
the world. ^ 
Anti-communism was a major theme in seminal policy documents 
of the Reagan administration. In one of the documents that 
leaked to the press, a meeting between Chester Corcker, 
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs and top 
South African officials stressed that the top U.S. priority 
is to stop Soviet encroachment in Africa. Another confiden¬ 
tial memo depicts the shared perception of South African 
leaders and the Reagan administration that the chief threat 
42 In a 1980 off-the-record interview, one of Reagan's 
top African advisors revealed: "The problem with Reagan is 
that all he knows about Southern Africa is he's on the side 
of the whites," quoted in Danaher, In Whose Interest?, p. 81. 
45 Quoted in Robert Lawrence, "Reagan's Africa Arsenal," 
Southern Africa (November/December 1980): 19. 
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to the realization of stability and cooperation in the region 
is the presence and influence in the region of the Soviet 
46 Union and its allies. Indeed, Reagan's planners were 
worried about Pretoria's regional aggression, not because of 
the human suffering it causes, but because it may backfire 
and boost the "communists." Reagan argued: 
We cannot afford to give them (the South African 
government) a blank check regionally ... South 
African government intransigence and violent 
adventures will expand Soviet opportunities and 
reduce Western leverage in Africa. ' 
This premise suggests that the apartheid regime should, 
therefore, be assisted militarily against the 'Godless commu¬ 
nism." For South Africa to maintain a posture of U.S. deputy 
peace keeper in the region, it had to be accorded military 
leverage. It also suggests, to some degree, the United States 
exasperation with the apartheid regime, and its fear that 
South Africa's internal and external aggression could 
v • \ 
strengthen the mass support for the Communists in the region. 
The Reagan team relied on the Soviet threat rhetoric more 
than any previous administrations to justify its military, 
economic, and political support of apartheid South Africa. 
If the Carter administration was implicit about U.S. 
economic and strategic interests in South Africa, the Reagan 
administration was explicit. The Reagan administration for¬ 
mulated its evolving policy toward South Africa exclusively 
4 6 Danaher, In Whose Interest?, p. 81. 
47 Ibid., pp. 81-82. 
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within the context of American economic and strategic stakes. 
The fundamental economic stake, of course, consists of the 
U.S. companies in South Africa, which in 1980, made the U.S. 
the top trading partner of South Africa for the third year 
in a row. The U.S. led in both exports and imports: this 
two-way trade was worth about $4.2 billion compared to $3.4 
48 billion in 1979, or an increase of 24 percent. 
A few weeks after taking office, Reagan set the tone 
of his administration's policies on South Africa in a tele¬ 
vision interview with Walter Cronkite on March 3, 1981. He 
said : 
There's been a failure in this country to recognize 
how many people, black and white, in South Africa 
are trying to remove apartheid and the steps that 
they've taken and the gains that they've made. As 
long as there's a sincere and honest effort being 
made, based on our own experience in our own land, 
it would seem to me that we should be trying to be 
helpful .... Can we abandon a country that has 
stood beside us in every war we've ever fought, a 
country that strategically is essential to the free 
world in its production of minerals we all must 
have and so forth? 
I just feel that myself, that here, if we're going 
to sit down at a table and negotiate with the 
Russians, surely we can keep the door open and 
continue to negotiate with a friendly nation like 
South Africa. 9 
Even the then Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, sounded 
much like Reagan. Toasting champagne with South African 
Foreign Minister Roelof Botha on May 14, 1981, he remarked: 
4 8 Jackson, From the Congo to Soweto, pp. 279-280. 
4 9 American Foreign Policy Current Documents, 1981 
(Washington: Department of State, 1984), p. 1090. 
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"Let this be the new beginning of mutual trust and confidence 
between the United States and South Africa—old friends—... 
who are getting together again. Indeed, one of the offi¬ 
cial documents of the Reagan administration underscores the 
willingness to work toward ending South Africa's "polecat 
status in the world and to restore its place as a legitimate 
and important regional actor with whom we can cooperate 
pragmatically. 
What really is the Reagan foreign policy toward 
South Africa? Reagan's policy is called "constructive 
engagement and it is perhaps best known for its advocacy of 
communication or dialogue with the South African government 
52 in order to promote racial reforms." If Kissinger was the 
architect of Nixon and Ford administrations' policy of 'open 
communication' with apartheid regime, 'constructive engage¬ 
ment' was the brainchild of one man, Chester Crocker, the 
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. The aim 
of the policy, Crocker argues, was to expand the United 
States role in Southern Africa to protect its legitimate 
"^Richard Leonard, South Africa at War: White Power 
and the Crisis in Southern Africa (Westport, Conn.: Lawrence 
Hill and Company, 1983), p. 224. 
51 
John S. Saul and Stephen Gelb, "The Crisis in South 
Africa," Monthly Review (July-August 1981): 146-147. 
52 Raymond W. Copson, Southern Africa: U.S. Regional 
Policy at a Crossroad? Congressional Research Service: The 
Library of Congress, October 24, 1985, p. 3. 
114 
strategie, political, and economic interests and thereby 
53 diminish Soviet power in the region. He exclaims: 
We seek to hasten peaceful evolution in South Africa 
away from apartheid and to reduce the violence and 
instability that threaten lives and livelihoods 
throughout the region.... A white government that 
does not feel besieged from outside its borders 
will be better able to take steps to reform its 
own society. Instability in the region offers our 
adversaries opportunities to threaten Western in¬ 
terests. The intrusion of Soviet power into an 
area outside its traditional sphere must be of 
concern to all who have responsibility for public 
policy in this country.54 
Under the guise of 'constructive engagement' the 
administration eased Export-Import Bank loan guarantee re¬ 
strictions for U.S. corporations operating in South Africa, 
facilitated a $1.1 billion loan for South Africa, relaxed 
trade restrictions on U.S. export sales to the South African 
military and police^ and failed to apply pressure on South 
Africa to stop its aggressive attacks on neighboring states. 
Contrary to the views of liberals, conservatives, and other 
perplexed analysts, there is an underlying logic to these and 
other contradictory policy initiatives carried out under the 
rubric of constructive engagement. Constructive engagement's 
logic stems from three premises: cold war internationalism, 
53 John de St. Jorre, "Constructive Engagement: An 
Assessment," Africa Report (September-October 1983): 48. 
54 Chester A. Crocker, "South Africa: The Hard Ques¬ 
tions," America (August 3-10, 1983): 49. 
■^Deborah Toler, "Constructive Engagement: Reaction¬ 
ary Pragmatism at Its Best," Issue (A Quarterly of Africanist 
Opinion) XII (Fall/Winter 1982): 11. 
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realpolitik, and expansionist capitalism. Cold war inter¬ 
nationalism calls for the United States to define U.S. in¬ 
terests in global terms and to use its power to contain the 
global expansion of Soviet influence. Realpolitik calls 
for U.S. military vigilance, the selection of allies or 
partners in foreign policy confrontations only on the basis 
of their power, defined largely in military and coercive 
capability terms. Expansionist capitalism calls upon the 
U.S. to use its power to guarantee access to raw materials 
for its industrial and military plants, access to export 
markets for the products, and particularly to promote favor¬ 
able climates for U.S. private investments in foreign 
lands.^ In order to understand the three dimensions, it is 
necessary to put them together to form a coherent whole. 
During President Reagan's first term, the right-wing 
faction of the administration, led by National Security Advi¬ 
sor, William P. Clark, and U.N. Ambassador Jean J. Kirkpatrick 
did adopt a messianic or what Hans Morgenthau calls a "demon¬ 
ological" approach towards communism and the Soviet Union. 
But, the architects of constructive engagement led by Crocker 
57 
came from realpolitik school. Hence, we are drawing heavily 
upon the scholarship of Crocker, who, during the period under 
study, played a dominant role in U.S. policy toward South 
56Ibid., pp. 11-12. 
■^Ibid. f p. 12. 
Africa. 
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Apart from political rhetoric wrapped under construc¬ 
tive engagement, the Reagan administration did carry out the 
following activities: 
1. On June 30, 1981, the Reagan administration 
issued new guidelines which allow the sale of 
medical equipment and supplies to the South 
African military on a case by case basis, even 
if they are intended for military use. The new 
regulations also permit sale of metal detectors 
used in combating sabotage. 
2. On July 14, U.S. State Department announced it 
will issue visas to South African rugby team, 
the Springboks, to tour the U.S. The thirty- 
member team includes several members of the 
South African armed forces, which raised ques¬ 
tions about possible violation of U.N. arms 
embargo. 
3. In August, two South Africa military officers 
began training at U.S. Coast Guard Station on 
Governor's Island, N.Y. and a group of South 
Africa nuclear experts visited Goodyear's 
Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant in Piketon, 
Ohio, where uranium isotopes are purified. 
4. In October, U.S. Commerce Department grants 
license to export Sperry Univac 1100 series 
computer to Atlas Aircraft Corporation, a 
subsidiary of South African Armaments Deve¬ 
lopment and Manufacturing Corporation (ARMSCOR) 
in which South Africa government owns control¬ 
ling interest. 
5. On March 26, 1982, U.S. Commerce Department 
issued license for Control Data Corp. to export 
a Cyber 170/750 Computer to South Africa 
government-run Council for Scientific and 
Industrial Research (CSIR) which has nuclear 
and cryptographic applications. 
On November 8, The Star (South Africa) reported 
that, according to U.S. Department of Commerce 
data, U.S. investment in South Africa has in¬ 
creased by 13.3 percent since the start of 
Reagan's "constructive engagement" policy. 
6. 
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7. On October 2, 1983, South Africa press reported 
Reagan administration has opened a special 
trade promotion office in Johannesburg with the 
goal of increasing U.S.-South Africa trade by 
one billion dollars per year. 
8. On January 6, 1984, a report published by the 
American Friends Service Committee revealed 
that the Reagan administration has allowed 
more commercial military sales to South Africa 
($28 million) than in previous thirty years 
combined. 
A major common error in analysis of constructive 
engagement is the tendency to concentrate on its short term 
objectives without understanding that the policy seeks to 
accomplish its short term objectives in a manner which pro¬ 
motes very specific long term U.S. objectives in South Africa. 
The U.S. activities enumerated above coalesce in construc¬ 
tive engagement's short term objectives of promoting evolu¬ 
tionary changes in South Africa and increasing U.S. influ¬ 
ence over South Africa in order to insure its long term 
objectives for the firm establishment of a pro-Western, pro- 
capitalist South Africa as a full and open member of the 
Western military community and as the region's dominant 
economic and military power. Indeed the proponents of con¬ 
structive engagement firmly believe, in the realpolitik tra¬ 
dition, that the staying power of the white minority regime 
is guaranteed by its overwhelming military capability, and 
that time is therefore on the side of evolutionary rather 
58 For a comprehensive detail of these and other 
activities, see Danaher, In Whose Interest?, pp. 150-190; 
see also Henry F. Jackson^ "South Africa: Reagan's Policy 
Rupture," Africa Report (September/October 1981). 
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than revolutionary change. Reaching conclusions analogous 
to Henry Kissinger's logic in the selection of the infamous 
"Tar Baby" - NSSM 39 Option Two, Crocker reasoned that: 
1. The South Africa state ... is structured politi¬ 
cally and organized militarily to withstand 
significant levels of unrest by international 
(and especially Western) standards.... In raw, 
physical terms, the white minority possesses 
overwhelming firepower to sustain an adminis¬ 
trative apparatus designed, if necessary, to 
break black organization and seal off the black 
majority from the essentials of life. At the 
present juncture, it seems likely this capacity 
could be used successfully before violence 
became uncontrolled or triggered direct inter¬ 
national intervention; and 
2. The black communities of South Africa do not 
possess the means for a direct assault on white 
power, and there is little likelihood that this 
will change soon. The attitudinal ingredients 
of a potential revolution may be present, but 
the physical ones are not. Threatening groups 
or elites can be ruthlessly contained and con¬ 
trolled.... Spontaneous violence is likely to 
be highly self-destructive.... This is not to 
say that South Africa is invulnerable. It is 
simply to note that the balance of coercive 
power remains overhelmingly in favor of the 
whites and the outcome of violent challenges 
remains entirely predictable.^9 
Clearly, by supporting South Africa militarily, 
economically and politically, Reagan's constructive engage¬ 
ment was designed to thwart a potential South African revo¬ 
lution by expanding the role of the U.S. to allow time for 
moderate (i.e., non-Marxist) blacks to seize initiative for 
power sharing in order to protect Western interests. 
C Q 
Toler, "Constructive Engagement," pp. 13-14; see 
also Chester A. Crocker, "South Africa: Strategy for 
Change," Foreign Affairs 59 (Winter 1980-81): 327. 
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Summary 
The American foreign policy has failed conspicuously 
to alter the South African position on apartheid not out of 
policy miscalculation, but because it has been designed to 
enhance America's geo-economic (i.e., economic and strategic) 
interests. If anything, the U.S. policy toward South Africa 
has reinforced the conviction of the apartheid regime that 
its racial policies and continued denial of the vote of 80 
percent of the population are not only viable but necessary. 
The vital economic and strategic interests embodied 
in Option Two of NSSM 39 that was the basis of Nixon and 
Ford administrations is an irrefutable proof of the subordi¬ 
nation of U.S. policy to the interests of American capitalism. 
The Option Two basic rationale, as discussed, provided the 
essential justification for the U.S. support of apartheid 
South African regime. The American commitments to 'peaceful 
change' in South Africa are primarily aimed at preservation 
of the status quo and the prevention of revolution. The 
United States' goal is to keep South Africa indefinitely 
within the orbit of South African national as well as inter¬ 
national class interest. 
As we have seen, neither the Carter administration's 
policy toward South Africa camouflaged in 'human rights' nor 
the Reagan administration's policy of 'constructive engage¬ 
ment' was designed to bring about the desired change of a 
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black majority government in South Africa; rather, the poli- 
6 0 cies were invented to do just the opposite. The apostle- 
ship of Carter and Young for capitalism in South Africa as 
a panacea for racial oppression and exploitation was the 
most sophisticated brand of imperialist pragmatism. Even 
though the United States policy toward South Africa under 
the administrations of Nixon, Ford, Carter and Reagan has 
shown some tactical changes, there has been a continuity in 
its fundamental principle of U.S. business engagement with 
the apartheid regime. 
6 0 
The policies of Carter and Reagan remind us that 
'the cunning of a fox is as dangerous as the threatening of 
a lion,' both of which ought to be equally and carefully 
watched. 
CHAPTER III 
U.S. ECONOMIC, MILITARY AND POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT 
IN SOUTH AFRICA 
The arguments of opponents of sanctions against 
South Africa that investments are neutral, that they help 
provide jobs for blacks, that if these investments were 
withdrawn the plight of blacks would be worse, and that 
investments promote growth and help to erode apartheid may 
sound plausible for people who are not well-informed about 
the nature of imperialism. As W.E.B. DuBois observed more 
than a quarter of a century ago: 
. . . the greatest and most immediate danger of 
white culture perhaps least sensed is its fear 
of truth, its childish belief in the efficacy of 
lies as a method of human uplift.^ 
In New York Daily Tribune, 3 August 1853, Karl Marx was 
unmistakably quoted: 
The profound hypocrisy and inherent barbarism of 
bourgeois civilization lies unveiled before our 
eyes, turning from its home, where it assumes 
respectable forms, to the colonies where it goes 
naked.2 
The shuttle diplomacy in Southern Africa by Kissinger 
must not be viewed in isolation. It is part of a well- 
^Cited in Bernard Magubane, "Economic Relations 
Between South Africa and the United States," Issue: A 




orchestrated global strategy aimed at safe-guarding American 
and its junior capitalist partners' interests in the region, 
particularly in South Africa. Hence, we must view with 
reservation the United States exhibition of an enthusiastic 
and active desire to see the oppressed and exploited people 
3 
fighting for national liberation, not just self-independence 
(a flag-waving), free. It is not, however, too difficult, 
on the basis of the internal logic of capitalism, to ascer¬ 
tain the reasons why the United States deems it necessary 
to be overtly involved in South Africa's panorama. Our 
objective here is not to argue against a wishful thinking 
of American voluntary disengagement on the basis of moral 
and human rights principles or to argue for its continued 
engagement in a vague notion that blacks' conditions will 
improve; rather, our aim is to critically analyze why the 
United States government is highly unlikely to disengage 
with the capitalist apartheid regime economically, militarily 
and politically unless the violent revolution of national 
liberation movements deepens. 
3 
The national liberation struggle has been defined 
by Amilcar Cabral as the rejection by a people of the nega¬ 
tion of their historical process, the regaining of their 
historical personality, and their return to history through 
the destruction of imperialist. For a detailed analysis, 
see Cabral, Revolution in Guinea (New York: Monthly Review 
Press, 1972), p. 102. Please note that the liberation 
struggle in South Africa is aimed at the destruction of the 
imperialist domination through settler colonialism. Although 
the "direct enemy" faced by blacks in South Africa is the 
apartheid colonial-settler regime, the second target of 
their struggle is imperialism - "indirect enemy." 
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The U.S. Economie Stake in South Africa 
The U.S. government has consolidated its position in 
South Africa—thanks to its multinational corporations. By 
1977, the U.S. had become South Africa's largest trading 
partner, second among South Africa's overseas investors, 
and supplier of approximately one-third of South Africa's 
international credit. South Africa's trade with the U.S. 
produced a consistent and substantial positive trade balance 
for the United States. The U.S. investment has expanded 
rapidly over the past decade, particularly in industry and 
in areas of advanced technology. Though a large number of 
the U.S. firms have investments in South Africa, nearly 
three-quarters of the total U.S. investments are controlled 
4 
by twelve major corporations. (See Table 3.1.) 
These firms are influential even in the United States 
with General Motors ranking number one. According to Table 
3.1, the auto industry seems to have a good share of South 
Africa's markets when evaluated in terms of investment alone 
Of the total U.S. investments there, General Motors (GM) 
accounts for 14.1 percent, Mobil Oil, 13.5 percent, Texaco, 
11.4 percent, and Ford, 11 percent. The three auto compa¬ 
nies, including Chrysler, account for 30.1 percent of the 
U.S. investments. 
4 
Joel Samoff, "Transnational, Industrialization, and 
Black Consciousness," Journal of Southern Africa Affairs 3 
(October 1978): 497-498. 
TABLE 3.1 
THE TWELVE MAJOR U.S. COMPANIES IN SOUTH AFRICA 








South Africa GM 125 14.1 
Mobil Oil Southern 
Africa, Mobil Refining 
Co., S.A. Mobil 122.5 13.5 
Caltex Oil S.A. Texaco 
Standard Oil of 
California 100 11.4 
Ford South Africa Ford 80-100 11.0 approx 
Standard Telephone and 
Cable (and other 
companies) ITT 50-70 7.8 approx 
South African 
General Electric GE 55 6.1 
Chrysler South Africa Chrysler 45.0 5.0 






Name of Firm 
Approximate Approximate 
Investments Percent of 
U.S. Owner(s) U.S. ($m.) U.S. Total 
Goodyear Tire and Rubber 
Company South Africa Goodyear 15 1.7 
Minnesota Mining and 
Manufacturing Company 
South Africa MM 12 1.3 
IBM South Africa IBM 8.4 1.0 
Caterpillar (Africa) 
and Barlow Caterpillar Caterpillar 6.4 0.7 
TOTAL 648-692 72-77 
Source: As taken from Bethuel Setai, "The Role of International Companies in the Economy 






In South Africa, GM ranks eleventh in assets and 
forty-first in the number of employees among the leading 100 
public companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange.5 
Table 3.2 gives the hourly employment by work grade classi¬ 
fication and race. Column one gives the work grade on a 
scale of one to eleven, with one representing the poorest 
jobs, and the job grades improving all the way up to eleven. 
Columns two and four offer a striking contrast in that the 
blacks are concentrated in work grades one to four while 
the whites are concentrated in grades eight to eleven. Over 
90 percent of GM South Africa employees are in categories 
one to four and they are paid less than the minimum effec¬ 
tive level of $140 per month, which the South African Insti¬ 
tute of Race Relations has suggested for Port Elizabeth 
where the major company operations are based.5 
The GM South Africa works in close collaboration with 
the South African government by taking part in her all- 
important local content program. The local content program 
has three objectives: (1) to reduce South Africa's economic 
vulnerability to outside economic pressures, (2) to improve 
import-substitution programs, and (3) to stimulate the growth 
of other economic sectors. The other companies listed in 
Table 3.1 are also involved with the South African government 
5Bethuel Setai, "The Role of International Companies 
in the Economy of South Africa," The Review of Black Politi¬ 




HOURLY EMPLOYMENT BY WORK GRADE CLASSIFICATION AND RACE 
















1 - 146 196 342 
2 3 233 98 331 
3 3 326 110 436 
4 32 486 99 585 
5 5 267 24 291 
6 35 107 5 112 
7 50 46 4 50 
8 139 176 5 178 
9 268 55 10 65 
10 446 - - - 
11 92 — — — 
Source: Bethuel Setai, "The Role of International Companies 
in the Economy of South Africa," p. 355. 
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in similar ways.^ 
Table 3.3 gives Mobil's work force in each employ¬ 
ment category. Mobil Oil Corporation shows a picture which 
is similar to that of General Motors South Africa. The 
salary groups are rated on a scale of one to thirteen with 
the unskilled jobs being on the lower scale and skilled ones 
on the upper scale. Blacks are concentrated in unskilled 
jobs and insignificant numbers have advanced into semi-skilled 
and skilled posts. Even those who have been promoted into 
skilled categories have not gone into meaningful jobs. (The 
term "skilled job," when it applies to blacks, means being 
employed to drive a car and/or a truck for the company.) 
According to recent United Nations documents, the 
large disparity between black and white wages occur in all 
areas of the economy, and these disparities are by industry 
as follows: in mining, the white-black ratio is 20:1, the 
8 average for manufacturing and public service is 6:1. Also, 
as Dr. Francis Wilson revealed in his study of Labor in the 
South African Gold Mines, the cash wage of the blackman in 
1969 was the same as in 1911, while the real wage of his 
white counterpart had risen by 70 percent. It is therefore 
instructive to realize that while blacks constitute 82 per¬ 
cent of the population, their share of the national wealth is 
^Ibid. 
g 
John Sprack, "Trade Union Solidarity with the 
Struggle Against Apartheid in South Africa," United Nations 
(SEM/7, June 1976), p. 5. 
TABLE 3.3 
MOBIL'S WORK FORCE 
(Number and percent of workers in each employment category , 1972) 
Salary Group/ 
Type Position* 
















Laborers 687 387 365 0 365 100% 0% 
1A 342 267 271 0 271 100 0 
2 157 145 143 0 143 100 0 
2A 78 142 82 15 97 84.5 15.5 
3 Semi-skilled 0 22 37 41 78 47.4 52.6 
3A 0 12 36 110 146 24.7 75.3 
4 0 0 42 114 156 26.9 73.1 
5 0 6 48 301 349 13.8 86.2 
6 Skilled 0 6 16 279 295 5.4 94.6 
7 Supervisory and 
Skilled 0 0 0 219 219 — 100 
8 Supervisory and 







No. of Africans, Asians, Africans, 
Salary Group/ 












and Skilled 0 0 1 409 410 0.21 99.8 
13 and above 
Managerial 0 0 0 186 186 - 100 
TOTAL EMPLOYEES 1,264 989 1,046 1,806 2,852 36.7 64.4 
*Details of what the position entails is reported by Mobil but generalized here. 
**Computed by adding number of white workers to number of African, Asian and Colored 
workers when necessary. 
"''Mobil reports 1.2 percent. 
Source: Church Investments Corporations and Southern Africa (New York: Friendship Press, 
1973), p. 124 as taken from Setai, "The Role of International Companies in the 






23 percent. The whites, who are less than 20 percent of 
g 
the population, take home 76 percent of the national wealth. 
South Africa possesses a major share of the world's 
known mineral reserves, and produces a significant propor¬ 
tion of the world's mineral supply. Tables 3.4 and 3.5 pro¬ 
vide a general overview of South African mineral reserves, 
the degree of U.S. dependency, and the significance of South 
Africa as a supplier. 
According to Robert Price, it is the top four minerals 
listed in Table 3.4 that give South Africa its vital signi¬ 
ficance for the United States. These minerals have four 
features in common: they are essential in a core industry 
activity (chronium, vanadium, and antimony are vital to the 
production of anti-corrosive steels, and platinum is a key 
element in anti-pollution technology); they are found in 
insufficient quantity, or not at all, in the industrial coun¬ 
tries; there are no known feasible substitutes for them; and 
the only major reserves of them outside South Africa, and to 
some degree Southern Africa, are in the USSR with the excep¬ 
tion of antimony, which is found in substantial quantities 
in China. Thus if the United States and its allies were to 
be cut off from access to South African minerals their only 
major alternative source for these vital industrial raw 
9 
Setai, "The Role of International Companies m the 
Economy of South Africa, p. 357. 
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TABLE 3.4 
U.S. IMPORT DEPENDENCY ON SOUTH AFRICA* 
% of U.S. Major Non-South 
% of Needs Imports from African Source 








Vanadium 36 57 Chile (28) 
USSR (8) 
Antimony 52 44 China (18) 







Diamonds 81 Zaire (11) 
*Data from different "authoritative" sources vary in some 
cases by as much as 10 percent. 
Sources: U.S. Congress, Senate, Sub-committee on African 
Affairs, "Imports of Minerals from South Africa by the 
United States and the OECD Countries," September 1980; U.S. 
Congress, House Subcommittee on Mines and Mining, "Sub- 
saharan Africa: Its Role in Critical Mineral Needs of the 
Western World," July 1980; U.S. Department of State, The 
Trade Debate, May 1978; U.S. Bureau of Mines, Mineral Indus¬ 
tries of Africa, 1976; U.S. Department of the Interior, 
Mining and Minerals Policy, 1977; U.S. Bureau of Mines, 
Commodity Data Summaries; Africa Confidential, v. 18, no. 
5, 1977, p. 8. 
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TABLE 3.5 
SOUTH AFRICAN RESERVES AND PRODUCTION OF ESSENTIAL MINERALS 
Mineral % of World Reserves % of World Production 
Chrome 68 34 
Vanadium 64 39 
Platinum Group 86 46 
Antimony 7 21 
Manganese 41 24 
Industrial Diamonds 7 17 
Uranium 17 13 
Sources: U.S. Congress, Senate, Sub-committee on African 
Affairs, "Imports of Minerals from South Africa by the 
United States and the OECD Countries," September 1980; 
U.S. Bureau of Mines, Mineral Commodities Summaries (Washing¬ 
ton, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978). 
materials would be two "communist countries.The impli¬ 
cation is that the U.S. will almost solely rely on two cen¬ 
trally planned political economies whose system is antitheti¬ 
cal to the operations of multinational corporations. The 
emphasis on the vitality of South African mineral resources 
and its indispensability to the U.S. capitalist system 
explains the U.S. government's determination to preserve 
these resources for its industrial base. 
10Robert C. Price, "U.S. Policy Toward Southern 
Africa: Interests, Choices, and Constraints," in Interna¬ 
tional Politics in Southern Africa, eds. Gwendolyn M. 
Carter and Patrick O'Meara (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1982), p. 61. 
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The South African mineral resources are not only 
important to the local industries; they have clearly world¬ 
wide strategic significance. Although the precise degree 
of this significance has been disputed, nobody has totally 
denied this fact. A South African source described the 
situation by the following words: 
Nature endowed South Africa not only with 
fabulous wealth in diamonds and gold, but 
with vast reserves of many other valuable 
minerals, too: three-quarters of the Free 
World's chromite, 85 percent of its platinum, 
and a quarter of its uranium. These together 
with huge quantities of vanadium, manganese, 
titanium, iron, zinc, antimony, lead, and other 
metals may eventually make us one of the world's 
most important sources of many of the metals 
that are essential to the industrial progress. x 
Another important aspect of the U.S.-based multi¬ 
national corporations' assistance to apartheid regime is 
oil. The role of oil in the South African economy is sig¬ 
nificance because South Africa has no oil reserves of its 
own in spite of intensive exploration efforts. Since South 
Africa has vast coal mines, it has been able to reduce its 
dependence on oil. Its electrical utilities and many other 
plants, which might normally have utilized oil, burn coal 
instead. The state corporation, SASOL, has built one oil- 
from-coal plant with another one under planning. SASOL 
purchased a major share of the necessary technology from the 
United States oil firms. The basic construction has been 
^Raimo Vayrynen, "The Role of Transnational Corpora¬ 
tions in the Military Sector of South Africa," Journal of 
Southern African Affairs 5 (April 1980) : 228. 
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contracted by the Fluor Corporation of Los Angeles for 
about one billion dollars. The U.S. firms helped the South 
African electrical utility, ESCOM, to build plants using 
nuclear power, another important substitute for oil. More 
importantly, despite the lack of known oil reserves in 
South Africa itself, the U.S. oil companies have doubled 
12 their investments there m recent years. 
Recent data regarding the operations of U.S.-based 
multinational oil corporations are scarce. However, the data 
presented here suggest the impact of the economic crisis of 
the mid-1970s, combined with the Soweto uprising, on the U.S. 
investments in South Africa. A careful examination of Tables 
3.6 and 3.7 shows an explicit decline of U.S. investments 
and incomes during the turbulent years of the Soweto crisis. 
Clearly, the decline of investments and repatriation of 
incomes was a direct result of the revolutionary political 
climate of South Africa during this historic period, and not 
because of a result of public outcry for a wishful U.S. with¬ 
drawal from South Africa on the vague notion of moral and 
ethical grounds. 
The growth of U.S. investment in South African mines, 
manufacturing, refining and distribution of oil has been 
accompanied and facilitated by the simultaneous intrusion 
of U.S. financial interests. The U.S. banking and financial 
12 Seidman and Seidman, South Africa and U.S. Multi¬ 
national Corporations, p. 107. 
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TABLE 3.6 
U.S. INVESTMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA COMPARED TO THE REST OF 
AFRICA AFTER SOWETO UPRISINGS (1976, 1977) 
U.S. Investment 
in South Africa 
($ millions) 




1976 1977 1976 1977 
All Industries 1,608 1,791 2,775 2,783 
in mining and 
smelting Da Da 534 544 
in petroleum Da Da 1,506 1,520 
in manufacturing 713 710 259 266 
in transport, 
communications 
public utilities 1 2 66 74 
in trade 196 199 101 129 
in finance and 
insurance -12b -12b 63 76 
in other indus¬ 
tries 69 70 159 175 
Notes : (a) "D" is used by U.S. Department of Commerce to 
mean "suppressed" to avoid disclosure of data of 
individual companies. 
(b) The negative figures indicate that foreign 
affiliate returned home more funds than U.S. finan¬ 
cial institution invested—presumably part of the 
capital outflow resulting from political and economic 
crises affecting South Africa in the mid-1970s. 




U.S. INCOME FROM INVESTMENTS IN SOUTH AFRICA COMPARED TO 
THE REST OF AFRICA AFTER SOWETO UPRISING (1976, 1977) 
U.S. Investment 
in South Africa 
($ millions) 




1976 1977 1976 1977 
All Industries 197 197 610 586 
in mining and 
smelting 23 15 Da Da 
in petroleum 42 D 467 461 
in manufacturing 90 79 16 29 
in transport, 
communications, 
public utilities 0 0 5 2 
in finance and 
insurance 6 5 8 12 
in other indus¬ 
tries 18 Da Da Da 
Notes : (a) "D" is used by U.S. Department of Commerce to 
mean "suppressed" to avoid disclosure of data of 
individual companies. 
(b) The negative figures indicate that foreign 
affiliate returned home more funds than U.S. finan¬ 
cial institution invested—presumably part of the 
capital outflow resulting from political and economic 
crises affecting South Africa in the mid-1970s. 
Source : U.S. Department of Commerce, Survey of Current 
Business, 1978. 
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concerns appear to provide the key link in the complex net¬ 
work which binds together the corporations in the other sec¬ 
tors. The two leading U.S. banks, Chase Manhattan and the 
First National City Bank of New York have become increasingly 
significant in this business in the last decade. Both of 
these banks are enmeshed in the Rockefeller Group in the 
United States which own about 15 percent of the assets and 
deposits of all commercial banks. David Rockefeller, Chair¬ 
man of Chase Manhattan, boasted at a 1974 press conference 
in Pretoria, South Africa, that his organization had substan¬ 
tial investments in South Africa. He asserted bluntly: 
"People I have talked to are of the opinion that foreign 
13 
investment here is advantageous to all concerned." The 
expansion of Chase's own involvement in South Africa suggests 
that, at least from Chase's own perspective, it is indeed 
advantageous. 
Like Chase, the First National City Bank has direct 
links through its board of directors with other U.S. corpora¬ 
tions investing in South Africa. W.E. Wriston, Chairman of 
the Bank's Board, is a director of General Electric, one of 
the U.S. firms with the biggest South African interests. 
Other directors sit on the boards of the Coca-Cola Company, 
the American Express Company, Chrysler Corporation and 
14 
Texaco. Indeed all of the U.S.-based corporations in South 
13Ibid., P- 113. 
"^Ibid. , P- 115. 
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Africa are mutually linked in a network of exploiting the 
abundant profitable business ventures. Reed Kramer of African 
News Service summarized: 
The biggest U.S. banks have organized and parti¬ 
cipated in a number of multi-million dollar loans 
to the South African government, state-owned 
corporations, and private projects. As a result, 
U.S. indirect investment (mostly bank loans) in 
South Africa has for the first time in history 
surpassed the direct stake held there by some 300 
American corporations. The latest major credit 
agreement was signed in late October 1976—a 
$110 million loan to the government from syndicate 
led by Citibank and co-managed by Morgan Company 
Trust. Total lending to South Africa by American 
banks and their overseas subsidiaries has now sur¬ 
passed two billion dollars—nearly double what it 
was one year ago.15 
According to congressional hearing reports, by the 
end of 1976, South Africa's overseas debt equaled $7.6 
billion, of which $2.2 billion, or nearly one-third of all 
bank claims on South Africa, was owned to U.S. banks and 
their foreign branches. The report revealed: 
The $2.2 billion of American credit outstanding 
in 1976 is roughly equivalent to the amount of 
foreign exchange required to cover South Africa's 
defense and oil import costs for the same year, 
based on figures from South African sources and 
the United Nations. The cost of defense and oil 
quintupled between 1973 and 1976 from an estimated 
$400 million to an estimated two billion dollars. 
The international credit ... supported the South 
African government in its desire for greater 
economic and strategic investment policy, aimed 
15 
Reed Kramer, "In Hock to U.S. Banks," The Nation, 
11 December 1976, p. 6. 
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at fortifying its security and defense-related 
projects.16 
With abundant raw materials and a pool of cheap labor, 
the U.S. monopolies have become increasingly aggressive in 
capital investment. As one report lucidly concluded: 
The lure of South Africa for corporate planners 
stems in part from the unusually high profits on 
investment there. For the U.S. corporations, the 
average rate of return on investment in 1974 was 
19.1 percent, compared with a world average of 11 
percent for U.S. investment, according to the U.S. 
Department of Commerce.H 
In this regard, we profile some of the United States multi¬ 
national corporations' investments in South Africa. 
The General Assembly, in its resolution 36/172D of 
17 December 1981, requested and authorized the Special 
Committee against Apartheid to publicize the activities 
of transnational corporations, financial institutions and 
other interests collaborating with the apartheid regime of 
South Africa, to organize conferences and seminars and to 
arrange for studies and publications on all aspects of sanc¬ 
tions against South Africa and the continuing collaboration 
with South Africa by governments, corporations and other 
interests. Among the United States multinational corporations 
found in collaboration with South Africa were: Burroughs 
16 
U.S. Policy Toward South Africa, Hearings before 
the subcommittees on International Economic Policy and Trade 
on Africa, 96th Congress, 2nd Session, June 10, 1980, p. 7. 
17 
141 
Corporation, Citicorp, Control Data Corporation, Interna¬ 
tional Business Machines Corporation (IBM), Union Carbide 
18 Corporation, and the United States Steel Corporation. 
Burroughs Corporation was ranked as the 137th largest 
United States industrial concern in 1980 on the basis of 
annual sales of $2.9 billion. It had 1980 assets of $3.9 
billion and net income of $82 million. Burroughs was the 
world's second largest manufacturer of data processing equip¬ 
ment in 1979 with principal products being electronic data 
processing equipment, terminal computers and data prepara¬ 
tion equipment. The company also supplies related software 
and services and a line of business equipment and office 
products. The company has its headquarters in Detroit, 
Michigan and its largest foreign manufacturing facilities 
19 are in Europe, Canada and Brazil. 
Burroughs Machines Limited, the company's South 
African subsidiary, was established in 1929. The head office 
is in Johannesburg and the main branch offices are in Durban, 
Capetown, Port Elizabeth and Johannesburg. The company also 
maintains four smaller branch operations in South Africa. 
Burroughs is the third largest computer company in South 
Africa, behind International Business Machines and Interna¬ 
tional Computers Limited, and in 1978 controlled an estimated 
18 Transnational Corporations with Major Investments 
in South Africa, U.N. General Assembly, Special Committee 
Against Apartheid, A/AC 115/L.574, 3 September 1982, pp. 
1-5. 
19 Ibid., p. 19. 
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15 to 20 percent of the large computer market in the coun¬ 
try. Although the company does not disclose specific sales 
figures, the South African press reported that the company's 
1979 turnover was expected to increase by 48 percent over 
the previous year. Burroughs is engaged in marketing a 
wide range of computer and business equipment in South Africa 
and had estimated 1979 sales of $50 to $75 million of which 
an estimated 15 percent went to public sector buyers and the 
remainder to the private sector. Burroughs is a leader in 
the main frame, as well as the mini-computer market. It has 
supplied computers to the Cape Midlands Bantu Affairs Adminis¬ 
tration, the East Rand Administration Board, the Transvaal 
Provincial Administration, South African Railways and Harbors, 
the Air Survey of Africa and the Ford Motor Company of South 
Africa. In December 1979, Burroughs was awarded perhaps its 
largest public sector contract with the iron and steel corpo¬ 
ration of South Africa. The contract which involved the 
supply of two large process B7811 computers was worth as much 
as $20 million. The first of the computers was delivered in 
mid-1980 and the second in 1981. Burroughs, at year-end 
1979, had 525 employees in South Africa, composed of 85 per¬ 
cent white and 15 percent black workers, and its growth in 
20 South Africa in the last few years has been strong. 
20 Richard Leonard, Computers in South Africa: A 
Survey of United States Companies (New York: The Africa 
Fund, 1978 ) , p. TT. 
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Another major computer company which specializes in 
large scale computers, peripheral equipment and computer ser¬ 
vices is Control Data Company. The company which was estab¬ 
lished in South Africa in 1964 as a wholly-owned subsidiary 
of the United States parent company had a head office in 
Sandton, a suburb of Johannesburg, and customer services cen¬ 
ters in Johannesburg and Pretoria. The company had an asset 
of $26.1 million in 1979. In 1979, Control Data in South 
Africa had revenues of $17.8 million most of which was de¬ 
rived from the rental, rather than outright sale, of its 
equipment. The South African Weather Bureau, Escom and Iscor 
together account for 50 percent of Control Data's income. 
The company's share of income from the public sector is ex¬ 
pected to decrease with the growth of Control Data private 
sector business. Control Data markets a range of products 
in South Africa including mini-computers, mainframe units, 
software packages and data processing and educational ser¬ 
vices. In 1979, Fluor Corporation, the managing contractor 
for South Africa's SASOL projects, subcontracted Control 
Data for the supply of a mainframe unit for the two SASOL 
plants at Secunda. The Control Data Company 173 computers 
were leased to Fluor for three years. Other users of Control 
Data equipment in South Africa include the Council for 
Scientific and Industrial Research, South African Airways, 
the Department of Transport and Randburg Municipality. Com¬ 
puters are in great demand by the mining industry in South 
Africa, and Control Data has established specialized facilities 
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to give mine management and professions access to the latest 
computer technology in their fields. The computers are 
21 valued for their ability to increase labor productivity. 
A third company specialized in computers is Inter¬ 
national Business Machines Corporation (IBM). The corpora¬ 
tion, the world's largest computer company, has had a sub¬ 
sidiary in South Africa since 1952. It has its headquarters 
in Johannesburg with principal branch offices in Capetown, 
Durban, Pretoria and Port Elizabeth. The South African 
operations are organized into general administration and 
three divisions so as to handle the full range of IBM pro¬ 
ducts and clientele. Although the company refuses to reveal 
specific sales or investment figures, it stated that South 
Africa accounts for less than 1 percent of its total corpo- 
22 rate revenues. IBM has traditionally been m the forefront 
of the South African computer industry, holding an estimated 
56 percent of the computer market in 1973. In recent years, 
however, its position has eroded somewhat in the face of 
increased competition by other computer companies. Inter¬ 
national Computers Limited of the United Kingdom has made 
particularly strong gains in the market and claims to have 
surpassed IBM on the basis of mainframe computer sales, al¬ 
though some industry analysts believe that IBM still holds 
21 United Nations General Assembly, Transnational Cor¬ 
porations with Major Investments in South Africa, Special 
Committee Against Apartheid, A/AC. 115/L-574, 3~September 
1982, pp. 29-30. 
22 Leonard, Computers in South Africa, p. 26. 
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23 a marginal edge in terms of total sales value. 
Prior to the restrictions which the United States 
Department of Commerce placed in 1978 on United States com¬ 
puter sales to the South African police and military, IBM 
made sales to the Atomic Energy Board, Department of Defense, 
Department of the Interior, Department of Prisons, the South 
African Broadcasting Corporation, South African Railways and 
Harbors and the Uranium Enrichment Corporation. It also has 
supplied the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research, 
the National Institute for Telecommunications Research, the 
South African Airlines and the administration of the bantus- 
tans of Bophuthatswana and Gazanzulu with computers. In the 
private sector, IBM users include General Motors, Chrysler, 
British Leyland, all of the major oil companies, Firestone, 
Goodyear, Standard Bank and the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. 
The company has announced a policy of not bidding for busi¬ 
ness "where we believe our products are going to be used for 
repressive purposes." Although IBM acknowledges that compu¬ 
ters used by South African governmental agencies do not have 
repressive potential, it claims that it knows of none of its 
computers being used for such purposes. IBM, with a South 
African workforce of 1,507 in December in 1980, of whom 81 
percent were white and 19 percent were black, continues to 
service its customers' equipment, including the computer 
23 Ibid., pp. 26-27. 
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24 which it has sold to the South African Department of Defense. 
The practice of servicing equipment of clientele by- 
IBM while insisting that it abides by the United States 
government's ban on computers to South Africa is counter¬ 
productive. If the United States government's aim was to 
cripple South Africa's sophisticated machines, IBM servicing 
of the apartheid regime's machines undermines the ban. 
The roles of IBM, Burroughs Corporation, and Control 
Data Corporation in South Africa are significant. They abet 
and assist the apartheid regime in its enforcement of repres¬ 
sive laws. The computers delivered to the government are 
used to enforce the hated "pass law," which requires that 
an identification be carried by South African blacks to cur¬ 
tail their movement and reduce them to aliens in their own 
land. The production and delivery of computers to the South 
African regime also enhances the government's military build¬ 
up and nuclear development. 
Another important United States corporation in South 
Africa is Union Carbide which is a diversified industrial 
corporation with principal interests in chemicals and plas¬ 
tics. The company is also engaged in the production of gases 
and related products, metals and carbons, batteries, home 
and automobile products, and specialty products. Union Car¬ 
bide has a number of subsidiaries and affiliates in South 
Africa. Their names and the share of Union Carbide's holdings 
24 , 
U.N. General Assembly, Transnational Corporations 
with Major Investments in South Africa, p"ü 51. 
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are as follows: Union Carbide Southern Africa (USA) Inc., 
Union Carbide South Africa Limited (100 percent), UCAR Chrome 
Co., SA Limited (100 percent), Ucar Minerals Corporation 
Limited (100 percent), Electrode Maatskappy Van Suid Afriak 
(EMSA) (50 percent), Tubatse Ferrochrome Limited (40 per- 
25 cent), Multifoil Limited (75 percent). 
The main subsidiary, Union Carbide South Africa 
Limited, is the main distributor and sales office for im¬ 
ported Union Carbide products. Ucar Minerals is engaged in 
vanadium mining and has processing facilities both in the 
bantustan of Bophuthatswana and in South Africa. Ucar Chrome 
is involved in chrome mining in the Lebowa bantustan and 
Tubatse Ferrochrome has a smelter close to the Lebowa border. 
Both of these subsidiaries were adversely affected by the 
1980 drop in demand for stainless steel and Ucar Chrome shut 
down one of its two mines and Tubatse shut down one of its 
three furnaces in late 1980. Tubatse is 51 percent owned by 
the South African firm of Gencor, which supplies all of the 
plant's chrome requirements although the plant is managed by 
the Union Carbide. The plant began exporting in 1977 and has 
an annual capacity of 120,000 tons of ferrochrome. Union 
Carbide has built one of the most modern ferro-alloy plants 
in South Africa, and the company's refinery produces about 
2 6 
20 percent of South Africa's chrome. 
25Ibid., pp. 71-72. 
2^Ibid., p. 72. 
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The EMSA is engaged in the production and sale of 
graphite electrodes. The subsidiary has undertaken an expan¬ 
sion of capacity, first in 1979 and then in mid-1980. The 
earlier expansion increased production capability by 10 per¬ 
cent and the more recent one, costing $20 million upon com¬ 
pletion, will result in a 25 percent increase in capacity. 
Funds for EMSA expansion were generated from retained earn¬ 
ings and local borrowings. The Ucar Minerals, Ucar Chrome 
and Tubatse Ferrochrome have not expanded in recent years. 
The main Union Carbide subsidiaries in South Africa employed 
a total of 2,368 persons in June 1980, of whom 1,842, or 78 
27 percent, were black and 526, or 22 percent, were white. 
Another United States corporation with significant 
impact in the South African economy is Steel Corporation. 
U.S. Steel Corporation, one of the largest fully integrated 
steel producers in the world with 1980 production of 23.4 
million tons, has a number of holdings in South Africa. Most 
of them result from the company's fourteen-year relationship 
with the Anglo Transvaal Consolidated Investments (Anglovaal), 
the holding company for one of South Africa's major mining 
houses. U.S. Steel's holdings include a 46 percent share of 
Prieska copper mines which operates copper and zinc mines in 
the northwestern Cape Province. From mid-1979 to mid-1980, 
Prieska planned more than $12 million in capital expenditures. 
In 1975, U.S. Steel purchased 20 percent of Associated 
27 Ibid., p. 12. 
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Manganese mines which operates iron and manganese mines near 
Sishen in the northwestern Cape Province. During 1977 and 
1979, Associated Manganese had capital expenditures of more 
than $26 million. Most of the sales from these mines have 
been from export, with U.S. Steel contracting to buy over 
three million net tons of the ore annually beginning in 
1978.28 
U.S. Steel has a 27 percent share in a holding com¬ 
pany, Associated Ore and Metal which has interests in Asso¬ 
ciated Manganese, Feralloys and Zeerust as well as other 
smaller interests. Zeerust chrome mines, located in the 
Transvaal Province adjacent to Bophuthatswana, are 49 per¬ 
cent owned by U.S. Steel. They produce about 80,000 tons of 
chrome ore annually for sale to Feralloys. This latter com¬ 
pany, in which U.S. Steel has a 45 percent stake, operates 
ferromanganese furnaces in northern Natal Province and ferro- 
29 chrome furnaces in the eastern Transvaal. 
Finally, any discussion of the United States corpo¬ 
rations' economic assistance to South Africa without an exami¬ 
nation of the banking sector will be a failure to conceptu¬ 
alize the South African mutually integrated economic network. 
One of the banks is Citicorp, a banking corporation with a 
multinational financial services organization which has more 
than 2,000 offices worldwide with 796, or 38 percent 
28Ibid., pp. 72-73. 
28Ibid., p. 73. 
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in the United States, and 1,300 or 62 percent in ninety-two 
countries outside the United States. Citicorp has been 
represented in South Africa since 1958 by its wholly-owned 
subsidiary Citibank, N.A. Limited (formerly First National 
City Bank, N.A. Ltd.). It has a head office in Johannesburg 
and branches in Capetown and Durban. Citibank is the only 
United States bank which has a subsidiary in South Africa, 
and with capital assets of $12 million and local currency 
deposits of $138 million, the bank ranked as the 23rd 
largest in South Africa in 1980. 
Citicorp has been one of the largest overseas len¬ 
ders to South Africa throughout the years. In the period of 
1972 through 1978, Citibank and its subsidiaries participated 
in $1.6 billion of identifiable loans to South African 
borrowers. The vast majority of the loans raised on the 
Eurocurrency, Eurobond and foreign capital markets were for 
public sector borrowers such as the Electricity Supply Com¬ 
mission, South African Railways and Harbors, the Iron and 
Steel Corporation and the government itself. In 1980, Citi¬ 
bank made its first direct loan to the South African govern¬ 
ment since the Soweto riots of 1976. Together with banks 
from the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany and 
Switzerland, Citibank acted as a manager in a $250 million 
loan which the apartheid regime claimed was for use for 
3(^Beate Klein, "Bricks in the Wall: An Update on 
Foreign Bank Involvement in South Africa," World Council of 
Churches, 1981, p. 81. 
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black housing, education and health care facilities. The 
bank said that loans such as that to the South African govern¬ 
ment is consistent with a policy which considers "loans to 
both the private and public sectors in South Africa, giving 
priority to loans that we believe will provide employment, 
health care, education, housing and transportation, for South 
Africans of all races." The $250 million loan to the govern¬ 
ment prompted withdrawal of accounts and the sale of Citibank 
instruments by churches and universities which maintained 
that the loan was not of "socially productive" nature but 
served to perpetuate the system of apartheid. 
In addition to direct lending to South African 
borrowers, Citibank, like other banks in South Africa, finan¬ 
ces the system from within the country. All banks within 
South Africa are subject to a South African law which requires 
that they set aside reserves equal to 13 percent of the value 
of their deposits, 5 percent of which must be held in liquid 
assets and 8 percent in government prescribed investments. 
Based on 1980 local currency deposits of $138 million, Citi¬ 
bank has more than $11 million invested in South African 
government bonds and shares of public corporations. However, 
the bank claims that it has not purchased South African de¬ 
fense bonds with the reserve funds. More than $800 million 
in assets was recently transferred to an investment company 
in Bermuda to finance any North American acquisitions by 
31 Ibid., pp. 81-82. 
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32 Minorco. 
As we have seen, the aforementioned United States 
multinational corporations have significant investments in 
South Africa. Given the large number of the U.S. multina¬ 
tional corporations which have operations in South Africa, 
it is not possible to document the activities of each one of 
them. Suffice it to say that the analysis is an attempt to 
present a representative cross-section of the companies, their 
nature of investments, their strategic economic viability to 
the apartheid regime. (See Appendix A for a comprehensive 
list of United States multinational corporations in South 
Africa.) 
U.S. Military Assistance to South Africa 
Government policy plays a key role in determining 
the nature and extent of foreign participation in a country's 
military power. However, in the case of South Africa, such 
foreign participation has been affected by action of the 
United Nations Security Council. On November 4, 1977, the 
U.N. Security Council adopted resolution 418 (1977) estab¬ 
lishing a mandatory embargo on arms to South Africa which is 
binding on all members of the U.N. Paragraph two of the 
resolution states that the Security Council: 
Decides that all states shall cease forthwith any 
provision to South Africa on arms and related 
material of all types, including the sale of trans¬ 
fer of weapons and ammunition, military vehicles 
32 Ibid., p. 82. 
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and equipment, para-military police equipment, 
and spare parts of the aforementioned, and shall 
cease as well the provision of all types of equip¬ 
ment and supplies, and grants of licensing arrange¬ 
ments, for the manufacture or maintenance of the 
aforementioned.33 
Paragraph three deals with contractual and licensing agree¬ 
ments for arms, and reads: 
Calls on all states to review, having regard to 
the objectives of this resolution, all existing 
contractual arrangements with and licenses 
granted to South Africa relating to the manu¬ 
facture and maintenance of arms, ammunition of 
all types and military equipment and vehicles, 
with a view to terminating them. ’ 
Paragraph four explicitly states: 
Further decides that all states shall refrain 
from any co-operation with South Africa in the 
manufacture and development of nuclear weapons.35 
However, as we will learn the resolution 418 by the 
Security Council was succinctly prepared, but has been openly 
violated by the United States government and its South 
African-based multinational corporations. There is empirical 
evidence of widespread embargo violations by the U.S. cor¬ 
porations and their overseas subsidiaries. 
The first indication of illegal corporate sales came 
to light in 1976, when The New Haven Advocate revealed: 
that employees of two Connecticut gun companies— 
the Colt Firearms division of the Ohio Corporation— 
had arranged to ship rifles, shotguns and ammunition 
33 U.N. Center for Transnational Corporations, The 
Activities of Transnational Corporations in the Industrial 





to South Africa via firms in the Canary Islands, 
Austria, Greece, and West Germany. This dis¬ 
closure led to several court proceedings, the 
first of which resulted in a one-year sentence 
for Walter Plowman, who pleaded guilty and was 
never placed on trial, and thus Colt was spared 
the embarrassment of having its officers testify on 
the South African deals under oath; in pre-trial 
hearings, however, Plowman indicated that such 
transactions were known to be commonplace in the 
arms industry. Even more revealing was his state¬ 
ment that the U.S. State Department regularly 
"acquiesced" to these sales by "looking the other 
way" when presented with fraudulent export declara¬ 
tions—a charge that the federal prosecutor evi¬ 
dently neglected to follow up. ® 
In another violation involving Space Research Corpo¬ 
ration (SRC) in what the U.S. Customs Service considered an 
intricate arms smuggling scheme, an American-Canadian muni¬ 
tions firm with close Pentagon ties illegally supplied the 
apartheid government of South Africa with Special 155-mm 
shells that have 20 percent greater range than standard 
ammunition. According to the Washington Post, 
The company, SRC, refuses to discuss the charges, 
which are contained in classified U.S. government 
documents. Those documents state that some 55,000 
artillery shells, along with expertise to duplicate 
them, were exported from the United States and Canada 
to South Africa in 1977 and 1978, thanks in part to 
the Pentagon, which unwittingly shipped at least 
1,700 of the founds to Antigua on vessels chartered 
by the U.S. Navy.37 
^Michael T. Klare, "The Corporate Gunners: South 
Africa's U.S. Weapons Connections," The Nation, July 28 - 
August 4, 1979, p. 75. 
37 David C. Martin and John Walcott, "Smuggling Arms 
to South Africa," Washington Post, 5 August 1970, p. Bl; see 
also Klare, "The Corporate Gunners," p. 76. Between March 
1977 and March 1978, SRC sold at least four shiploads of 
Congrange 155-mm shells—each shell worth hundreds of thou¬ 
sands dollars—to South African authorities. 
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Another violation involved illegal technology trans¬ 
fer to South Africa by Sanders Associates of Nashua, N.H. 
In 1976, Sanders requested and received a license from the 
State Department to supply South Africa with a sophisticated 
38 $150 million ocean surveillance system. 
How did the apartheid regime feel about this military 
assistance? A delighted South African Prime Minister Pieter 
W. Botha, on April 28, 1977, announced that his country had 
developed, "in record time," a new long-range 155-mm canon 
39 and shell. Apparently, the South African government which 
feels insecure at least internally, has built up an efficient 
military and police apparatus. The emphasis placed on this 
build-up of defense forces can be gauged by military expen¬ 
diture which is the best measure of a country's degree of 
militarization. As shown in Table 3.8, military spending 
by the South African government has increased considerably 
particularly since the 1960 Sharpeville massacre. The coun¬ 
ter-insurgency force has been stepped up to fight against 
liberation movements. 
The United States and its junior North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) members have been trying to ex¬ 
tend the NATO umbrella to South Africa, to bring it gradually 
into the Western alliance in the hope of ensuring "stability." 
38 Klare, "The Corporate Gunner," p. 77. 
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MILITARY EXPENDITURE OF SOUTH AFRICA, 1957-1977 
Year 
Constant Prices at 
1973 Rates (Millions 
of Dollars) 
As Percentage of 
Gross Domestic 
Product 










1961 163 1.3 
1962 263 2.0 
1963 267 1.8 
1964 374 2.4 
1965 384 2.3 
1966 416 2.4 
1967 469 2.5 
1968 467 2.4 







1971 511 2.2 
1972 518 2.1 






1975 1,020 3.5 
1976 1,298 4.4 
1977 1,625 — 
Source : Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 
Yearbook of World Armaments (Uppsala, 1978), pp. 156-161 as 
taken from the U.N. Center for Transitional Corporations, 
The Activities of Transnational Corporations in the Industrial 
Mining and Military Sectors of Southern Africa (New York: 
United Nations, 1980) , p. 56. 
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By establishing links with South Africa, the U.S. hopes to 
control the direction and pace of change, with a view to 
maintaining access to the region's strategic and economic 
assets and thwarts the possibility of a socialist triumph in 
South Africa. In trying to make South Africa a de facto 
partner in the Western alliance, the U.S. and its NATO mem¬ 
bers may not hesitate to fight on the side of the racist 
regime. According to Africa Report, the following major 
steps towards closer military co-operation with South Africa 
have been observed: 
1. The Defense Planning Committee of NATO 
authorized the Supreme Allied Commander in 
the Atlantic (SACLANT) to carry out contin¬ 
gency planning for the protection of the 
Cape sea routes in war and "sub-war situa¬ 
tions." This was the first time that NATO 
had been authorized to draw up contingency 
plans for operations outside the NATO area. 
2. Although NATO authorities originally stipu¬ 
lated that this planning was not meant to 
lead to any kind of operation outside the 
NATO area, NATO is now readying plans for 
the establishment of joing naval task force 
in the South Atlantic Ocean. It is doubtful 
whether such a task force could function 
without using South African bases, communi¬ 
cations facilities, airfields, etc. 
3. A major U.S. base is being established at 
Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. There 
are indications that an Indian Ocean joint 
task force may already be based there or 
soon will be. Again, such a task force 
would have to make use of at least some of 
South African infrastructure. 
4. South Africa, with the assistance of the 
U.S. and some of its NATO members, has 
constructed a major military communica¬ 
tions and intelligence complex at Silvermine 
near Simonstown. The NATO IFF system is 
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connected to this network. NATO intelli¬ 
gence agencies are using the radio and 
intelligence gathering systems of the 
Silvermine complex.^ 
There is little doubt that the U.S. is seeking the 
cooperation of its Western allies to avoid being depicted as 
a strong supporter of the apartheid government of South 
Africa. A report in Africa Confidential reveals: 
...a research team at the U.S. School of Naval 
Warfare had concluded that cooperation with 
South Africa for regional defense would be 
necessary. But, within the context of the 
Western alliance, it was generally considered 
that protection of the Cape route was primarily 
a NATO strategic interest. Control of the 
Indian Ocean itself was regarded more as an 
American responsibility in terms of global 
rivalry with the Soviet Union. 
Responding to the Pentagon stationing of long-range, anti¬ 
submarine at Diego Garcia, a senior Defense Department offi¬ 
cial warned: "The creation of this type of force would be 
tangible evidence that ... we are prepared to do what is 
necessary, including the use of military force, to defend 
42 our vital interests there." Additionally, the U.S. wants 
to bolster the confidence of friendly nations along the West's 
oil routes. A Navy official invoked tradition: "We want to 
show the flag to assure these countries that we need them and 
43 will protect them." One of these friendly countries 
40 
Sean Gervasi, "South Africa Under the NATO Umbrella," 
Africa Report (September/October 1976): 16. 
41 
"The Indian Ocean: The U.S. Responds," Africa 
Confidential, 9 May 1979, p. 3. 
43Ibid. t p. 4 . 
43Ibid. 
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implicitly is South Africa, and the defense of "vital inter¬ 
ests" suggests the determination of the United States to 
maintain the status quo in South Africa. 
For the purpose of military surveillance and communi¬ 
cations in the southern oceans, South Africa has virtually 
become a nerve-center for NATO defense. In a letter attached 
to a memorandum issued by the British Anti-Apartheid Movement 
in 1975 (A/AC. 115/L. 408), it is stated that: "...NATO 
defense code is available to the Pretoria regime and has been 
utilized to code the equipment and spares of its new military 
. . 44 communications system known as Project Advokaat." The 
memorandum further states that companies in the U.S. and its 
European partners were directly involved in Project Advo- 
45 kaat. It is easy to understand, in light of this evidence, 
why the U.S. which claims to abide by the U.N. arms embargo, 
now finds it necessary to oppose a mandatory arms embargo. 
The U.S. corporations have helped South Africa build 
its nuclear capacity with obvious military implications. As 
experts have emphasized, there is no such thing as a solely 
peaceful military technology. South Africa bought its first 
nuclear reactor, Safari I, from the U.S. under "Atoms for 
Peace" program. South African nuclear scientists were trained 
at the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission's laboratory in Oak 
44 Quoted in Khalifa, Assistance to Racist Regimes 




Ridge. A U.S. Foxboro corporation sold South Africa's 
Pelindaba nuclear center two computers for military use/® 
Jennifer Davis, the research director of the Africa 
Fund, testified before the African Subcommittee of the U.S. 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1975 that the Air 
Commando training entails radio cooperation with army and 
mobile police striking forces, reconnaissance, practice bomb¬ 
ing, and general cooperation in maintaining the internal 
security of South Africa. She revealed: 
Many of these Commando members fly U.S. light planes, 
such as Pipers and Cessnas. Thus, even if the 
licensing procedures were adhered to technically 
in the sense that no planes were sold to the mili¬ 
tary, such planes would become available to the 
military, and, most important of all, form part 
of the "security planning" of the government.^ 
Finally, besides the direct military assistance 
through sales to the South African government, the avail¬ 
ability of oil is crucial to the operation of any technically 
advanced military establishment; oil products are crucial for 
its mobility and operational capacity. Some 4 percent to 5 
percent of the total oil consumption is used by the military, 
and the military consumption of aviation gasoline has its 
own category. It has been stated in the case of South Africa, 
and this certainly applies to other countries, that oil is 
46 
Ann Seidman, "Why U.S. Corporations Should Get Out 
of South Africa?" Issue: A Quarterly Journal of African Opin¬ 
ion 9 (Spring/Summer 1979): 39. 
4 7 
Michael Klare and Eric Prokosch, "Evading the 
Embargo: How the U.S. Arms, South Africa and Rhodesia," 
Issue: A Quarterly Journal of African Opinion 9 (Spring/ 
Summer 1979) : 44. 
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considered a "munition of war," and that: 
oil forms a vital part of the South African 
defense and police efforts. Oil is an item of 
strategic and military importance to South 
Africa. Its police and military force will not 
be able to function at all without it.^8 
The U.S. Political Support of South Africa 
We have critically analyzed the U.S. economic and 
military ties with South Africa. Simultaneously, we have to 
examine the U.S. political support of apartheid regime as it 
thwarts the emancipation of black people in South Africa. 
The U.S. economic, military, and political supports of South 
Africa are interrelated; each is designed to reinforce the 
other in direct and indirect ways. In a report to the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, the Chairperson of the Sub¬ 
committee on African Affairs, Senator Dick Clark, unmistakably 
summarized black discontentment against the U.S. government. 
Those blacks in South Africa who have given up 
hope of the Afrikaner power structure changing 
the system have also giveiup on America. They 
see us as their traditional enemy. They point 
out that we vote against them at the United 
Nations by vetoing measures which censure South 
Africa and try to bring nonviolent pressure upon 
her. They say that we have made little mention 
of the Government's suppression of the Soweto 
students. They point out that we have an exchange 
of intelligence information and send military 
attaches to South Africa—they wonder at this 
particularly because we also say we have no 
military relationship. They point out that our 
industries provide computers to implement the 
pass laws and other equipment used to oppress 
them. More and more now argue that our invest¬ 
ments are a greater support to the apartheid 
4 8 
Vayrynen, "The Role of Transnational Corporations 
in the Military Sector of South Africa," p. 235. 
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system than a model for economic and social 
change.^9 
Later in the report, after suggesting "an escalating 
series of disengagements" from South Africa, Senator Clark 
predicted their likely effect: 
The white minority in South Africa looks upon us 
as their last hope and friend. Psychologically, 
they cannot afford to be isolated further from us. 
They feel sure that we will some day understand 
their problem and come to their aid in fighting 
the common enemy: communism. They do not really 
believe that America will isolate them for their 
policies. If they understand clearly that we will 
take action against them, it will be a most power¬ 
ful force for change. Indeed, it may be the only 
way meaningful change will occur.^0 
Certainly, the apartheid regime depends heavily on the United 
States and its Western capitalist allies to survive; without 
them, the apartheid system cannot be sustained. The racist 
white minority does not believe that America will isolate 
them because the system of apartheid is profitable to all 
with vested interests in South Africa. Hence, apart from 
economic and military involvement, the U.S. supports South 
Africa politically. It is a matter of record that the United 
States voting pattern in the United Nations regarding racism 
and apartheid leaves no doubt which side of history she 
belongs. 
4 9 Quoted in Thomas Karis, "Toward a Policy Built on 
Truth: Realism, South Africa and the U.S.," Christianity 
and Crisis (Special Issue), 13 March 1978, p. 50. 
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As we know, 1971 was proclaimed as "International 
Year Against Racism" by the U.N. Toward the end of that year 
on December 6, the General Assembly passed a very important 
resolution (2784XXVI). Among the components of that 
resolution were the following: 
. . . invites Economic and Social Council to request 
Commission on Human Rights to study policies and 
practices of racial discrimination, in particular, 
discrimination against people of African origins 
in all countries, and submit report to the General 
Assembly by its 28th Session. U.S. voted "No." 
... notes with appreciation the report of the 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimi¬ 
nation. U.S. voted "No." 
... reaffirms apartheid is a crime against humanity. 
U.S. abstained while ninety-seven countries voted 
"Yes."51 
As an addition to the Resolution, the President of the General 
Assembly attached a statement elaborating to heads of states 
the racist practices of South Africa and urging all countries 
to combat this sort of racial discrimination. The U.S. again 
voted "No" even though ninety-seven countries voted "Yes." 
Indeed, several resolutions have asked the specialized agen¬ 
cies of the U.N., especially the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) and the Inter¬ 
national Monetary Fund, to withhold all technical, economic 
and other assistance from South Africa, and to withdraw 
loans. The U.S. voted "No."^ 
51 
Camille A. Bratton, "A Matter of Record: The History 
of the United States Voting Pattern in the United Nations 
Regarding Racism, Colonialism, and Apartheid, 1946-1976," 
Freedomways 17 (1977): 159. 
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On issues concerning apartheid, resolution 1178X11, 
November 26, 1957, appealed to South Africa to revise its 
policy of apartheid. The U.S. voted "No."^ Perhaps this 
is understandable because at this particular time, the U.S. 
government had not, in reality, constitutionally allowed its 
black population to participate in its political system 
until the middle of the 1960s. However, sixteen years later, 
in the resolution 3151BXXVIII, December 14, 1973, the beha¬ 
vior of the government of South Africa was condemned by the 
majority of the world community. The American government's 
position toward the apartheid regime's policies is reflected 
here. The resolution, 
urges the Special Committee on Apartheid to 
intensify its efforts towards eradication of 
apartheid; send missions to governments for 
consultation on action against apartheid; and 
to discuss with OAU. The U.S. abstained.^ 
Every resolution concerning racism and apartheid has not been 
mentioned and it is not even necessary (for further details 
on United States voting pattern in the United Nations, see 
Resolutions on Apartheid, Appendix B). The point to be made 
is quite clear: the U.S. is trying to save a system of 
economic domination and political tyranny in South Africa. 
^Ibid., p. 161. See also Mariyanda Nzuwah, "An 
Index of Selected Resolutions, Documents and Declarations 
of the United Nations on Southern Africa," Journal of Southern 
African Affairs 4 (January 1979). 
"^Bratton, "A Matter of Record," p. 16 3. 
164 
Summary 
In this chapter, we have examined how and why the 
U.S. supports South Africa economically, militarily, and 
politically. The U.S. investments form the basis of Ameri¬ 
can involvement. The American corporations enjoy the avail¬ 
ability of raw materials, market potentials in the region, 
a pool of cheap and coercible black labor, and protective 
shields of the apartheid repression. The U.S. military 
connection and its attempt to bring South Africa into NATO 
alliance is designed to safeguard its multinational corpora¬ 
tions . 
The analysis and the records that we have laid out 
in this chapter confirm that it cannot be said that the U.S. 
does not have a foreign policy toward South Africa. It most 
certainly does have one of support for the apartheid regime's 
repression of blacks. Contrary to apologist perspective of 
American moral and human rights principles, if such ever 
existed, its moral fibers have since decayed. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE IMPACT OF PUBLIC OPINION ON 
U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD SOUTH AFRICA 
In the area of foreign policy the interaction between 
American policy-makers and the public is very controversial, 
in particular, the U.S. foreign policy toward white colonial 
settler regime in South Africa. In the "democratic" society 
of the United States, the American policy is repeatedly told 
by politicians that the individual conscience is the ultimate 
seat of judgment and hence it is the final court of appeal, 
and that public opinion consequently prevails. 
In this chapter, we subject this assumption to the 
test of empirical evidence. In doing so, we utilize three 
indicators through which the public opinion is manifested 
and measured—polls, protests, and individual expressions of 
opinion through newspapers—and marshall an aggregate of data 
to disprove that the U.S. policy toward South Africa serves 
the interest of the American public. 
It is our conviction that if there is to be a more 
informed understanding of the United States relationship with 
South Africa, it is essential that the various elements in¬ 
volved within American society should be analyzed and the 
extent of their respective impacts assessed. As a contribu¬ 
tion toward filling that need for both the South Africans and 
the anti-apartheid groups as well as the concerned Americans, 
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the chapter also examines the views and roles of relevant 
institutions and segments of American society: trends in 
general public opinion, in major demographic groups, and 
among the small minority alert to and influential in foreign 
affairs. The universities and colleges, churches, black 
leaders, and corporations and businesses are discussed. The 
analyses provide bases for consideration of linkages of 
these extragovernmental groups with the United States execu¬ 
tive and Congress and their impact on the making of policy 
toward South Africa. 
Public Opinion Through Protests 
A number of organizations have contributed to the 
divestment campaign against South Africa including American 
Friends Service Committee (AFSC), American Committee on 
Africa (ACOA) and some other local groups in the United 
States. The ACOA, based in New York, has been carrying on 
a campaign for ending the U.S. bank loans to and corporate 
investment in South Africa. In a leaflet, "South Africa: 
Taking Stock of Divestment," the ACOA summarized its criti¬ 
cism against the United States policy toward South Africa. 
For more than forty years, U.S. corporations 
and banks have been investing in South Africa, 
not merely aware of the repressive system, but 
clearly defending it. In exchange for the enor¬ 
mous profits on cheap black labor, U.S. corpora¬ 
tions and banks have helped provide the capital 
and technology for the nuclear, military, police 
and prison systems needed by the white minority 
to maintain control of the black majority. Con¬ 
tinuing U.S. corporate support for apartheid is 
evidenced by the tripling of corporate investments 
in South Africa over the past two decades, making 
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the U.S. the largest foreign investor next to 
Britain. U.S. banks have also bolstered the 
apartheid economy with more than $2.2 billion 
in recent loans. The uprisings in the sprawling 
black township of Soweto in 1976, the death in 
detention of black consciousness leader, Stephen 
Biko, in 1977 and numerous reported bannings and 
arrests are a telling sign that apartheid not 
only continues in South Africa but is becoming 
even more repressive. It is time to end U.S. 
support for the apartheid system by withdrawing 
corporate investments and ending bank loans that 
are so crucial to its survival. 
ACOA intensifies its work in support of the struggle 
against apartheid. In its annual report for 1981, the 
ACOA said, "With the heightened awareness of Africa in the 
United States, we responded to numerous requests for speci¬ 
fic information (about the situation in South Africa) from 
Congressional offices, state and municipal legislators, 
2 
churches, universities, civic organizations and unions." 
ACOA provided information to columnist Jack Anderson, the 
New York Times, and the Washington Post to aid the success¬ 
ful effort to defeat Ernest Lefever's nomination as head of 
the U.S. State Department of Human Rights Bureau. Lefever 
is a close friend of the South African government.^ 
At the state level, the Georgia Coalition for Divest¬ 
ment and other groups, particularly with American Friends 
Quoted in "Ending Corporate Investments in South 
Africa," International Mobilisation Against Apartheid and 
for the Liberation of Southern Africa 1(2) (June 1980): 3. 
2 
"American Committee on Africa's 1982 Program," 
International Mobilisation Against Apartheid and for the 
Liberation of Southern Africa 3(2) (August 198 2) : 6"! 
^Ibid. 
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Service Committee's Office (AFSC) in Atlanta, have vigorously 
been undertaking major efforts to encourage corporate and 
individual divestment of holdings in corporations which 
operate in South Africa. The Georgia Coalition for Divest¬ 
ment in South Africa was instrumental in persuading M&M 
Products of Atlanta, Georgia to sever all ties with Vivid 
Distributors. Vivid Distributors, a white South African 
company, was contracted to handle M&M's distribution in the 
Southern Africa region. While M&M stood to suffer financial 
setbacks in its international sales, it felt that it should 
concern itself with its relationship with the black community 
worldwide. The AFSC's South Africa Program and the Georgia 
Coalition have held some successful demonstrations against 
the importation and sale of the South Africa gold coin, the 
Krugerrand. These protests have led to the cessation of 
sales in a number of coin stores and distributors in the 
southeast region.^ 
Another anti-apartheid organization is American 
Co-ordinating Committee for Equality in Sport and Society 
(ACCESS). ACCESS is a coalition of 30 religious, sporting, 
political and other activist groups organized to fight for 
the exclusion of South African sports teams and individuals 
from the United States and international sports until South 
Africa is no longer ruled by the policy of apartheid. ACCESS 
4 
From a leaflet received from contact with Tandi 
Gcabashe, Coordinator Southern Africa Program, American 
Friends Service Committe, Atlanta, Georgia. 
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has protested against professional boxing matches involving 
South Africans. The 1980 World Amateur Team Golf Champion¬ 
ships at Pinehurts in North Carolina were picketed, leading 
to the exclusion of South Africa from biennial Eisenhower Cup 
tournaments after 1982. The organization has coordinated 
international actions and letter-writing with other anti¬ 
apartheid sports groups around the world, particularly the 
South African Non-racial Olympic Committee (SAN-ROC) in London 
and the Supreme Council for Sport in Africa. ACCESS joined 
a still wider coalition with scores of other groups and coa¬ 
litions to form the Stop Apartheid Rugby Tour Coalition in 
the summer of 1981, leading to the cancellation of most of 
the matches scheduled involving South Africa's team. The 
10-1 outnumbering of spectators by demonstrators at three 
matches in the United States led to one of the matches being 
played in total secrecy on a farm field in a remote location 
with no spectators.'* 
The labor union is not silent on the apartheid 
regime's repression. The AFL-CIO, a national-based labor 
union, has been vigorous in its demand for a fundamental 
change in the United States policy toward South Africa. At 
its convention in October 1983, the AFL-CIO reiterated its 
long-standing opposition to apartheid and adopted a resolu¬ 
tion attacking the system. The resolution in part reads: 
^U.N. Center Against Apartheid, Directory of North 
American Non-governmental Organizations Engaged Against 
Apartheid, 84-14721, June 1984, pp. 1-2. 
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The rise of the black trade union movement in 
South Africa offers the best hope for the ultimate 
dismantling of the odious apartheid system. The 
AFL-CIO is fully committed to assisting this move¬ 
ment in its struggle against a government which 
resorts to brutal measures of repression against 
opponents of apartheid, including trade unionists. 
We call upon the United States Government to exert 
maximum pressure on the South African Government 
to give full recognition to the right of black 
workers to organize and bargain collectively with¬ 
out government interference.... The AFL-CIO will 
continue to urge its affiliates in the athletic 
and performing industries not to perform in South 
Africa.® 
In compliance with AFL-CIO directory, the African-American 
Labor Center (AALC), which is responsible for the implementa¬ 
tion of AFL-CIO programs in Africa has carried the following 
tasks: (1) In May 1983, the AALC sponsored a visit to the 
United States by Andrew Zulu, Vice President of the Federation 
of South Africa Trade Unions (FOSATU), to address the 
annual convention of the A. Philip Randolph Institute, a 
civil rights organization supported by the AFL-CIO; (2) the 
AALC supported an ongoing program of training in South Africa 
for black trade union organizers; and (3) the AALC continues 
to undertake a wide-ranging campaign against apartheid and is 
disseminating information among workers, students, and church 
groups in the form of films, video-tapes, publicity, buttons, 
and T-shirts.^ 
In its contribution to fighting the apartheid system 
in South Africa, American-South African Peoples' Friendship 
^Ibid., p. 4. 
^Ibid., p. 5. 
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Association has had several rallies. The Association supports 
the cause of all South African liberation groups in their 
efforts to free the South African people from the oppressive, 
racist South African system. It assists in directing the 
teaching of apartheid in the classroom. One such teachers' 
conference was held in Philadelphia (Mid-Atlantic Regional 
Conference for Social Studies) on February 16, 1984. The 
Association participated in like manner at New York State 
Council for the Social Studies Conference held at Ellenville, 
April 1-2, 1984. It helped organize and participated in the 
North East Regional University Students Conference against 
apartheid at New Paltz, February 25-26, 1984. The Association 
worked with the Office of Assemblyman Herman Farrel on the 
Divestiture Bill and has shown films on apartheid to thou¬ 
sands of viewers in New York and Rhode Island in exposing the 
8 evils of apartheid. Another group which has some impact on 
the United States policy toward South Africa is the Associa¬ 
tion of Concerned Africa Scholars (ACAS). A critic of 
American policy toward South Africa, the ACAS has assisted in 
disseminating information in the academic community. It pro¬ 
vides scholarly analysis and opinion in the process of na¬ 
tional and international policy formulation with special focus 
on the policy of the United States government. Since its 
inception in 1977, the ACAS has focused its activity on op¬ 
posing the United States' financial and technical support of 
the South African government through corporate investment and 
®Ibid., pp. 16-17. 
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and government loans and guarantees. The ACAS has stimulated 
research by university members on a range of issues relating 
to Southern Africa, resulting in publication of, among other 
materials, the book, UYS. Military Involvement in Southern 
Africa (Boston: South End Press, 1978), which we have earlier 
analyzed in our review of the literature. The ACAS comple¬ 
ments other anti-apartheid groups and is premised upon an 
important and distinct role that scholars can play in research 
and analysis and through communication of those conclusions 
9 
to the American public. 
Cognizant that the domestic struggle for civil 
rights is inextricably linked to the worldwide struggle for 
human rights, the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under 
Law formed the Southern Africa Project in 1967 in response to 
requests for assistance in cases involving human rights in 
South Africa. According to the Lawyers' Committee, cases 
that the Project has litigated have (1) challenged the publi¬ 
cation by the New York Times of "want-ads" for employment in 
South Africa which expressed directly or in indirectly 
racially discriminately criteria for employment; (2) chal¬ 
lenged an order of the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) which 
authorized South African Airways to serve a new route between 
Johannesburg and New York on the grounds that the order 
violated the Federal Aviation Act which prohibited the CAB 
from issuing a permit to a foreign air carrier which dis¬ 
criminated among its passengers on a racial basis; (3) 
^Ibid., pp. 18-189. 
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sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prohibit the U.S. 
Government from continuing to trade with South Africa; (4) 
challenged on behalf of the United Mine Workers and the State 
of Alabama the importation of South African coal into the 
U.S. on the grounds that it violated the Tariff Act of 1930 
which precludes the importation of goods that have been pro¬ 
duced by forced or indentured labor; and (5) intervened in a 
proceeding before the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to 
challenge the issuance of a license to export a sizeable 
quantity of highly-enriched uranium for use in South Africa. 
In addition to its legal work, the Project works closely 
with congressional offices to inform them about South African 
affairs pertinent to the United States foreign policy. The 
Project Director William Robinson has testified upon request 
before several congressional committees, including the House 
Sub-Committee on Africa of the Foreign Relations Committee 
and the Sub-Committee on International Organizations."^ 
There is also a local group with significant impact 
in the campagin against apartheid. Over the past few years, 
Madison Area Committee on Southern Africa (MACSA) has given 
numerous workshops and media presentations to state and 
local community organizations, religious groups, and schools 
concerning the situation in South Africa. An important focus 
has been the U.S. corporate involvement in the apartheid 
system and the issue of divestment. MACSA members have been 
10 Ibid., pp. 38-39. 
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actively involved in support for state divestment bills in 
Wisconsin and other midwestern states—testifying at public 
hearings, writing articles for newspapers, and appearing on 
various radio programs. The MACSA has also sponsored speak¬ 
ing and cultural events, featuring speakers from the African 
National Congress, films, and a play written and performed 
by South African exiles. In June 1983, members of MACSA 
produced a 50-minute videotape entitled, "When Non-Violence 
Fails...The Case of South Africa."^ 
Complementing the MACSA, the National Anti-Imperial¬ 
ist Movement in Solidarity with Africa Liberation (NAIMSAL) 
has concentrated its campaign for comprehensive and mandatory 
sanctions against South Africa. It is presently in the midst 
of a petition drive calling upon the Reagan administration 
to end its policy of "constructive engagement" and impose 
sanctions—economic, diplomatic, military, and cultural— 
against South Africa. In the past, it submitted over 100,000 
signatures from American citizens to the United Nations 
calling for the expulsion of the representatives of the 
racist regime. The NAIMSAL also works to educate and inform 
the United States public about developments in Southern 
Africa, and frequently issues statements analyzing events 
12 
and holding public forums. 
Another related organization to NAIMSAL is Revolu¬ 
tion in Africa Action Committee (RAAC). The RAAC is an 
11T. ., Ibid., P- 41. 
12_. • - Ibid., P- 43. 
175 
anti-imperialist organization that raises political and 
material solidarity with African Liberation movements and 
independent countries. In 1983, the RAAC staged anti¬ 
apartheid demonstrations on numerous occasions in New York 
and Washington, D.C. More significantly, the RAAC provides 
financial aid for the Pan-Africanist Congress of South 
Africa. 
The Southern Africa Support Project (SASP) is a 
community-based organization whose primary purpose is to 
mobilize public support for the people of Southern Africa 
and to express viable opposition to the United States foreign 
policy and corporate actions which favor the apartheid 
regime. Since SASP's inception in 1978, it has raised 
$100,000 in goods and funds to purchase medical equipment, 
clothing and educational supplies for refugees in Southern 
Africa. Joining with local universities, unions and church 
groups, the SASP mobilizes demonstrations and pickets against 
the United States government and corporate ties with racist 
14 minority regime in South Africa. 
Perhaps, there is no anti-apartheid organization more 
vocal than TransAfrica. The organization seeks to influence 
the formation of the United States policy toward Africa, par¬ 
ticularly South Africa. It strives to introduce the views of 
Afro-Americans into the decision-making process and generally 
13Ibid., P- 45. 
"^Ibid. , P- 47. 
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to increase public awareness on the issue of apartheid. 
TransAfrica advocates economic sanctions against South 
Africa, and in order to achieve its goal it communicates 
the policy views of its constituency to Congress, the 
media, and the United States executives in oral and written 
form. In August 1982, the organization exposed the ship¬ 
ment of 2,500 electric "shock batons" to South Africa by the 
United States. The device, which delivers a powerful 3,500- 
volt shock, was an ideal crowd control or torture instru¬ 
ment. TransAfrica was the first anti-apartheid group to 
learn that South Africa was about to apply for a substantial 
loan from the International Monetary Fund. Nevertheless, 
the organization was unsuccessful in stopping the United 
15 
States government from supporting the loan. 
The United States Peace Council, founded in 1979 
with local Peace Councils in approximately 60 U.S. cities, 
is no less a strong anti-apartheid. In addition to the 
local work in the cities, the organization's national execu¬ 
tive board, located in New York consisting of 50 persons, 
has a Southern African Task Force. The United States Peace 
Council's main area of concern since its four-and-a-half 
years of existence has been: (1) a petition campaign to free 
Nelson Mandela; (2) public actions to save the lives of ANC 
fighters sentenced to death; (3) public actions in commemora¬ 
tion of 16 June as Soweto Day; and (4) participation on 
15 Ibid., p. 53. 
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various levels in the anti-apartheid demonstrations.16 
Finally, the Washington Office on Africa, founded in 
1972, is a church and trade union sponsored lobby which works 
to promote a progressive U.S. foreign policy toward Southern 
Africa. Since 1981, the Washington Office on Africa has been 
lobbying to end the United States-South African nuclear 
collaboration, stop United States support for IMF loans to 
South African government, and ensure the passage of four 
South Africa-related provisions in the Export Administration 
Act which would restrict trade relations with the apartheid 
regime. The Office works closely to supply the press and 
members of the U.S. Congress with pertinent and relevant 
information on Southern Africa with a view to alerting and 
mobilizing United States citizens across the country on 
developments in Southern Africa and the U.S. policy toward 
the area. Undeterred by its efforts to make appreciable 
impact on the United States policy toward South Africa, the 
Washington Office on Africa is currently waging a campaign, 
which it actually started in December 1983, to influence 
Congress to pass a bill which will prohibit the export of 
the United States' goods to South Africa.1”^ 
Over the years, the impact of the various anti-apar¬ 
theid organizations have led to many sporadic public agita¬ 
tions for immediate and unconditional business disengagement 
16Ibid., p. 57. 
17 Ibid., p. 58. 
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with the apartheid regime by the United States government 
and its corporations. There is nowhere the campaign for 
corporate disinvestment more vocal than on university and 
college campuses. It seems clear that no single event 
either in the United States or in South Africa, was respon¬ 
sible for the rise in student concern that was experienced 
most dramatically in the 1970-79 period. Instead a number 
of factors came together during that period to produce a 
dramatic surge in student concern over a situation in which 
the U.S. government policy was already bankrupt. However, 
many people believe that the riots in Soweto in 1976 which 
followed, among other events, the death in detention of 
Stephen Biko and the bannings and detentions of a number of 
government critics in 1977, once again, focused world 
opinion on South Africa's racial policies in a manner that 
demanded attention. The generation of American students 
then on campus was the product of a substantially different 
period in American society from the generation on campus in 
1960 when Sharpeville massacre occurred. The latter genera¬ 
tion had been raised during a time when American racial 
attitudes and practices had become considerably liberalized 
and when there existed a presumption that the full force of 
law would be used to enhance and protect the rights of indi¬ 
viduals. The racial disturbances in South Africa highlighted 
the general perception that little had changed in South 
Africa and the incidents in that country served to focus 
attention. The U.S. college students who shared a common 
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perception of the situation formed organizations to express 
their support for the struggles of South African blacks in 
their attempts to gain national liberation. For most student 
groups concerned about South Africa, the immediate focus for 
change was the ownership by their institutions of stock¬ 
holdings in the United States corporations that maintain 
direct links in South Africa subsidiary or affiliate com- 
18 panies. 
The students' arguments in favor of the United States 
corporate withdrawal from South Africa generally were based 
partly on ethical grounds and partly on political and econo¬ 
mic grounds. The ethical grounds usually stated that the 
manner in which South African laws are written and operated 
makes it impossible for any American or other organization 
to operate there in a way that does not exploit blacks and 
support the status quo. Since a company which treats blacks 
and whites equally in all phases of employment is in viola¬ 
tion of South African law, no company that operates within 
the law can operate in a manner consistent with a basic 
policy of equal opportunity. Therefore, the students rea¬ 
soned that the only way a company could relieve itself of 
the ethical dilemma of operating under one set of principles 
in the United States and another set of principles in South 
18 Lawrence F. Stevens and James G. Lubetkin, 
"American Universities and South Africa" in The American 
People and South Africa: Publics, Elites, and~Policymaking 
Processes, eds. Alfred 0. Hero, Jr. and John Barrat (Lexing¬ 
ton, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1976), pp. 123-127. 
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Africa was to withdraw from South Africa until such a time 
that country had abolished all aspects of apartheid. At 
virtually all campuses where student groups were formed 
around the South African issue, the focus of student discon¬ 
tent was the investment policy of the institution. The 
students generally demanded that the institutions sell the 
securities of the companies that have operations in South 
Africa and the banks that were continuing to grant loans to 
19 the government of South Africa. Consequently, since 1976 
every major American university or college has witnessed a 
number of spontaneous demonstrations and protests. A review 
of some of the activities of the student groups and other 
anti-apartheid organizations which joined together as con¬ 
cerned citizens is imperative. 
During the second week of March 1978, some students 
and other groups of anti-apartheid system gathered at Meharry 
Medical College in Nashville for a conference on "Inter¬ 
national Sports, Politics, Racism and Apartheid," in a 
prelude to the Davis Cup tennis match between the U.S. and 
South Africa, which was scheduled at Vanderbilt University 
in the same city on March 17, 1978. The United States Tennis 
Association and Vanderbilt University had planned to go ahead 
with the match, amidst predictions of major demonstrations 
called by the NAACP, the International Campaign Against 
Racism in Sports (ICARIS), and the American Coordinating 
19 Ibid., pp. 128-129. 
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Committee for Equality in Sport and Society (ACCESS). The 
cost of the match was being underwritten by Joe C. Davis of 
Davis Coals, Inc., after the NLT Corporation, owner of the 
Grand Ole Opry, had withdrawn its $88,000 backing. A peti¬ 
tion circulated among Vanderbilt faculty calling for the 
cancellation of the match received wide support, but Univer¬ 
sity Chancellor Alexander Heard claimed that academic free¬ 
dom required the university to stick with its commitment. 
The United States Tennis Association, for its part, had 
pledged to request South African withdrawal from the Inter¬ 
national Tennis Federation, but said it was committed to 
20 this match. Speaking with Africa News, Dennis Brutus, a 
South African exiled poet and international leader of the 
movement against apartheid sports, explained some of the 
reasons for the protest. 
The concessions made so far by South Africa 
fall far short of abolishing racism in sport, 
rather there is an attempt to impose a 'multi¬ 
national' system, similar to the separate 'Ban- 
tustan' nationalities envisaged for Black South 
Africans. White teams play against black teams 
on occasion, but only with the proper permits 
granting waivers from Group Areas Act and other 
segregation laws. The protest overseas does a 
tremendous job of boosting the morale of people 
in the ghettoes. While it may dishearten or 
anger white South Africa, it delights black 
South Africa, l 
Replying to the argument that expelling South Africa from 
international sports events would only harden South African 
2 0 
"Anti-South Africa Protest Set for Davis Cup," 
Africa News X (March 13, 1978): 10. 
21 Ibid. 
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positions, Brutus contended that the historical record 
shows the reverse to be true. He added: "Each victory we 
have won in forcing erosion of South Africa's racial sports 
22 system has come from pressure." Nevertheless, the tourna¬ 
ment in question was never deterred by the estimated 40,000 
protesters who were expected to be on hand for the matches 
on March 17, 18, and 19, 1978.^ 
Unable to end the public pressure which had been 
built on the issue of loans to South Africa, six United 
States banks announced in April 1978 the cessation of loans 
to South African government. The banks—Citicorp, Chemical 
Bank, First National Bank of Chicago, Continental, Illinois, 
Northwestern National Bank of Minneapolis, and First Wis¬ 
consin—made similar statements to the effect that further 
loans to South Africa should be re-examined. In the First 
Chicago's notice to shareholders, it said: "management be¬ 
lieves that amelioration of South Africa's racial policies 
is necessary to assume that the country remains credit¬ 
worthy." The New York-based Committee to Oppose Bank Loans 
to South Africa, which coordinated actions around the country 
including 55 national and local organizations, called the 
bank statements "a significant concession," but said that 
they did not go far enough. The Committee demanded an end 
2 3 
"Anti-Apartheid Groups Take Aim at Davis Cup," 
Africa News X (February 20, 1978): 4. 
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to all loans to South Africa. That was also the stance of 
national church coalitions which filed shareholder resolu¬ 
tions with eight banks. The Bank of America, Crocker, First 
Boston, and Manufacturers Hanover were asked by church share- 
24 holders to end all loans to South Africa. 
However, four of South Africa's largest lenders— 
Bank of America, Morgan Guaranty, First Boston, and Manufac¬ 
turers Hanover—refused in principle to place restrictions 
on lending. But in fact, no American banks were willing to 
make public loans, apart from short-term trade credits. As 
a Chase Manhattan Bank analyst observed, "the economy remains 
on a low plateau" and he foresees "little improvement" in 
25 the year 1978. Two scenarios account for it. The protests 
are one reason and the other is South Africa's political tur¬ 
moil. The underpinning reason for re-examination of further 
loans to South Africa is that economic viability depends on 
political stability. The freedom fighters in South Africa 
were beginning to exert their impact. 
From 21 March to 6 April 1980, student groups in the 
United States launched campaigns on several campuses for 
divestment from South Africa. As part of these campaigns, 
student regional conferences were organized in New York City, 
Kalamazoo (Michigan) and Seattle. The U.N. Special Committee 
Against Apartheid has consistently supported these campaigns. 
24 "Protests Continue on Loans to South Africa," 
Africa News X (April 3, 1978): 10. 
25 Ibid., pp. 10-11. 
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It has viewed student action in the United States and other 
Western countries as important since governments, corpora¬ 
tions and institutions in these countries continue to 
2 6 
collaborate with the racist regime. 
The anti-apartheid movement in the United States 
beginning from 1976 has made some significant impacts both 
in South Africa and in the United States. In 1976, anti¬ 
apartheid groups in New York demonstrated against and brought 
about the closure of "ipi Tombe," a South African theatrical 
production. In 1978, anti-apartheid demonstrations in New 
York brought about the closure of "Umbatha," a South African 
play. In October 1981, the Board of the Associated Actors 
and Artists of America—an umbrella organization of major 
actors' unions with a total membership of over 240,000 
actors—took a unanimous decision that its members should 
27 not perform in South Africa. On March 6, 1981, the Execu¬ 
tive Board of the Boston Ballet decided to abandon a pro¬ 
jected two-week tour of South Africa. The decision was 
hailed by the anti-apartheid protesters, particularly since 
South African government was actively trying to entice cul¬ 
tural and academic institutions and sports bodies, as well 
as individual entertainers and sportsmen, to visit South 
2 6 
"U.S. Students Divest from Apartheid," Interna¬ 
tional Mobilisation Against Apartheid and the Liberation of 
Southern Africa 1(2) (June 1980): 7. 
27 
"Some Important Developments in the Movement for a 
Cultural Boycott Against South Africa, U.N. Center Against 
Apartheid 20/83 (October 1983): 18. 
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2 8 Africa with tempting offers of financial rewards. 
The anti-apartheid movements in the United States 
also forced the American corporations to adopt a business 
code in South Africa. In 1977 came the Sullivan Principles, 
a code drawn up for the United States firms by Reverend Leon 
Sullivan, a black clergyman from Philadelphia, whose concern 
about American involvement in the apartheid system was 
sharpened by his membership on the board of General Motors, 
a major investor in South Africa. From the American perspec¬ 
tive, the Sullivan code is obviously of greatest interest. 
The code was adopted by a dozen companies when it was first 
announced in 1977, and by late 1980 the list of signatures 
had grown to 137 and included most of the major American 
corporations operating in South Africa. As amplified in 
1978 and 1979, the Sullivan principles call for desegregation 
of "all eating, comfort and work facilities"; equal and 
fair employment practices, including support for the "elimi¬ 
nation of discrimination against the rights of blacks to 
form or belong to government registered trade unions"; equal 
pay for comparable work and "equitable" wages "well above 
the appropriate local minimum economic living level"; the 
development of training programs; the advancement of blacks 
into management positions; and the improvement of the 
"quality of employees' lives outside the work environment," 
2 8 "National Activities Against Apartheid," Interna¬ 
tional Mobilisation Against Apartheid and for the Liberation 
of Southern Africa 1 T2"5 (May 1981) : 6"I 
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including "housing, transportation, schooling, recreation, 
29 
and health facilities." (The full text of the Sullivan 
Principles is set forth in Appendix C.) 
There are flaws in the Sullivan Principles. Declaring 
the Sullivan Principles "no cure for apartheid," a number of 
leaders of the United States, in a public statement on March 
24, 1980, argued that the principles do not and cannot change 
the structure of apartheid. The signatories to the statement 
include U.S. Senators, judges, professors, church leaders, 
trade union leaders, executive directors, educationists, 
and film producers. These leaders insisted that the princi¬ 
ples are not a result of genuine change in corporate atti¬ 
tudes, but "a public relations effort to respond to black 
demands," which have developed into a major defense of the 
United States business activity in South Africa. In a 
statement, these leaders said: 
Only the people of South Africa themselves can 
end apartheid. But there are ways in which the 
United States can help. We call on American corpora¬ 
tions, the American government, and the American 
people to act now to end United States trade with 
South Africa; to halt bank loans and investment 
in that country; and to join with the United Nations 
in urging the withdrawal of all companies with 
existing operations in South Africa. 0 
29 The Report of the Study Commission on U.S. Policy 
Toward Southern Africa, South Africa: Time Running Out 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), pp. 96-97. 
3^"U.S. Leaders Declare Sullivan Principles No Cure 
for Apartheid," International Mobilisation Against Apartheid 
and the Liberation of Southern Africa 1(2) (June 1980) : 77 
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Other achievements of the United States anti-apar¬ 
theid movement can also be counted in dollars and cents. In 
the two decades since the late Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr. 
called for an economic boycott of Pretoria by the United 
States and other western nations, the divestment movement in 
this country has grown. According to Africa Fund: 
From the movement's origins in the late 1960's 
campaign to end bank loans to Pretoria, more than 
thirty colleges and universities had divested more 
than one hundred million dollars from banks and 
corporations operating in South Africa. From 1978 
to 1982, the Africa Fund reports that 35 colleges 
and universities had partially or totally divested, 
despite an ebb in the mass anti-apartheid movement. 
Liberal religious institutions ranging from the 
American Lutheran Church to the United Presbyterian 
Church have resolved to anchor have started action 
against corporations and banks involved in South 
Africa. 
Indeed, a number of colleges and universities in the United 
States have sold their stocks in corporations active in 
South Africa. In some cases they have divested partially 
and in other cases totally. (The full text of the sales of 
stock by colleges and universities is set forth in Appendix 
D. ) 
The total campus divestment actions since 1977 have 
reached $250 million, with $96 million divested in the 1984- 
85 academic year. This accelerated divestment trend is 
attributed to the effectiveness of campus protests. While 
students at Dartmouth College were holding a rally, the 
college trustees voted to divest $2 million from two companies 
^"U.S. Anti-Apartheid Upsurge," The Black Scholar 
16 (November/December 1985): 14. 
188 
involved in South Africa; on May 8, 1985 the Foundation 
Board at the California State University-Northridge unani¬ 
mously moved to divest all $2.3 million of its holdings 
linked to South Africa; and the full State University of 
New York (SUNY) Board of Regents voted for a $4 million 
partial divestment action which followed several protests 
at their meetings,including one on April 24, 1985 that 
resulted in 27 arrests. At the University of Iowa, a deci¬ 
sion to divest $2.25 million out of $2.50 million of its 
holdings in IBM, Mobil, Texaco, General Motors, and General 
Electric, came in the wake of a building occupation in 
which 137 protesters were arrested. Another Iowa-based 
school, Grinnell College, decided on partial divestment that 
will affect $9 million in South Africa-related holdings. 
In its first ever divestment action, in May 1985, the Trus¬ 
tees of Georgetown University voted to sell $11 million in 
32 holdings. 
These divestment moves were preceded by enactment 
of total divestment policies at the City University of New 
York (CUNY) and at two Washington State schools—Evergreen 
State and Western Washington—affecting $10 million. Fur¬ 
thermore, partial divestment actions have been undertaken 
at Rutgers University ($7 million), Harvard University ($1 
million), Yale University ($4.1 million), and Brown Univer¬ 
sity ($4.6 million). Columbia University, the scene of 
32 Ibid., pp. 14-15. 
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vigorous student protests throughout the 1985-86 academic 
year, tops the list of divestment schools. Its trustees 
announced in October 1985 that it would divest holdings 
33 amounting to $39 million over the next two years. 
While protests have led to some success on many 
campuses, other campuses which witnessed massive mobiliza¬ 
tion in behalf of divestment have not yet been so success¬ 
ful. A case in point is the 9-campus University of Cali¬ 
fornia (UC) system. A lot is at stake in this struggle. By 
1985, when student pressure forced the Regents to reconsider 
divestment after a ten-year battle, the value of UC-held 
stock in South Africa-related corporations had increased to 
$1.9 billion. The UC's investments in corporations with 
direct South Africa subsidiaries include Caterpillar Tractor 
($7,756,000), General Motors ($17,914,000), DuPont 
($90,753,000) and Citicorp ($82,345,000) .34 
Besides the student campus protests, the anti-apar¬ 
theid various organizations have had some successes as well. 
By mid-1984, well before the launching of Free South Africa 
Movement (FSAM), the number of states considering some divest¬ 
ment action had reached 29. Among the states that have 
passed legislation involving hundreds of millions of dollars 
are: Maryland, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Michigan, Nebras¬ 
ka, Iowa and Wisconsin. Moreover, divestment measures have 
33Ibid., p. 15. 
34 Ibid. 
190 
passed in such municipalities as New York City, Boston, 
Miami, Atlantic City and San Francisco, and in such counties 
35 as Montgomery (Maryland) and Cuyohoga (Ohio). (For a 
summary chart on public fund divestment of states, cities 
and counties, see Appendix E.) 
Meanwhile in Birmingham, Alabama, the battle for 
corporate divestment from South Africa is deadlocked. 
Although Birmingham Mayor Richard Arrington had promised he 
will meet each City Council member individually to better 
explain his resolution urging all city stock with companies 
doing business in South Africa to be withdrawn, the resolu¬ 
tion failed at the City Council's meeting on January 13, 1985 
because of a tied vote of 4 to 4. One of the Council mem¬ 
bers, Russell Yarbrough, who voted against the measure, 
defended his vote: "If we take our economic affairs away 
from South Africa it will hurt the poor people in South 
Africa rather than help because they will not have that 
revenue, and the city of Birmingham has no business dabbling 
in South Africa's affairs." In contrast, another Councilman 
William Bell, who voted for the ordinance, argued: "Con¬ 
sider the fact that blacks working in the mines in South 
Africa are working for $.50 to $.75 an hour while the aver¬ 
age white worker is making between $18.00 to $30.00 per 
3 6 
hour. So who are we really hurting?" Taking into 
35 American Committee on Africa, Summary Chart on 
Public Fund Divestment (New York: ACOA, 1985), p. 2. 
"^"Council Split on South Africa Resolution," The 
Birmingham Times, 10-15 January 1985, p. 1. 
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consideration the racial history of Birmingham, the home of 
Governor George Wallace, the avowed segregationist (although 
Rev. Jesse Jackson said he has been redeemed), it is not 
surprising to note that the bill was defeated. The apar¬ 
theid system cannot be equated with the polarization in the 
United States in the 1960's; however, the specters of racism 
masquerade in Birmingham. 
The protests by students, church groups, government 
officials, labor union members and other anti-apartheid 
groups have not been carried out without some reprisals. 
The Executive Director of ACOA, Jennifer Davis, was one of 
320 people arrested on April 22, 1985 in a non-violent 
blockade of the White House, the last of four days of action 
for peace, jobs and justice. As one of the initiators of the 
April actions and a member of the steering committee, the 
ACOA successfully pressed the coalition to include opposi¬ 
tion to apartheid as one of the four main themes of the 
action. The ACOA was instrumental in bringing in other 
anti-apartheid organizations. The action included rallies 
in Washington, D.C., Los Angeles, Seattle and San Francisco 
37 
that drew over 150,000 people. 
In demonstrating their relentlessness, the arrest of 
some of the anti-apartheid protesters at the White House and 
37 "Anti-Apartheid Action at the White House," 
American Committee on Africa (ACOA) Action News, No. 19 
(Spring 1985) , p. I~. 
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other places did not deter further marches, sit-ins, demon¬ 
strations and pickets; rather the arrests reinforced the 
anti-apartheid protesters' conviction that the apartheid 
regime and its collaborators cannot be defeated without some 
sacrifice. Thus, students across the United States joined 
in national anti-apartheid actions on April 24, 1985 calling 
for divestiture of university stockholdings in corporations 
doing business in South Africa. More than 70 campuses were 
involved. The initiative for the April 24 action came from 
students in the University of California system, where 32 
campuses took part in "some form of protests," according to 
Bart Stratton, Press Coordinator for the "Mandela Sit-In 
Committee" at Santa Cruz. He said the students' plan was to 
step up pressure on the university regents and state pen- 
38 sion funds to divest. 
There were sit-ins to dramatize the protest at 
Cornell, Tufts, the State University of New York, and Wis- 
consin-Madison. Protests were also reported at Dartmouth, 
Oberlin, Kentucky, Georgia State, New Mexico, Smith, George¬ 
town, Reed College, Oregon, and Princeton. A number of 
students also took part in the demonstration in front of 
the South African Embassy in Washington on April 24, 1985. 
At Columbia University in New York, where students under 
pressure from a court order ended a three-week sit-in on 
the steps of the university administration building, new 
3 8 
"U.S./South Africa: Student Protests on Rise," 
Africa News XXIV (May 6, 1985): 7. 
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demonstrations to coincide with a trustees' meeting and 
Commencement were announced. As part of the continued cam¬ 
paign to convince the university to divest, about 60 students 
were arrested on April 26 during a demonstration outside the 
offices of Rolls-Royce, Inc., whose chairman, Samuel L. 
Higginbottom is also chairman of Columbia's Board of Trustees. 
At Berkeley, in California, where about 1,000 students were 
camped outside Sproul Hall since April 16, 159 protesters 
were arrested for trespassing. The students' action also 
attracted backing from members of labor unions who were bused 
39 to the campus from nearby towns. 
Meanwhile, the apartheid regime is equally relent¬ 
less in its campaign for investment and is getting some help. 
To make the case for continued United States investment in 
South Africa, the South African Embassy hosted some 200 
business executives at a day-long seminar in Washington, D.C. 
on October 11, 1983. The seminars have been annual events 
for the past eight years. Some of the earlier gatherings 
were considerably more elaborate—attracting former President 
Gerald Ford and William Simon as highly-paid speakers, with 
funding from the secret Information Department funds that 
later became the focus of scandal in the South African govern¬ 
ment. The October 11 event, by contrast, was low-key, but 
it did attract between 20 and 50 demonstrators in the early 
39 Ibid., p. 8. 
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morning and at lunchtime. The protesters gathered outside 
the Madison Hotel with banners calling for an end to the 
. 40 United States involvement in the white-ruled nation. 
The South African government has also been involved 
with propaganda activities in the United States. On Monday, 
February 13, 1984, the New York Daily News reported the 
criticism of Rev. Jesse Jackson by Mayor Ed Koch for allowing 
his organization, PUSH, to accept funds from the Arab League. 
In his irrepressible style, Mayor Koch said: "It would be 
like white presidential candidate Walter Mondale accepting 
funds from the South African Good Government apartheid 
group." But as Dumisani Kumalo, Project Director of ACOA, 
revealed, Mayor Koch himself had received money from an agent 
of the apartheid regime for his re-election campaign in 1981. 
Reporting a major study of South African government propa¬ 
ganda activities in the United States by ACOA in 1983, he 
revealed : 
Records that agents of foreign governments 
are required to file with the Justice Department 
revealed that Baskin and Sears, a large law firm, 
was apartheid's major lobbyist, earning $500,000 
per year. One of the partners in this firm, John 
Sears, was Ronald Reagan's campaign manager in 
the 1980 presidential elections. The senior 
partner, Phillip Baskin, is a nationally respected 
Democrat and fund raiser for Walter Mondale's 1984 
presidential campaign. South Africa was buying 
the services of a firm with significant access to 
powerful people. Mayor Koch was only one of many 
influential elected officials who had received 
4 0 "South African Embassy Hosts Seminar," Africa 
News XXI (October 17, 1983): 3. 
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campaign contributions from the apartheid 
propagandists.... 
The South Africa's agents in this country and their American 
corporate allies can be expected to intensify their efforts 
on behalf of the apartheid regime. It is imperative, there¬ 
fore, for the ACOA and other anti-apartheid groups to con¬ 
tinue unfolding the activities of the apartheid propagandists 
as part of the broader campaign to break the links between 
the United States and South Africa. 
As the oppression of blacks in South Africa intensi¬ 
fies, a new wave of anti-apartheid protests have begun. The 
anti-apartheid protests, which began in Washington, D.C. 
during the month of May 1985, have spread to many other 
American cities, and have become a powerful force of at least 
educating the public on the bankruptcy of the United States 
foreign policy toward South Africa. Initiated by black 
leaders, the Free South Africa demonstrations have been 
joined by every racial and organizational character of 
American sociopolitical spectrum including labor groups, 
student activists, religious groups, and, to a lesser extent, 
elected government officials. As World Press Report noted, 
at least "twenty members of the U.S. House of Representatives 
and a member of the Senate" were, in an unprecedented manner, 
42 
arrested for civil disobedience. Among the actions, the 
41 "Busting Pretoria's Propaganda Ring," ACOA Action 
News, No. 17 (Spring 1984), p. 1. 
^World Press Report, June 1985, p. 42. 
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reinforced anti-apartheid protesters have taken are: sit- 
ins, occupations and blockades at universities, demonstra¬ 
tions at the South African Embassy in Washington, protests 
at corporate annual meetings, and state and local laws 
barring investment with institutions doing business in South 
Africa. 
At Harvard University, anti-apartheid senior stu¬ 
dents on Thursday, June 6, 1985, paraded four mock coffins 
through graduation exercises. One of the coffins reading, 
"A Harvard Investment," passed through the crowd of 25,000 
and symbolized "all those killed for speaking out against 
apartheid in South Africa," according to Melinda Daetsch, 
a senior student. Daetsch was one of the three seniors who 
got empty envelopes instead of diplomas for their part in 
blocking the door at a campus reception May 2 for South 
African U.N. Consul General Abe Hoppenstein. Of Harvard's 
4,586 graduates, more than 1,500 wore white arm bands to 
protest the university's $563 million investment in compa¬ 
nies doing business with South Africa. Nearly half of the 
class of 1985 has contributed to the endowment for divesti¬ 
ture instead of directly to Harvard's senior class gift 
43 fund. A graduating senior who carried one of the coffins 
and was denied his diploma, Tim Tangherlini, lucidly com¬ 
mented: "Harvard cannot force us to take courses in moral 
4 3 
Alfie Kohn and Eric Marsden, "Protests, Sanctions: 
The Tools of Change," USA Today 7 June 1985, p. 7A. 
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44 
reasoning without being moral itself." 
The solidarity movement against apartheid in the 
U.S. took a decisive leap in size and energy on August 13, 
1985 during the weekday rallies of a 35,000 crowd in New 
York and 6,000 in Washington, D.C. Other large and impres¬ 
sive solidarity demonstrations on the same day were held in 
Atlanta, Boston and San Francisco. These demonstrations 
include men and women from all walks of life including 
. . . 45 
activist, entertainer Harry Belafonte. As Workers World 
reports : 
Along with strong representation from community, 
anti-war and leftist political organizations, there 
were many workers from District 65, from District 
1199, from AFSCME Local 420 and from many other 
Washington, D.C.'s unions; one group of Greyhound 
bus drivers walked over from the Port Authority to 
join the rally. Many of the members, especially 
from District 65, had taken off from their jobs 
at 3:30 p.m. to make it to the rally by 4:30 p.m. 
Hundreds on the March carried the poster of the 
'U.S. Out of South Africa.''*® 
In San Francisco on August 9, action at Pier 80, a 
shipping port, marked the end of four days of picketing 
against the arrival of South African cargo on the Ned Lloyd 
ship, which docked August 8. As the ship reached the pier, 
it was temporarily forced to stop by anti-apartheid acti¬ 
vists in a boat. Eight months earlier, Pier 80 was the site 




John Catalinotto, "Giant Protests Open New Phase 
of Anti-Apartheid Struggle in U.S.," Workers World 22 August 
1985, p. 1. 
46 
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and Warehousemen's Union Local 10, which refused to unload 
47 South African cargo from the Ned Lloyd Kimberly. 
During the first week of October 1985, marches, 
vigils, religious services and solemn processions swept the 
U.S. in a groundswell of protests against apartheid. A pro¬ 
tester, Jim Harding, explained the significance of the mar¬ 
ches: "We are trying to send a message throughout the 
country and the world to let them know that apartheid in 
South Africa must stop." Meanwhile, in New York, a march to 
St. Patrick's Cathedral, led by NAACP Director Benjamin 
Hooks and comedian Bill Cosby, was followed by ecumenical 
services. Other observances included an early Sunday 
evening march in Los Angeles; in New Orleans, services were 
planned in St. Louis Cathedral; in Dallas, a rally was held 
at John F. Kennedy Memorial; and in Hannibal, Missouri, a 
procession from the courthouse was staged. 
In another campaign against the U.S. involvement 
with apartheid, the District of Columbia's congressional 
delegate and two other black leaders, released after spend¬ 
ing a night in jail for a sit-in at the South African Embassy, 
pledged that they will continue to assist in a national cam¬ 
paign against that nation's apartheid system and U.S. policy 
toward it. Delegate Walter Fauntroy, along with U.S. Civil 
Rights Commissioner Mary Frances Berry and black lobbyist, 
4P 
Karen DeWitt, "Apartheid Protests to Span USA," 
USA Today, 4 October 1985, p. 3A. 
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Randall Robinson, pleaded not guilty to misdemeanor charges 
and were released on their own recognizance. Commissioner 
. 49 Berry described U.S. policy toward Africa as "bankrupt." 
However, the anti-apartheid protesters who gather 
daily outside the South African Embassy in Washington are 
almost non-existent to Bernardus G. Fourie, South Africa's 
ambassador to the United States. Fourie defiantly ex¬ 
claimed: "Many days, I am not even aware that they have 
been there. The protests would not have any effect whatso¬ 
ever on the policies of my government. 
As the controversy over U.S. policy toward South 
Africa continues to grow, Rev. Jesse Jackson, a self-ap¬ 
pointed diplomat, requested and was granted a visa to visit 
South Africa. Jackson said: "The more that we can open up 
the lines of communication . . . the more the moral leaders 
51 
of the world will speak out." On the surface, this 
sounds plausible—an eloquent statement from a nobleman. 
But when we critically examine Jackson's diplomacy, we find 
no recorded instance whatsoever of any contact between him 
and the national liberation movements like the ANC; neither 
4 9 Timothy McQuay, "Capital Sit-In Launches South 
Africa Protest," USA Today, 13 November 1984, p. 3A. 
50 
Steve Marshall, "Protests Don't Rock South African 
Envoy," USA Today, 21 December 1984, p. 14A. 
^Mereille Grangenois and John T. McGowan, "Jackson 
Gets Visa, Will Visit South Africa," USA Today, 4 December 
1984, p. 4A. 
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has he met with any of the leaders of frontline states to 
share their views on the best way Black Americans can con¬ 
tribute to the eradication of apartheid. Conflicting issues 
cannot be reconciled in an isolation or in a vacuum. What 
would be the immediate result of Rev. Jackson's meeting with 
the leaders of white minority regime? Whatever the outcome 
would be, it is unlikely to alter the fundamental principle 
of apartheid system. While an increasing number of Americans 
are supporting dismantlement of apartheid and black triumph 
in South Africa, it appears that some influential figures in 
the United States like Rev. Jackson, an unsuccessful candi¬ 
date for the Democratic presidential nomination in 1984, are 
using the oppression of blacks in South Africa to advance 
their political fortunes. 
The so-called moral majority leader, Rev. Jerry 
Falwell, on August 20, 1985, met with South African President 
Pieter Botha and emerged with praise for the white minority 
government. Rev. Falwell said he agreed with Botha that 
apartheid is more "a social reality" than a government 
policy. He exclaimed that Americans were falsely informed 
about South Africa and he would spend one million dollars 
on television advertisements to correct the impression. He 
said he would mount a campaign to promote U.S. investment 
in South Africa. Falwell accused leaders such as Bishop 
Desmond Tutu, whom he described as "phony", of presenting 
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. 52 a distorted picture of South Africa. Falwell further 
argued: 
The South African issue has to be the Water¬ 
gate of the American media. You have to go to 
twenty or thirty countries before you find 
South Africa as the major problem in Africa. 
The problem is the famine in Ethiopia; Uganda, 
where Idi Amin killed 300,000 blacks; . . . 
Libya (with its) hit squads and terrorists 
. . . and other countries.53 
Rev. Falwell's foray into South Africa's affairs is to 
draw our attention away from the issue. The racial and 
class polarization in South Africa is not analogous to the 
problem of famine in Ethiopia or the political turmoil in 
Uganda. The real "phonies" are those who wish to see the 
blacks remain in the wilderness with chains of enslavement 
rather than risk retaliation for daring to be free. 
In any case, Rev. Falwell is not alone in defending 
apartheid. James J. Kilpatrick, in a letter to the editor 
of the Atlanta Constitution, wrote: 
It is curious, is it not, that Congress so 
ferocious toward South Africa should be so silent 
about the Soviet Union? Every recital made about 
South Africa would comply with equal accuracy to 
the Communist world, but who would vote sanctions 
against Moscow? South Africa is our anti-communist 
ally; one day we may need its tactical and strate¬ 
gic assistance.54 
52 United Press International, "South Africa is 
Praised by Rev. Falwell—Moral Majority Leader Vows Support 
to Botha," USA Today, 20 August 1985, p. 1. 
53 The Associated Press, "Jackson, Falwell Debate 
South Africa," Atlanta Journal, 5 September 1985, p. 6A. 
54 James J. Kilpatrick, "South African Bills Ignore 
Our Own Nation's History," Atlanta Constitution, 18 July 
1985, p. 17. 
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In a similar manner, the Daughters of the American Revolu¬ 
tion (DAR)—an elite organization—passed a resolution 
urging friendly relations and vigorous trade with South 
Africa. The DAR members called South Africa "a proven ally, 
one of the few remaining republics in the world" and 
urge that stable, friendly relations be maintained 
with that pro-Western government of the Republic 
of South Africa and vigorous trade be pursued in 
a concerted effort to thwart the alarming build¬ 
up of Soviet power in this region.^5 
Survey Polls of Public Opinion 
Public opinion polls specifically on American public 
attitudes and/or the United States foreign policy toward 
South Africa are scarce, particularly during the administra¬ 
tions of Presidents Nixon and Ford. Beginning from the 
Carter administration, there have been few but, nevertheless 
significant works done regarding public attitudes vis-a-vis 
United States policy toward the racist minority regime. 
Therefore, our analysis begins from 1977 inculcating compara 
tive attitudes of major American groups. 
Although there was still widespread ignorance among 
a significant number of American citizens in 1977 regarding 
the apartheid system and the United States government collab 
oration with it, because of the paucity of general informa¬ 
tion about South Africa by the mass media, a general tone 
of public opinion, nevertheless, did prevail among the 
55 
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majority of those Americans who offered their views. The 
majority of the concerned Americans related either directly 
or indirectly to the race relations and especially the 
behavior of the South African government. Opposition to 
the apartheid policies and practices and to the white 
regime responsible for them has been much more widespread 
when these issues have been cast in more moral and ethical 
terms. Only 12 percent of the total adult public—mainly 
less educated, lower and working class, especially older 
deep southern whites—felt the "system of apartheid in 
South Africa is justified" against 63 percent who dis¬ 
agreed.^ Analyzing this impact of public view, Alfred 0. 
Hero, Jr. explained: 
Racial issues are accorded priority over all 
other considerations in the images and attitudes 
most Americans hold regarding South Africa. They 
are either the only issues noted or the first or 
most prominent issues mentioned in open-ended 
questions about South Africa. Considerations of 
strategic interests, raw materials, investments, 
trade, and possible influence by governments or 
ideologies hostile to the United States (such as 
Communism) are relatively seldom raised except 
when specifically posed in the interview.^7 
Yet the "vital economic and strategic interests" are given 
a priority by the U.S. government over the moral and 
humanitarian concers for the South African oppressed. The 
American public is repeatedly told by the ruling class that 
c zr 
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Africa" in The American People and South Africa: Publics, 
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the "vital economic and strategic interests" must be 
defended in the name of "national interest and security." 
But why is it that the public has not given any considera¬ 
tions to the so-called "national interest" that the U.S. 
policy toward South Africa purportedly represents? If the 
much emphasized "national interest" by the ruling class is 
assumed to represent the interest of the general public, the 
American citizens have denied rather than confirmed that 
assumption. In retrospect, the pursuit of "national inter¬ 
est" serves the interest of those who own and control the 
economic stakes in South Africa. 
In respect to South Africa in particular, 44 percent 
in late 1977 favored the "United States and other Western 
nations putting pressure on South Africa to give blacks 
there more freedom and participation in government," while 
only 26 percent were opposed. In November 1977, 51 percent 
to 24 percent of the American public favored cutting off 
arms sales to South Africa; 46 to 38 percent getting American 
corporations in that country to put pressure on the South 
African government; and 42 to 33 percent preventing new U.S. 
business investment. A year and a half later, 52 to 24 per¬ 
cent would "cut off all shipments of military supplies and 
replacement parts," 48 to 26 percent would "persuade allies 
to join in boycott of military supplies and replacement 
parts;" 70 percent of the U.S. public agreed "with a U.S. 
position that called on South Africa to eliminate racial 
discrimination" (16 percent disagreed), and 83 percent agreed 
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with one that "called on South Africa to start talks between 
black and white leaders there on the future of that country" 
5 8 (8 percent disagreed). 
However, only a minority in 1979 favored more strin¬ 
gent measures be taken against the apartheid regime to force 
it to change. The majority was reluctant for the United 
States to become more directly involved in the racial and 
class confrontation in South Africa. For example, only 7 
percent favored (and 73 percent opposed) "encouraging blacks 
inside South Africa to engage in guerrilla warfare against 
the white government; 13 percent favored the United States 
sending military supplies to black African states for use 
against South Africa; 12 percent favored helping build up 
military pressures in Africa against South Africa; and 7 
percent favored starting a limited military action against 
South Africa. Furthermore, only a small minority in 1979 
would support either whites (9 percent) or blacks (2 per¬ 
cent) "if the level of violence in South Africa increased 
and many whites were being killed by blacks"; and only 10 
percent would have the United States help mediate the con¬ 
flict, and a significant majority (59 percent) would not 
59 
get "involved." This is, by no means, a tacit support of 
the prevailing American policy, as some may have us believe. 
The public did not want (and does not want) the United 
58Ibid., p. 10. 
59Ibid., pp. 10-11. 
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States government to be directly involved in South Africa 
because the lessons of Vietnam were still very much fresh 
in their minds. In the Vietnam war, where the United States 
lost countless casualties and billions of dollars despite 
suffering the most humiliating military defeat in recent 
history, it was the American innocent citizens, and not the 
ruling class, that paid the ultimate price in defense of 
anti-communist propaganda. With that in mind, most American 
citizens have resolved not to allow their government to draw 
them into another Vietnam. 
As we have seen thus far, the cast of majority U.S. 
opinion between 1977 to 1979 was in conflict with the public 
stance of the Carter administration regarding South Africa. 
The emphasis on increased trade with the apartheid regime in 
the hope that the U.S. corporations can use their leverage 
in promoting racial harmony, as President Carter will argue, 
was not supported by the majority of the American public. 
Rather, the majority supported a decrease in trade with 
South Africa. Although public relations to a crisis in 
American foreign policy depend on the tone of coverage on 
television and in other popular media and on interpretations 
and policy preferences argued by leaders in and out of 
government, suffice it to say that the American public in 
general does have some basic knowledge of the system of 
apartheid and the United States collaboration with it. 
Insofar as blacks are concerned with the U.S. foreign 
policy toward Africa, they have singled out South Africa as 
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a particularly important issue. The general black citizenry 
is much less likely than their white compatriots to hold 
negative stereotypes of South African blacks and much more 
sensitive to and critical of racial discrimination in that 
country. Only 7 percent of blacks generally, contrasted 
with 26 percent of whites, in late 1977 opposed the U.S. 
government's putting pressure on the South African govern¬ 
ment "to give blacks more freedom and participation in 
government." In early 1979, only 11 percent of blacks, 
contrasted with 30 percent of whites, felt that if blacks 
in South Africa gained political control, the result would 
be "economic chaos," only 15 percent versus 40 percent 
believed that "whites will either be killed or driven out," 
and 9 percent versus 40 percent believed that South Africa 
would be "heavily influenced by communists." At that time, 
70 percent of blacks, contrasted to 55 percent of whites, 
favored official U.S. "public statements, condemning South 
Africa's racial policies," 52 percent versus 41 percent 
favored "cutting down trade," and 53 percent versus 47 per- 
6 0 cent favored "restricting business investments." 
It is not inconceivable that the frustrations of 
and psychological impacts on black South Africans have been 
perceived by black Americans as deja vu from their own ex¬ 
periences and feelings and those of their ancestors a genera¬ 
tion ago. The attitudes of South African whites who resist 
60 Ibid., p. 12. 
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change may seem to them much like those of American segre¬ 
gationists. But the reality is that, unlike the black 
Americans who are a minority, the black South Africans who 
suffer a cross of humiliation in their own land, are the 
majority. This point is important in that no amount of 
sham reforms short of a total national liberation will free 
the dispossessed and exploited South Africans. Evidently, 
this realization is increasingly becoming pervasive among 
black Americans. A groundswell of black political opinion 
is beginning to assert that the issue in South Africa is 
not a matter of marginal, incremental changes within the 
apartheid system; rather there must be fundamental change— 
a matter of black political power and the restructuring of 
the economy. 
In contrast, most U.S. corporations have rejected 
suggestions that they withdraw from South Africa. To do 
so, they say, would only aggravate unemployment there and 
strengthen the resolve of whites to resist external pressure. 
They believe that they can act as a progressive force for 
change by remaining in South Africa. Although there has 
been no specific study to measure the U.S. corporations' 
attitudes toward South Africa; nevertheless, as evidence of 
a commitment to business as usual, more than 130 U.S. com¬ 
panies have endorsed the Sullivan Principles.This is 
^Desaix Myers, III, "U.S. Domestic Controversy Over 
American Business in South Africa," in The American People 
and South Africa: Publics, Elites, and Policymaking Pro¬ 
cesses (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1978), p. 67. 
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supported by the Carter administration which opposed more 
stringent control on trade and investment, arguing that 
such actions would be ineffective and run counter to the 
6 2 United States policy on foreign investment worldwide. But 
the continued U.S. business activities in South Africa con¬ 
tribute capital and technical expertise that strengthen the 
apartheid regime's economic system and make it less suscepti¬ 
ble to international pressures for political change. 
According to George Gallup, "the foreign policy of 
a democracy cannot be successfully carried on for very long 
6 3 
unless policy-makers continually consult public opinion." 
In spirit, that view has an appealing, all-American ring, 
but in practice, it amounts to an emptiness. South Africa 
presents the latest and one of the most revealing cases of 
American public impotency in influencing its own government. 
Two main features continue to dominate public opinion toward 
South Africa: a profound dislike of the present system in 
that country and a general feeling that the United States 
should do something about it. 
The survey upon which this report is based was con¬ 
ducted by Response Analysis Corporation (Princeton, New 
Jersey) at the request of the Carnegie Endowment for Inter¬ 
national Peace. It is based on telephone interviews 
62Ibid., p. 73. 
^Quoted in Deborah D. Barron and John Immerwahr, 
"The Public Views South Africa: Pathways Through a Gather¬ 
ing Storm," Public Opinion (January/February 1979): 54. 
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conducted February 15 to March 16, 1979, with 1,000 adult 
64 men and women around the United States. This report was 
presented for hearings before the subcommittee on Africa 
of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representa¬ 
tives . 
According to Table 4.1, a clear majority of the 
public thinks that the United States should do something to 
get the South African government to change its racial poli¬ 
cies. This is a general shared perception though predictably 
more intensely held by blacks. The strongest opposition to 
doing something is found among the Jewish and Republican 
respondents. If the popular assumption that the Jews and 
the Republicans are more business-oriented than other citi¬ 
zens is valid, their opposition then to the most profitable 
capitalist apartheid South Africa is clear. 
On the basis of the description given, there was 
also an overwhelming disapproval of the current regime in 
South Africa by the American public. This assessment was 
shared by many elements in the society. 
There are about five million whites in South 
Africa and about eighteen million blacks. Black 
South Africans cannot vote or participate in the 
national government. South African law strictly 
enforces racial discrimination. In addition, the 
government does not live up to many of American 
64 
J. Daniel O'Flaherty, "Public Opinion Poll on 
American Attitudes Toward South Africa," Hearings before 
the sub-committee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, House of Representatives, 96th Congress, 1st 
Session, October/November 1979, p. 402. 
TABLE 4.1 
Do you think that the United States should or should not do something 




Grad. Repub. Dem. Union Jew Blk. White 
Yes 53 55 50 58 56 50 67 51 
No 35 35 38 31 35 40 27 36 
Qualified 5 6 4 4 6 __ __ _ _ 5 
Source: J. Daniel O'Flaherty, "Public Opinion on American Attitudes Toward South 
Africa," Hearings before the Sub-Committee on Africa of the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 96th Congress, 1st Session, 






standards of justice. For example, it keeps 
people in jail without making criminal charges 
against them and it doesn't bring them to trial. 
How do you feel about this situation? Do you 
feel that it is right or wrong that these condi¬ 
tions exist, or doesn't it matter to you one 
way or the other? 
Right 2% 
Wrong 86% 
Doesn't Matter 5% 
Qualified 3%65 
Significantly, a plurality of the public supported 
the proposition that the United States should act in 
accordance with a United Nations embargo on trade with 
South Africa if enacted, and interestingly the public agrees 
with the proposition that the United Nations plays a "use¬ 
ful role in world affairs." The respondents were asked: 
What do you think about the United Nations? 




If the United Nations were to approve a resolution 
calling on all countries to cut off trade with South Africa, 
do you think the United States should or should not cut off 
trade? 
Should 46% 
Should Not 33% 
Qualified 5%66 
65Ibid., p. 419. 
^Ibid., pp. 415 and 434. 
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At the same time, as the study has revealed, the public 
expressed a clear preference that the United States not 
get involved if internal black-white violence in South 
Africa increases (52 percent to 11 percent), if "Communists" 
supply black revolutionaries in South Africa with military 
support (49 percent to 18 percent), or if Soviet troops 
actually get involved on the side of the blacks (46 percent 
to 20 percent).^ 
Indeed, there is an apparent consensus among the 
majority of the public on what should be role of the United 
States toward apartheid South Africa. Louis Harris, a popu¬ 
lar American survey expert, has recently found that by 
almost a two-to-one margin (46 to 26 percent), Americans 
favor the United States and other nations putting pressure 
on the South African government to dismantle apartheid 
system. Specifically, he found large segments of the public 
support cutting off arms sales to South Africa (favored 
51 to 24 percent), getting U.S. companies in South Africa 
to put pressure on the South African government (46 to 28 
percent), and preventing new U.S. business investments in 
6 8 
South Africa (42 to 33 percent). 
Indeed, the overwhelming weight of American public 
opinion is supportive of the black majority in South Africa. 
67Ibid., p. 438. 
6 8 
See the analysis of Barron and Immerwahr, "The 
Public Views South Africa: Pathways Through a Gathering 
Storm," Public Opinion, p. 54. 
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In a special Gallup Poll, American most respected poll¬ 
ster, completed August 15, 1985, as shown in Table 4.3, 
59 percent say they sympathize more with the black South 
African population; only 11 percent take the part of the 
government, while 7 percent are sympathetic toward both 
factions. Almost one in four (23 percent) does not express 
an opinion on the issue. Of 1,009 Americans surveyed, 64 
percent of 505 men polled sympathize with black population 
as against 56 percent of 504 women. Table 4.3 also shows 
that the higher the level of education of the respondents 
the more sympathy they have for the black population in South 
Africa. Seventy-five percent college graduates compared 
with 38 percent of non-high school graduates sympathize with 
the black South Africans. 
As Table 4.4 indicates, there is an obvious politi¬ 
cal slant to the public's assessment of the Reagan adminis¬ 
tration's South African dealings, with 35 percent approving 
and 32 percent disapproving. The extent of the public's 
ambivalence about the President's South African actions is 
illustrated by the fact that among those surveyed who 
approve of the Reagan administration's handling of the 
situation in South Africa, only 17 percent, as Table 4.2 
shows, have very closely followed the events in South Africa. 
Therefore, the 35 percent approval as against 32 percent 
disapproval of Reagan's handling of the situation in South 
Africa cannot be interpreted as a harbinger of a massive 
swing in public attitudes in favor of his administration. 
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But rather it should be seen as a reflection of the paucity 
of information to the public on the U.S. government and its 
multinational corporations' activities in South Africa. It 
is further instructive that the majority of those surveyed 
have little knowledge about the United States-South African 
relations and much less the situation in South Africa. For 
example, Table 4.5 indicates that only 48 percent of the 
1,009 polled know that black South Africans have no right 
to vote. Predictably those without a high school education 
(30 percent) believe that black South Africans cannot vote 
in contrast to those with a college education (60 percent). 
It is also instructive to note that only 59 percent of the 
respondents are aware that black South Africans are three- 
fourths or more of the South African population (see Table 
4.6). Surprisingly, the white respondents are better in¬ 
formed than their black counterparts. Sixty percent of the 
white respondents compared to 47 percent black respondents 
believe that black South African population is three-fourths 
or more. 
Recognizing the necessity to validate the August 
poll, Gallup conducted another survey in October 1985 with 
a sharp swing in public attitudes which places Reagan's 
handling of the situation in South Africa in the wrong direc¬ 
tion. According to Table 4.7, of 1,540 Americans surveyed, 
only 33 percent approve of Reagan's handling of the situation 
in South Africa against 39 percent who disapprove. Pre¬ 
dictably, this is a more tensely held view among blacks 
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(77 percent disapproving) than whites (35 percent). Signi¬ 
ficantly, the disapproval rate of Reagan's handling of the 
situation in South Africa is higher among the unskilled 
workers than the professional/business persons. The un¬ 
skilled workers' disapproval rate is 39 percent and the pro¬ 
fessional/business persons' approval rate is 37 percent. 
It is obvious that amid growing racial tension and 
little concrete evidence that the South African government 
is ready to change its apartheid racial system, the American 
people feel the United States should play a more assertive 
role in helping to end apartheid rather than the direct 
support that the Reagan administration gives South Africa in 
the hope that it will bring about "preferred" evolutionary 
change. The Gallup Poll shows that a 47 percent plurality 
of "aware" Americans feels the U.S. should put more pressure 
on the government of South Africa to end apartheid, while 30 
percent think that the United States is adequately handling 
the situation; 15 percent would apply less pressure, and 8 
percent are undecided (see Table 4.10). The aware group 
comprises, as shown in Table 4.8, 56 percent of the total 
sample saying they have followed recent events in South 
Africa very or fairly closely. 
As in the August 1985 survey, the October 1985 Gallup 
Poll reveals that Americans strongly support the black 
majority in South Africa, with 63 percent saying they sympa¬ 
thize with the black population there. By comparison, 13 
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percent side with the South African government and 18 per¬ 
cent are equally sympathetic to both sides (see Table 4.11). 
Also in the October Gallup Poll, as Table 4.9 indi¬ 
cates, a 47 percent plurality of the aware group disapproves 
of President Reagan's handling of the South African situa¬ 
tion, while 39 percent approve. Whereas in August 1985, 
those approving (41 percent) and disapproving (40 percent) 
were about equal in number, the October 1985 survey, with a 
greater sample size of 1,540 as against 1,009 in August, is 
statistically more significant. It is also instructive to 
note that a sharp difference exists between Table 4.7 on 
Reagan's handling of the situation in South Africa based on 
the aware group. The significance is that the more Ameri¬ 
cans are aware of the situation in South Africa, the lesser 
they are supportive of their government's role there. 
In sum, the Gallup Poll of October 1985 confirms 
that the American public favors a more assertive role in 
South Africa in contrast to the August 1985 survey. In 
essence, the American public is increasingly distancing 
itself from the rubric of "constructive engagement" of 
Reagan's policy. The feeling that the U.S. should put more 
pressure on South Africa predominates in most key population 
groups, but is expressed to a greater extent by younger 
Americans, the college-educated, and especially blacks as 
Table 4.10 has revealed. 
Another survey by Louis Harris and Associates in 
May-June 1977 also shows that the majority of Americans 
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sympathize with black South Africans. In this study, 1,546 
respondents, of whom 129 are black, were asked: 
In the Union of South Africa, the white minority 
has run the country and kept blacks from attaining 
any real political or economic power. Do you feel 
that this policy of keeping blacks down in South 
Africa can be justified or not? 
Justified Not Justified No Opinion 
National 15% 57% 28% 
Black 11% 67% 21%69 
In another survey by Louis Harris and Associates, September 
5-9, 1985, 1,255 respondents were polled including 108 
blacks. The respondents were asked: 
Is it immoral for the U.S. to support a government 
that oppresses blacks? 
Agree Disagree No Opinion 
National 63% 32% 5% 
Black 71% 29% 0%70 
Yet in another question, Louis Harris and Associates, in the 
September 5-9, 1985 survey asked the respondents: 
Do you favor putting pressure on the South 
African government to give blacks more freedom 
and participation? 
Favor Oppose 
National 71% 21% 8% 




"Americans Evaluate the Situation in South Africa," 




Even a survey by CBS News, August 29, 1985, in 
which 709 respondents including 77 blacks were interviewed, 
shows that Americans are increasingly becoming impatient 
with Reagan's policy of "constructive engagement" with the 
apartheid regime and are edging toward punitive measures 
against South Africa. The respondents were asked: 
Next month Congress will be debating whether or 
not to impose economic sanctions limiting trade 
with South Africa as a way to pressure South 
Africa to change its racial policies. Should 
the United States impose economic sanctions or 
not? 
U.S. Should Should No 
impose Sanctions Not Opinion 
National 37% 34% 29% 
Black 70% 17% 72 13% 
As demonstrated, the poll data on South Africa pre¬ 
sented here reveal that when given a chance, Americans 
readily acknowledge that they are not very well informed 
about conditions in South Africa. Nonetheless, they have a 
reasonable firm idea of the general approach they want their 
leaders to take. First, the system of apartheid should be 
condemned and the U.S. should try to get the South African 
government to change by putting economic pressure on the 
regime. Secondly and more importantly, Americans have 
voiced their opposition to their government for supporting 
a regime that is morally bankrupt. 
72 Ibid., p. 28. 
TABLE 4.2 
How Closely Followed Situation in South Africa 
Question: How closely would you say you've followed the recent events 
in South Africa—very closely, fairly closely, or not very 
closely? 
August 13- 15, 1985 
Very Fairly Not very No Number of 
Closely Closely Closely Opinion Interviews 
NATIONAL 17% 46% 36% 1% 1,009 
Sex 
Men 20 45 34 1 505 
Women 14 47 38 1 504 
Age 
Total under 30 13 43 42 2 287 
18-24 years 9 46 44 1 150 
25-29 years 17 39 41 3 137 
30-49 years 16 49 35 * 411 
Total 50 & older 21 46 32 1 307 
50-64 years 24 41 33 1 180 
65 & older 18 51 31 * 127 
Region 
East 18 49 33 * 280 
Midwest 15 45 40 * 282 
South 19 43 36 2 275 
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Very Fairly Not very No Number of 























High school graduates 






















Republicans 18 45 37 * 330 
Democrats 21 42 36 i 302 
Independents 13 51 35 i 328 
Household Income 
$50,000 & over 19 47 34 * 123 
$35,000-$49,999 11 55 34 * 124 
$25,000-$34,999 15 44 40 i 203 
$15,000-$24,999 20 51 29 * 239 
$10,000-$14,999 20 43 37 * 119 
Under $10,000 15 41 42 2 120 
$25,000 & over 15 48 37 * 450 































Labor union families 19 50 31 * 180 
Non-labor union families 16 45 38 1 829 
* Less than one percent. 






Sympathies in South Africa 
Question: In the South African situation, are your sympathies more 
with the black population or more with the South African 
government? 
August 13-15, 1985 
Black S.A. Both No Number of 
Population Government (Vol.) Opinion Inverviews 
NATIONAL 59% 11% 7% 23% 1,009 
Sex 
Men 64 12 7 17 505 
Women 56 9 6 29 504 
Age 
Total under 30 68 12 4 16 287 
18-24 years 69 14 5 12 150 
25-29 years 68 10 2 20 137 
30-49 years 68 11 7 14 411 
Total 50 & older 43 10 9 38 307 
50-64 years 45 10 11 34 180 
65 & older 40 10 8 42 127 
Region 
East 66 10 8 16 280 
Midwest 53 10 9 28 282 
South 53 11 8 28 275 
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Black S.A. Both No Number of 





















College graduates 75 7 7 11 306 
College incomplete 68 8 7 17 259 
High school graduates 54 14 6 26 351 
Not high school graduates 38 14 10 38 91 
Politics 
Republicans 53 16 6 25 330 
Democrats 63 10 7 20 302 
Independents 65 8 6 21 328 
Household Income 
$50,000 & over 73 13 5 9 33 
$35,000-$49,999 66 6 8 20 124 
$25,000-$34,999 63 12 5 20 203 
$15,000-$24,999 65 8 6 21 239 
$10,000-$14,999 52 18 8 22 119 
Under $10,000 53 10 7 30 120 
$25,000 & over 66 10 7 17 450 































Labor union families 59 13 7 21 180 
Non-labor union families 60 10 7 23 829 






Reagan Administration's Handling of Situation in South Africa 
Question: Do you approve or disapprove of the way the Reagan 

























Total under 30 35 37 28 287 
18-24 years 37 36 27 150 
25-29 years 32 38 30 137 
30-49 years 34 34 32 411 
Total 50 & older 37 26 37 307 
50-64 years 42 24 34 180 
65 & older 33 28 39 127 
Region 
East 40 34 26 280 
Midwest 30 31 39 282 
South 38 26 36 275 






August 13-15, 1985 
Approve 
No Number of 
Disapprove Opinion Interviews 
Race 
Whites 38% 28% 34% 884 
Non-whites 17 58 25 125 
Blacks 12 63 25 77 
Education 
College graduates 39 40 21 306 
College incomplete 37 33 30 259 
High school graduates 36 27 37 351 


















$50,000 & over 47 34 19 123 
$35,000-$49,999 42 28 30 124 
$25,000-$34,999 35 31 34 203 
$15,000-$24,999 35 33 32 239 
$10,000-$14,999 24 41 35 119 
Under $10,000 37 34 29 120 
$25,000 & over 40 31 29 450 






August 13- 15, 1985 
No Number of 
Approved Disapprove Opinion Interviews 
Religion 
Protestants 37% 28% 35% 538 
Catholics 37 36 27 301 
Labor Union 
Labor union families 28 38 34 180 
Non-labor union families 37 31 32 829 






Can South African Blacks Vote? 
Question: Do you happen to know whether or not black South Africans 
have the right to vote? 
August 13-15, 1985 
Number of 
Yes, do No, do not Not sure Interviews 
NATIONAL 20% 48% 32% 1,009 
Sex 
Men 22 47 31 505 
Women 17 49 34 504 
Age 
Total under 30 17 44 39 287 
18-24 years 20 46 34 150 
25-29 years 14 41 45 137 
30-49 years 18 54 28 411 
Total 50 & older 23 45 32 307 
50-64 years 20 51 29 180 
65 & older 27 38 35 127 
Region 
East 23 52 25 280 
Midwest 18 48 34 282 
South 21 44 35 275 






August 13-15, 1985 
Number of 
Yes, do No, do not Not sure Interviews 
Race 
Whites 19% 49% 32% 884 
Non-whites 26 40 34 125 
Blacks 26 39 35 77 
Education 
College graduates 17 60 23 306 
College incomplete 15 56 29 259 
High school graduates 18 44 38 351 
Not high school graduates 32 30 38 91 
Politics 
Republicans 21 48 31 330 
Democrats 20 46 34 302 
Independents 17 53 30 328 
Household Income 
$50,000 & over 22 59 19 123 
$35,000-$49,999 13 59 28 124 
$25,000-$34,999 16 52 32 203 
$15,000-$24,999 18 50 32 239 
$10,000-$14,999 16 44 40 119 
Under $10,000 34 35 31 120 
$25,000 & over 16 56 28 450 









August 13-15, 1985 












Labor union families 20 46 34 180 
Non-labor union families 19 49 32 829 
Source: The Gallup Report, No. 240, October 1985, p. 16 
TABLE 4.6 
What Proportion Is Black? 
Question: Do you happen to know what proportion of South Africans are black? 
Would you say three-fourths or more, somewhere between one-half 
and three-fourths, somewhere between one-fourth and one-half, or 
less than one-fourth are black? 
August 13-15, 1985 
Between 
3/4 or h and Between Less Not Number of 
more 3/4 h and \ than V Sure Interviews 
NATIONAL 59% 24% 3% 1% 13% 1,009 
Sex 
Men 66 20 1 2 11 505 
Women 53 27 4 1 15 504 
Total under 30 53 31 4 2 10 287 
18-24 years 50 35 6 1 8 150 
25-29 years 55 28 2 2 13 137 
30-49 years 62 24 4 1 9 411 
Total 50 & older 62 17 1 1 19 307 
50-64 years 64 12 2 * 22 180 
65 & older 59 22 * 2 17 127 
Region 
East 60 25 4 3 8 280 
Midwest 63 21 3 1 12 282 
South 54 25 2 1 18 275 






August 13-15, 1985 
Between 
3/4 or H and Between Less Not Number of 
more 3/4 h a nd V t ha n \ i Sure Interviews 
Race 
Whites 60% 23% 3% 1% 13% 884 
Non-whites 53 25 2 3 17 125 
Blacks 47 28  1 4 18 77 
Education 
College graduates 71 21 2 * 6 306 
College incomplete 65 22 4 1 8 259 
High school graduates 55 26 5 * 13 351 
Not high school graduates 45 25 1 2 28 91 
Politics 
Republicans 58 28 3 * 11 330 
Democrats 63 19 3 1 14 302 
Independents 59 23 4 2 12 328 
Household Income 
$50,000 & over 76 15 2 * 7 123 
$35,000-$49,999 64 21 1 1 13 124 
$25,000-$34,999 64 23 5 2 6 203 
$15,000-$24,999 61 26 3 1 9 239 
$10,000-$14,999 50 25 3 1 21 119 
Under $10,000 49 24 5 2 20 120 
$25,000 & over 68 20 3 1 8 450 




































Labor union families 58 24 5 1 12 180 
Non-labor union families 59 24  3  1 13 829 
*Less than one percent. 
Source: The Gallup Report, No. 240, October 1985, p. 17 • 
TABLE 4.7 
Reagan's Handling of Situation in South Africa 
Question: Now let me ask you about some specific foreign and domestic problems. 
As I read off each problem, would you tell me whether you approve or 
disapprove of the way President Reagan is handling that problem? 
October 11-14, 1985 
No Number of 
Approve Disapprove Opinion Interviews 
NATIONAL 33% 39% 28% 1,540 
Sex 
Men 37 41 22 775 
Women 30 37 33 765 
Age 
Total under 30 28 44 28 319 
18-24 years 28 42 30 152 
25-29 years 28 45 27 167 
30-49 years 38 38 24 595 
Total 50 & older 32 36 32 621 
50-64 years 35 36 29 336 
65 & older 29 35 36 285 
Region 
East 38 38 24 383 
Midwest 30 38 32 403 
South 30 41 29 434 






October 11-14, 1985 
No Number of 
Approve Disapprove Opinion Interviews 
Race 
Whites 36% 35% 29% 1,391 
Non-whites 14 70 16 149 
Blacks 13 77 10 133 
Hispanics 43 32 25 100 
Education 
College graduates 39 44 17 300 
College incomplete 36 38 26 376 
High school graduates 35 37 28 517 
Not high school graduates 25 38 37 344 
Politics 
Republicans 47 27 26 538 
Democrats 23 50 27 628 
Independents 32 39 29 338 
Occupation of CWE 
Professional & business 37 37 26 463 
Clerical & sales 31 37 32 108 
Manual workers 32 41 27 545 
Skilled workers 31 44 25 259 






October 11-14, 1985 
No Number of 
Approve Disapprove Opinion Interviews 
Household Income 
$50,000 & over 46% 34% 20% 144 
$35,000-$49,999 41 42 17 220 
$25,000-$34,999 32 39 29 278 
$15,000-$24,999 34 38 28 340 
$10,000-$14,999 32 39 29 196 
Under $10,000 26 40 34 277 
$25,000 & over 38 39 23 642 
Under $25,000 31 39 30 813 
Religion 
Protestants 33 38 29 888 
Catholics 37 36 27 430 
Labor Union 
Labor union families 38 41 21 315 
Non-labor union families 32 38 30 1,225 






How Closely Followed Situation in South Africa 
Question: How closely would you say you've followed the recent events in 
South Africa - very closely, fairly closely, or not very closely? 
October 11-14, 1985 
Very Fairly Not very No Number of 
Closely Closely Closely Opinion Interviews 
NATIONAL 13% 43% 40% 4% 1,540 
Sex 
Men 16 45 37 2 775 
Women 11 41 43 5 765 
Age 
Total under 30 12 38 44 6 319 
18-24 years 13 32 49 6 152 
25-29 years 12 45 37 6 167 
30-49 years 12 47 38 3 595 
Total 50 & older 15 42 39 4 621 
50-64 years 15 44 38 3 336 
65 & older 13 40 42 5 285 
Region 
East 10 46 37 7 383 
Midwest 11 44 43 2 403 
South 14 41 39 6 434 






October 11-14, 1985 
Very Fairly Not very No Number of 



























College graduates 21 56 24 * 300 
College incomplete 14 45 39 2 376 
High school graduates 12 43 41 4 517 





Occupation of CWE 
Professional & business 14 
Clerical & sales 19 
Manual workers 10 
Skilled workers 9 
Unskilled workers 11 
48 39 1 538 
40 38 6 628 
40 44 3 338 
50 33 3 463 
33 40 8 108 
42 44 4 545 
4 3 46 2 259 






October 11- 14, 1985 
Very Fairly Not very No Number of 
Closely Closely Closely Opinion Interviews 
Household Income 
$50,000 & over 11% 48% 41% * 144 
$35,000-$49,999 18 51 29 2 220 
$25,000-$34,999 14 47 37 2 278 
$15,000-$24,999 14 46 36 4 340 
$10,000-$14,999 10 40 45 5 196 
Under $10,000 12 30 51 7 277 
$25,000 & over 15 49 35 1 642 
Under $25,000 12 39 43 6 813 
Religion 
Protestants 13 43 40 4 888 
Catholics 10 46 40 4 430 
Labor Union 
Labor union families 11 48 40 1 315 
Non-labor union families 13 42 40 5 1,225 
*Less than one percent 






Reagan's Handling of Situation in South Africa 
(Based on aware group) 
Question: Do you approve or disapprove of the way President Reagan is 
























Total under 30 36 55 9 166 
18-24 years 34 57 9 70 
25-29 years 38 53 9 96 
30-49 years 42 44 14 360 
Total 50 & older 38 44 18 363 
50-64 years 39 44 17 363 






October 11-14, 1985 
No Number of 
Approve Disapprove Opinion Interviews 
Region 
East 42% 48% 10% 225 
Midwest 39 43 18 230 
South 38 47 15 240 
West 39 49 12 198 
Race 
Whites 43 43 14 780 
Non-whites 16 71 13 113 
Blacks 16 76 8 102 
Hispanics 50 43 7 55 
Education 
College graduates 39 50 11 220 
College incomplete 42 46 12 233 
High school graduates 41 44 15 286 
Not high school graduates 32 49 19 153 
Politics 
Republicans 53 34 13 320 
Democrats 27 58 15 365 






October 11-14, 1985 
No Number of 
Approve Disapprove Opinion Interviews 
Occupation of CWE 
Professional & business 43% 43% 14% 312 
Clerical & sales 37 50 13 56 
Manual workers 36 50 14 288 
Skilled workers 33 56 11 139 
Unskilled workers 39 46 15 149 
Household Income 
$50,000 & over 47 43 10 88 
$35,000-$49,999 44 49 7 152 
$25,000-$34,999 37 48 15 179 
$15,000-$24,999 38 49 13 202 
$10,000-$14,999 39 39 22 103 
Under $10,000 39 50 11 122 
$25,000 & over 42 47 11 419 
Under $25,000 38 47 15 427 
Religion 
Protestants 42 44 14 506 
Catholics 42 46 12 248 
Labor Union 
Labor union families 42 45 13 190 
Non-labor union families 39 47 14 703 






U.S. Pressure on S.A. Government 
(Based on aware group) 
Question: Do you think the U.S. should put more pressure on the South 
African government to end apartheid, less pressure, or about 
the same amount as now? 
- October 11-14, 1985 
No Number of 
More Less Same Opinion Interviews 
NATIONAL 47% 15% 30% 8% 893 
Sex 
Men 47 15 32 6 483 
Women 47 15 28 10 410 
Age 
Total under 30 56 12 29 3 166 
18-24 years 58 13 23 6 70 
25-29 years 53 12 33 2 96 
30-49 years 50 12 30 8 360 
Total 50 & older 39 20 31 10 363 
50-64 years 39 20 30 11 206 
65 & older 38 21 32 9 157 
Region 
East 46 14 33 7 225 
Midwest 50 16 28 6 230 
South 42 15 32 11 240 






October 11-14, 1985 
No Number of 
More Less . Same Opinion Interviews 
Race 
Whites 42% 17% 33% 8% 780 
Non-whites 74 7 14 5 113 
Blacks 74 7 13 6 102 
Hispanics 47 9 38 6 55 
Education 
College graduates 53 13 28 6 220 
College incomplete 52 13 29 6 233 
High school graduates 42 19 30 9 286 
Not high school graduates 41 14 34 11 153 
Politics 
Republicans 39 18 37 6 320 
Democrats 57 12 23 8 365 
Independents 45 16 30 9 191 
Occupation of CWE 
Professional & business 48 16 30 6 312 
Clerical & sales 45 16 29 10 56 
Manual workers 52 12 28 8 288 
Skilled workers 50 14 21 15 139 






October 11-14, 1985 
No Number of 
More Less Same Opinion Interviews 
Household Income 
$50,000 & over 53% 15% 28% 4% 88 
$35,000-$49,999 54 17 24 5 152 
$25,000-$34,999 46 12 31 11 179 
$15,000-$24,999 50 10 30 10 202 
$10,000-$14,999 38 23 33 6 103 
Under $10,000 40 19 32 9 122 
$25,000 & over 50 15 28 7 419 
Under $25,000 44 16 31 9 427 
Religion 
Protestants 44 14 33 9 506 
Catholics 49 16 29 6 248 
Labor Union 
Labor union families 58 13 25 4 190 
Non-labor union families 44 16 31 9 703 







(Based on aware group) 
Question: In the South African situation, are your sympathies more with the 
black population or more with the South African government? 
October 11- -14, 1985 
Both 
Black S.A. Equally Neither White No Number of 
Pop. Govt. (Vol.) (Vol.) Interviews 
NATIONAL 63% 13% 12% 5% 1% 6% 893 
Sex 
Men 62 15 11 5 2 5 483 
Women 63 11 12 6 1 7 410 
Age 
Total under 30 71 11 10 4 2 2 166 
18-24 years 63 11 14 4 5 3 70 
25-29 years 78 10 6 4 * 2 96 
30-49 years 68 10 9 7 1 5 360 
Total 50 & older 52 17 16 5 1 9 363 
50-64 years 55 18 13 5 * 9 206 
65 & older 48 16 19 6 2 9 157 
Region 
East 61 11 14 7 1 6 225 
Midwest 67 11 11 4 2 5 230 
South 60 18 11 4 1 6 240 






October 11- 14, 1985 
Both 
Black S. A. Equally Neither White NO Number of 
Pop. Govt. (Vol.) (Vol.) Opinion Interviews 
Race 
Whites 59% 15% 12% 6% 1% 7% 780 
Non-whites 82 3 11 * * 4 113 
Blacks 85 2 10 1 * 2 102 
Hispanics 69 4 3 55 
Education 
College graduates 66 12 9 7 1 5 220 
College incomplete 65 14 12 5 1 3 233 
High school graduates 61 14 10 6 2 7 286 
Not high school graduates 57 11 18 4 * 10 153 
Politics 
Republicans 52 18 14 9 1 6 320 
Democrats 73 9 10 3 * 5 365 
Independents 65 12 9 5 2 7 191 
Occupation of CWE 
Professional & business 62 12 12 7 1 6 312 
Clerical & sales 67 18 7 4 * 4 56 
Manual workers 67 12 9 5 2 5 288 
Skilled workers 64 13 7 5 4 7 139 






October 11-14, 1985 
Both 
Black S.A. Equally Neither White No Number of 
Pop. Govt. (Vol.) (Vol.) Pop. Opinion Interviews 
Household Income 
$50,000 & over 58% 18% 11% 9% * 4% 88 
$35,000-$49,999 65 12 7 8 2 6 152 
$25,000-$34,999 63 13 12 7 3 2 179 
$15,000-$24,999 70 11 8 2 * 9 202 
$10,000-$14,999 63 10 14 6 2 5 103 
Under $10,000 49 18 23 3 * 7 122 
$25,000 & over 63 13 10 8 2 4 419 
Under $25,000 62 13 14 3 * 8 427 
Religion 
Protestants 60 13 13 6 1 7 506 
Catholics 64 14 12 4 1 5 248 
Labor Union 
Labor union families 69 10 12 5 1 3 190 
Non-labor union families 61 14 12 6 1 6 703 






Public Opinion of the Mass Media: 
Washington Post and New York Times 
The majority of the expressed opinions in the edi¬ 
torials, columns and letter sections of the Washington Post 
and the New York Times believes that the system of apartheid 
is wrong and that South Africa should be isolated until it 
changes its racial policy. In the three areas investigated 
—editorials, columns/articles and letters—the perception 
that South Africa should be ostracized is strongly held by 
those who expressed their opinions through letters, and 
closely followed by those who voiced their opinions through 
the newspapers' columns or articles. The least and rela¬ 
tively weak expressed opinions with regard to isolation of 
South Africa are held by the newspapers' editors. The trend 
of the positions held by the editors, columnists and letter 
writers in the two newspapers are basically the same from 
President Nixon to the administration of President Reagan. 
It is also instructive to note that while some editors and 
columnists expressed neutrality with regard to the banish¬ 
ment of South Africa, virtually all those who registered 
their opinions through the letter sections of the newspapers 
were unequivocal. The expressed opinions of the letter 
sections of the two newspapers were either against or in 
favor of ostracism of the apartheid regime. 
Table 4.12 shows that of all the editorials, columns, 
and letters which we examined in the Washington Post during 
the administration of President Nixon, 66 to 33 percent were 
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against any kind of U.S. military, economic and diplomatic 
cooperation with the racist regime. In the New York Times 
(see Table 4.16), the public resentment against South Africa 
was high under the Nixon administration; 84 to 15 percent 
were in favor of isolation of South Africa. 
The untimely departure of President Nixon from the 
White House in the aftermath of the Watergate scandal did 
not result in any major shift of public mood with regard to 
South Africa, largely because Secretary of State Henry 
Kissinger continued to dominate policy decision-making in 
the new Ford administration, which continued the policy of 
"open communication" with South Africa. The expressed 
opinion in the editorials, columns and letters in the 
Washington Post during the administration of President 
Gerald Ford on the issue of isolation of the apartheid 
regime was 66 to 26 percent in favor with 6 percent neu¬ 
tral (see Table 4.13). In contrast, however, the expressed 
opinion in the New York Times was 55 to 44 percent against 
(see Table 4.17). 
Under the Carter administration, the public expressed 
opinion in the print media—the Washington Post—was 76 to 
23 percent in favor of isolation of South Africa as shown in 
Table 4.14, while in the New York Times, 56 to 40 percent 
disagree with 3 percent neutral (see Table 4.18). Evidently, 
the most expressed opinions in the New York Times were from 
the editors and columnists. The attempt by the Carter 
administration to put pressure on South Africa was not 
252 
welcomed by the U.S. multinational corporations, who also 
control, to a great degree, American media. The influence 
of big business ownership was seemingly reflected in the 
political content of the New York Times opinion. 
Under the Reagan administration, the opposition to 
U.S. collaboration with South Africa grew to enormous pro¬ 
portion, largely because of his policy of "constructive 
engagement." In the New York Times, as shown in Table 4.19, 
the expressed opinion with regard to isolation of South 
Africa is 59 to 35 percent in favor with 5 percent neutral. 
Similarly, in the Washington Post, the expressed opinion is 
64 to 33 percent in favor with 2 percent neutral (see 
Table 4.15). 
A comparison of the expressed public opinions in 
the Washington Post and the New York Times (see Table 4.20) 
with regard to isolation of South Africa shows little 
difference in the opposition to the system of apartheid. 
In the Washington Post, the grand total of expressed opin¬ 
ions is 68 to 29 percent in favor of isolation of South 
Africa, while in the New York Times, 55 to 41 percent is 
in favor. More importantly, it is of great interest to 
note that, despite the frequently distorted news, Americans 
generally have not changed their opinion in vigorously 
opposing the apartheid system and the U.S. collaboration 
with the regime. 
TABLE 4.12 
Question: What is the expressed public opinion in the editorials, columns,* 
and letters sections of the Washington Post during the adminis¬ 
tration of President Richard Nixon (January 1971-August 1974)** 
with regard to isolationt of South Africa? 
Nixon Administration (January 1971-August 1974) 
Public Opinion Sampling Size Posit] Lon Valid Percentage 
Con Pro Neutral % of Con % of Pro % of Neutral 
Editorial 4 2 2 - 50 50 - 
Column 1 - 1 - - 100 - 
Letter 7 2 5 - 28 71 - 
TOTAL 12 4 8 - 33 66 - 
*Note that under columns, some articles were examined. 
**The Washington Post Indexes for 1969 and 1970 were not available. 
+By isolation, we mean the absence of military, economic, social and diplomatic 






Question: What is the expressed public opinion in the editorials, columns 
and letters section of the Washington Post during the adminis¬ 
tration of President Gerald Ford (August 1974-January 1977) 
with regard to isolation of South Africa? 
Ford Administration (August 1974-January 1977) 
Public Opinion Sampling Size Position Valid Percentage 
Con Pro Neutral % of Con % of Pro % of Neutral 
Editorial 9 3 5 1 33 55 11 
Column 9 3 5 1 33 55 11 
Letter 12 2 10 - 16 83 - 






Question: What is the expressed public opinion in the editorials, columns 
and letters section of the Washington Post during the adminis¬ 
tration of President Jimmy Carter (January 1977-January 1981) 
with regard to isolation of South Africa? 
Carter Administration (January 1977-January 1981) 
Public Opinion Sampling Size Position Va. Lid Percentage 
Con Pro Neutral % of Con % of Pro % of Neutral 
Editorial 17 4 13 - 23 76 - 
Column 8 2 6 - 25 75 - 
Letter 9 2 7 - 22 77 - 






Question: What is the expressed public opinion in the editorials, columns 
and letters section of the Washington Post during the adminis¬ 
tration of President Ronald Reagan (January 1981-December 1985) 
with regard to isolation of South Africa? 
Reagan Administration (January 1981-December 1985) 
Public Opinion Sampling Size Position Valid Percentage 
Con Pro Neutral % of Con % of Pro % of Neutral 
Editorial 21 11 9 1 52 42 4 
Column 24 5 19 - 20 79 - 
Letter 3 - 3 - - 100 - 






Question: What is the expressed public opinion in the editorials, columns 
and letters section of the New York Times during the adminis¬ 
tration of President Richard Nixon (January 1969-August 1974) 
with regard to isolation of South Africa? 
Nixon Administration (January 1969-August 1974) 
Public Opinion Sampling Size Position Valid Percent age ,  
Con Pro Neutral % of Con % of Pro % of Neutral 
Editorial 3 - 3 - - 100 - 
Column 8 2 6 - 25 75 - 
Letter 2 - 2 - - 100 - 






Question: What is the expressed public opinion in the editorials, columns 
and letters section of the New York Times during the adminis¬ 
tration of President Gerald Ford (August 1974-January 1977) 
with regard to isolation of South Africa? 
Ford Administration (August 1974-January 1977) 
Public Opinion Sampling Size Position Valid Percentage 
Con Pro Neutral % of Con % of Pro % of Neutral 
Editorial 10 5 5 - 50 50 - 
Column 15 9 6 - 60 40 - 
Letter 2 1 1 - 50 50 - 






Question: What is the expressed public opinion in the editorials, columns 
and letters section of the New York Times during the adminis¬ 
tration of President Jimmy Carter (January 1977-January 1981) 
with regard to isolation of South Africa? 
Carter Administration (January 1977-January 1981) 
Public Opinion Sampling Size Posa Ltion Valid Percentage 
Con Pro Neutral % of Con % of Pro % of Neutral 
to 
U1 
Editorial 8 4 4 - 50 50 
VO 
Column 18 12 5 1 66 27 5 
Letter 4 1 3 - 25 75 - 






Question: What is the expressed public opinion in the editorials, columns 
and letters sections of the New York Times during the adminis¬ 
tration of President Ronald Reagan (January 1981-December 1985) 
with regard to isolation of South Africa? 
Reagan Administration (January 1981-December 1985) 
Public Opinion Sampling Size Position Valid Percentage 
Con Pro Neutral % of Con % of Pro % of Neutral 
Editorial 21 7 12 2 33 57 9 
Column 50 16 32 2 32 64 4 
Letter 6 4 2 - 66 33 - 






A Comparison of Expressed Public Opinion in the 
WashingtonPost and the New York Times 
with Regard to Isolation of South Africa 
Washington Post (1971-1985) 
Public Opinion Sampling Size Position Valid Percentage 
Con Pro Neutral % of Con % of Pro % of Neutral 
Editorial 51 20 29  2 39 56 4 
Column 42 10 31 1 23 74 2 
Letter 31 6 25 - 19 80 - 
GRAND TOTAL 124 36 85 3 29 68 2 
New York Times (1969-1985) 
Public Opinion Sampling Size Position Valid Percentage 
Con Pro Neutral % of Con % of Pro % of Neutral 
Editorial 42 16 24 2 38 57 5 
Column 91 39 49 3 43 54 3 
Letter 14 6 8 - 42 57 - 







As we have seen, there is considerable public 
support for tougher punitive measures against the white 
colonial settler regime in South Africa, but the U.S. 
government has failed to go beyond rhetorical condemnation 
and gesture. The polls, protests, and even the content 
analysis of mainstream American public opinion as contained 
in the print mass media (New York Times and Washington Post) 
demonstrate that the controversy over the role of American 
corporations in South Africa continues as a strong under¬ 
current of United States relations with South Africa. While 
these protests and public opinion polls have not led to 
withdrawal, they have dampened enthusiasm for new business 
ventures in South Africa and this will continue until funda¬ 
mental change has taken place in South Africa. 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Conclusions 
The United States foreign policy toward South 
Africa has failed conspicuously to alter the South African 
government position on apartheid because it serves the 
interest of privately-owned South African-based U.S. multi¬ 
national corporations rather than the American public 
interest. The roots of U.S. policy toward South Africa have 
been to protect the class interest of its giant corpora¬ 
tions, not public interest in terms of boycotting trade 
with South Africa. It is evident that every administration 
analyzed did design a policy option to strengthen rather 
than weaken the apartheid system. 
The U.S. multinational corporations and the U.S. 
government activities have reinforced the conviction of the 
apartheid regime that its racial policies, and continued 
denial of the vote of its 80 percent population is not only 
viable, but necessary. In particular, the activities of the 
U.S. giant corporations in South Africa are the objectives 
of American foreign policy toward South Africa. 
The "vital economic and strategic interests" 
embodied in the policy objectives of Nixon, Ford, Carter, 
and Reagan administrations are irrefutable proof of the sub¬ 
ordination of U.S. policy to the interests of American 
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capitalism. The U.S. rhetoric of "peaceful change" is 
basically aimed to prevent revolution in South Africa which 
may jeopardize the so-called "vital interests." The Nixon- 
Ford policy of "open communication," the Carter policy 
wrapped in "human rights" and the Reagan policy camouflaged 
in "constructive engagement" are the most sophisticated 
brand of imperialist thinking. None was intended to achieve 
the ardent desire for freedom for the oppressed in South 
Africa. 
It is safe to say that the sales of arms to South 
Africa have been profitable for the U.S. multinational cor¬ 
porations. These corporations have filtered arms shipments 
to South Africa through several channels in violation of the 
U.N. arms embargo. The corporations have been permitted to 
send dual-purpose goods, allegedly for civilian use. They 
have made sales through subsidiaries and affiliates operating 
with licenses made available by the U.S. government. In 
many instances, the U.S. government has turned a blind eye 
to the activities of these corporations. 
Besides the immediate profitable business of the 
sales of arms, the U.S. military assistance to Pretoria fits 
a larger pattern of foreign policy aims. The government has 
tended to adopt the multinational corporations' interest as 
the interest of the American public. The government has 
sought to protect cheap black labor, cheap raw materials and 
markets for the U.S. multinational corporations, disregarding 
the question whether such a policy serves the interests of 
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the American public. In advancing the multinational corpo¬ 
rations' interests, the U.S. has focused on South Africa as 
a regional subcenter in Southern Africa—a key to the sta¬ 
bility of the entire region. South Africa has become not 
only a trading partner, but also a proxy for the U.S. larger 
interests in the region. 
The U.S. has supported South Africa politically. 
In the United Nations Security Council where the U.S. has a 
"veto" power, its voting pattern on racism and apartheid 
has been abysmal. The U.S. records in both the Security 
Council and General Assembly on racism and apartheid have 
made the United States notorious for supporting the most 
repressive and racist government since Adolf Hitler's 
Nazism. 
The appeal of some U.S. officials that blacks pur¬ 
sue a path of non-violence is deceptive. The appeal rein¬ 
forces Botha's position. It ignores the immense violence— 
both armed and structural^-—being inflicted upon black 
people in South Africa; it confuses the victim with the 
aggressor; it denies blacks the right to self-defense and 
^Structural violence is a term used in contemporary 
peace research and is to be distinguished from armed vio¬ 
lence. While armed violence is violence exerted by persons 
against persons with the use of arms, structural violence is 
violence exerted by situations, institutions, social, poli¬ 
tical, and economic structures. Thus, when a person dies 
because he/she has no access to food, the effect is violent 
as far as that person is concerned, yet there is no indi¬ 
vidual actor who could be identified as the source of this 
violence. It is the system of food production and distribu¬ 
tion that is to blame. The violence is thus exerted by the 
anonymous 'structure.' 
266 
it is, thus, racist, in that it values the safety of 
whites more than that of blacks, despite the culpability 
of the white regime for the present violence. There is the 
assumption that the net result of the struggle in South 
Africa would be to abolish apartheid. But the roots of 
oppression lie in the systematic exploitation of the labor, 
the land, the human and material resources of black African 
people who have been dominated by Afrikaner settlers over 
300 years. Apartheid is a system of social relations 
created by the Afrikaner ruling class for the exploitation 
of black people in South Africa. Hence, the demise of 
apartheid system can only be achieved when the political, 
social and economic destiny of South Africa is in the hands 
of black freedom fighters. 
Indeed, when reduced to its essence, the propaganda 
barrage by some American officials reflects a bias in favor 
of the white Afrikaner regime. Their anti-communism, their 
concern for white rights, and their denial of the right of 
blacks to national liberation and self-defense are intended 
to prolong the system of apartheid. Their advocacy of non¬ 
violence in South Africa represents class interest. The 
class perspective is that of the national and international 
business community whose priority is the maintenance of 
imperial hegemony in South Africa, at the expense of social, 
political and economic rights for blacks. 
Regrettably, the United States government, which 
bears a great responsibility as a permanent member of the 
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Security Council and professes total abhorrence of the 
apartheid system, has been pursuing a policy diametrically 
opposed to the essential lines of the United Nations action 
against apartheid, namely: isolation of the racist regime 
in South Africa; assistance in the legitimate struggle of 
the oppressed people and their national liberation movement; 
and mobilization of world opinion in support of effective 
international action for the total eradication of the apar¬ 
theid system. It favors greater economic and other involve¬ 
ment in South Africa under the pretext that increased collab¬ 
oration enables it to obtain greater leverage to encourage 
its desired "peaceful change." Under the guise of supporting 
forces for "peaceful change" in South Africa, the U.S. has'' 
developed closer links with the militarist and aggressive 
leaders of the apartheid regime whose so-called reforms it 
welcomes as moves towards the "peaceful change," while 
showing hostility to the national liberation movement in 
South Africa. 
The policies of the United States, particularly the 
Nixon-Ford's "open communication" with Pretoria and Reagan's 
"constructive engagement," were seen by the apartheid regime 
to be an encouragement of brazen aggression. The policies 
not only encouraged the apartheid regime's intransigence and 
emboldened it to engage in more brutal acts of internal 
repression, but also brazen acts of external aggression 
against its neighboring states. Moreover, the Reagan policy 
of "constructive engagement," based on the premise that South 
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Africa was its traditional ally, has ignored the freedom 
fighters, risking their lives in a legitimate struggle for 
the principles enshrined in the United Nations Charter; 
rather, the freedom fighters are professed by the United 
States to be "terrorists." 
The United States has relaxed its implementation of 
the arms embargo by the United Nations. While repression 
inside South Africa has increased considerably, the United 
States has continued to broaden its friendship with the 
apartheid regime by defending it in the United Nations and 
relaxing the U.N. arms embargo against the South African 
military and police. 
The demand for divestment has had some significant 
political impact. By focusing attention on the United 
States' corporate role in South Africa, the politicians and 
corporate management have been on the defensive, scrambling 
to distance themselves from the most odious aspects of the 
apartheid system. But, despite ‘some of the achievements of 
the anti-apartheid organizations including the student-based 
divestment movement, the corporate specific divestment tac¬ 
tic does not and cannot force the total corporate disengage¬ 
ment that divestment represents. The state-to-state rela¬ 
tions between Washington and Pretoria are the final arbiter 
of all United States involvement in South Africa. Only the 
United States government has the power to legally prohibit 
all ties with the apartheid regime. This is not to argue 
that the activists should abandon the divestment movement, 
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but rather to strengthen it by expanding their horizons to 
encompass the view that disinvestment is only one aspect of 
forcing change in South Africa. There are other ways the 
activists can contribute (see Recommendations). 
Findings 
In the analysis of public opinion survey polls, our 
findings are specifically: 
1. A higher percentage of American public would 
like the U.S. to take stiffer measures 
against South Africa; 
2. The impact of adverse public reaction to 
the direction of U.S. foreign policy toward 
South Africa is very slow and weak. The 
U.S. government has so far not been deterred 
from its policy toward South Africa by the 
spontaneous reaction of the American public 
opinion; and 
3. The U.S. government and its multinational 
corporations' practice of strengthening the 
South African government militarily, econo¬ 
mically, and politically runs counter to 
the interests of majority of Americans who 
have expressed their non-support of apar¬ 
theid regime. 
Other findings in this research include: 
1. In our evaluation of U.S. policies toward 
South Africa under the administrations of 
Nixon, Ford, Carter and Reagan, we find 
some changes in approach, but a continuity 
in fundamental principle of U.S. business 
engagement with the apartheid regime; and 
2. The U.S. government and its multinational 
corporations' pursuit of economic and 
strategic interests override the moral 
and humanitarian concerns for the 
oppressed in South Africa. 
Recommendations 
It is obvious to all concerned that the contact 
between the white settler apartheid regime and black people 
in South Africa results in barbarism, brutality, cruelty, 
sadism, and violence. Between the apartheid regime and 
black people there is only room for forced labor, intimida¬ 
tion, pressure, policing, theft, scorn, distrust, arrogance, 
roguery, exploitation, and domination by the former and 
resistance by the latter. There has never been any humane 
contact, only a relationship of conquest, hegemony and 
subordination. Above all, black people in South Africa, in 
particular, have experienced a cross of humiliation in their 
own land. This is well-articulated by Ali Mazrui. 
Africans are not the most brutalized of people, 
but are probably the most humiliated in modern 
history. In terms of physical brutalization, the 
holocaust suffered by the Jews under the Nazis and 
the genocidal treatment which native Americans and 
native Australians received from white people, were 
as gruesome as anything experienced by black people. 
But Africans have been humiliated in history in 
ways that range from the slave trade to being 
segregated and treated as third-class citizens 
in parts of their own continent to the present ^ 
day, in spite of being numerically the majority. 
In this regard, the United States advocacy of peace¬ 
ful-evolutionary non-violent method of discourse between the 
apartheid regime and the oppressed people in South Africa 
is nothing but a shenanigan to ensuring that South Africa's 
socio-economic and political structure remains indefinitely 
2 
Ali A. Mazrui, The African Condition (London: Cam¬ 
bridge University Press, 1980), p. viii. 
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in the hands of the apartheid regime. To advocate peace 
for the apartheid regime that is armed to the teeth will 
peter out to nothingness. Albert Luthuli, winner of a 1961 
Nobel Peace Prize, observed: 
. . . however, in the face of the uncompro¬ 
mising white refusal to abandon a policy which 
denies the African and other oppressed South 
Africans their rightful heritage—freedom—no 
one can blame brave, just men for seeking justice 
by the use of violent methods; nor could they 
be blamed if they tried to create an organized 
force in order to ultimately establish peace 
and racial harmony. 
However, black people need not be apologetic about 
the violent method as a strategy for national liberation, 
for Mao Tse-tung once reminded us that "political power 
grows out of the barrel of a gun." In each of the former 
white settler regimes in Southern Africa, the white minori¬ 
ties blocked peaceful change toward a more just society. 
More importantly, black people in South Africa are aware of 
another historical fact: in each of the formerly white- 
ruled states, independence and majority rule required the 
development of military skills among blacks. In the end the 
political power grew out of the barrels of the guns in 
Angola, Mozambique, Guinea Bissau, and Zimbabwe. A people, 
which has thus achieved an active attitude towards its own 
history, can no longer be misled by advocates of sham reforms 
or maneuvers of the apartheid power. The only course of 
legitimate action is revolutionary violence. As Frantz Fanon 
3 
Kevin Danaher, In Whose Interest? A Guide to U.S.- 
South Africa Relations (Washington, D.C.: Institute for 
Policy Studies, 1984, p. 69. 
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succinctly remarked: 
Violence alone, violence committed by the 
people, violence organized and educated by its 
leaders, makes it possible for the masses to 
understand social truths and gives the key to 
them. Without that struggle, without that knowl¬ 
edge of the practice of action, there's nothing 
but a fancy-dress parade and blare of trumpets. 
There's nothing save a minimum of réadaptation, 
a few reforms at the top, a flag waving: and 
down there at the bottom an undivided mass, 
still living in the middle ages, endlessly 
marking time.^ 
This lucid perspective is echoed by the president of the 
650,000-member Progressive National Baptist Convention and 
pastor of Bethany Baptist Church in Brooklyn, New York, 
Reverend William A. Jones, Jr., who, in an address on "A 
Theological Basis for Armed Struggle," concluded without 
confusing philosophical theology with social, reality: 
The question in South Africa is essentially 
one of self-defense against a systemic violence 
that is pervasive and unceasing. Genocide, on 
a massive scale, is being practiced in South 
Africa. To be non-violent in the context of 
genocide is to affirm violence and is tantamount 
to alliance with the adversary. To resist, by 
whatever means necessary, is the only sane and 
spiritual response of one who calls himself a 
Christian. Non-cooperation with evil is 
righteous and redemptive. The task of darker 
peoples the world around is to tune in to God's 
judgment already in process against that wicked 
and nefarious system. 
4 
Renate Zahar, Frantz Fanon: Colonialism and 
Alienation (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974), p. 85. 
^Quoted in Philip V. White, "The Black American 
Constituency for Southern Africa, 1940-1980," in The 
American People and South Africa: Publics, Elites and 
Policymaking Processes, p. 96~! 
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By choosing violent revolution as an alternative course of 
action, black people in South Africa have nothing to lose 
but the apartheid chains. The present ongoing rebellion in 
South Africa is certainly not going to be the end but the 
beginning of the end. According to a Stanford University 
history professor, Dr. George Fredrickson, who spoke at the 
University of Georgia: 
The struggle between blacks and whites in South 
Africa has reached a point where a prolonged race 
and class war is inevitable. I hope apartheid 
doesn't have to be drowned in blood, as Southern 
slavery was. But I find insufficient evidence 
to sustain a more optimistic prognosis.^ 
But the war for national liberation led by ANC is already on 
and will continue to be intensified until the political 
power is in the hands of the oppressed. The demise of apar¬ 
theid is inevitable but the task is to hasten it. 
What then needs to be done? Those who wish to 
support change in South Africa have only two ways to do it: 
(1) active assistance to the national liberation movements; 
and (2) a call for United States economic disinvestment and 
military and political disengagement from the present South 
African government. The latter, which is putting material 
pressure on the U.S. government, is being vigorously pursued 
by the anti-apartheid demonstrators, but with little success. 
The former, which is supporting the national liberation 
movements (morally, technically and financially), has not 
been vigorously pursued. 
6 The Atlanta Journal, 11 October 1985, p. 9A. 
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Those who are currently trying to raise U.S. 
citizens' awareness of the profound injustice of the white 
regime in South Africa must be applauded. At least, the 
goal of peaceful protests is to educate the public about 
what apartheid is and how the U.S. government and its multi¬ 
national corporations comply with it in their efforts to 
protect economic and strategic interests. However, these 
peaceful protests are inadequate, for U.S. government has 
shown that foreign policy is not made because of assumed 
interest of the public. The anti-apartheid movement in the 
United States should consider moral, technical, and finan¬ 
cial assistance to the liberation movements in South 
Africa in their efforts to resist the apartheid regime. 
Anything else is sophistry. 
APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A 
U.S. Corporations in South Africa 
1. AAF-INTERNATIONAL 
2. ASS Worldwide Technical Services 
3. Abbot Laboratories 
U. Abdelman Agencies 
5. Addressograph-Multigraph Corp. 
6. AFAMAL-Quadrant 
T. ASIA 
3. Alcan Aluminium 
9. Allied Chemical Corp. 
10. Allied Kelite Chemical 
11. Allis Chalmers 
12. Amalgamated Packaging Ind. Ltd. 
13. Amchem Products Inc. 
li. American Abrasives, Inc. 
15. American Bank Note 
17. American Bureau of Shipping N.C. 
18. American Can Company- 
19 . American Celanese Company- 
20 . American Chicle 
21. American Cyanamid Co. 
22. American Express Co. 
23. American Home Products Corp. 
2b. American Insurance rV>. 
25. American International Group Inc. 
26. American Metal Climax Inc. 
27. American Motors Corp. 
28. American Pacific 
29. America South Africa Investment 
30. American Steel Foundries 
31. Ampex Corp. 
32. Amrho International 
33. Amrho International Underwriters 
31*. Arthur Andersen and Co. 
35. Anderson, Clayton and Co. 
36. Aniken (Naico Chemical Co.) 
37. Applied Power Industries 
38. ARCO (Atlantic Richfield Co.) 
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39. Argus Africa Ltd. 
1*0. Argus Oil 
1*1. Amco Steel Corp . 
1*2. Armstrong Cork Co. 
1*3. Artnell International 
1*1*. Ashland Oil and Refining Co. 
1*5. Audco Rockwell 
1*6 . Ault and Wiborg 
1*7. Automated Building Components , Inc . 
1*8. Avco 
1*9. Avis-Incorporated World Headquart. 
50. Ayerst Laboratories 
51. Azolphate Corp. 
52. Badger Co. Inc. 
53. Balkind Agencies Ltd. 
5l*. Bankers Trust Co. 
55• Barlow Oshkosh 
5o. Batten, Barton, Durstine and Osborn, 
Inc. 
57. Baxter Laboratories 
58. Bechtel Corp. 
59. Beckman Instruments Inc. 
60. Bedaux, Charles and Associates 
61. Bellows, W.S. Construction Co. 
62. Berkshire International Corp. 
63. Bethlehem Steel 
61*. Bethlehem Steel Export Corp . 
65. Black Clawson Co. 
66. Black and Decker Manufacturing Co. 
67. Blue Bell Inc. 
68. Boeing Corp. 
69. Booz, Allen and Hamilton, Inc. 
70. Borden Inc. 
71. Borg-Warner Corp. 
72. Born Africa 
73. Boyles Drilling Co. 
7l*. Braun Transworld Co. 
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75. Bristol-Ityers Ço. 
76. 3uckman Laboratories 
77. Buckner Industries, Inc. 
78. Bucyrus-Erie 
79. Budd 
80. 3ulova Watch Co. Inc. 
81. Bundy 
32. Burlington Industries 
83. Burroughs Corn. 
8U. Butterick Fashion Marketing Co. 
85. Calabrian Co., Inc. of New York 
86. California Packing Corp. 
87. Caltex 
88. Canada Dry International Inc. 
89. Carbone Corp. 
90. Carborundum Co. 
91. Carlane Corp. 
92. Carnation International 
93. Carrier Corp. 
9U. Carrier International 
95. Carter Products Division 
96. Cascade Corporation 
97. J.L. Case Co. 
96. Caterpillar Tractor Co. 
9. elanese Corp. 
100. C.G.S. Scientific Corp. of America 
101. Champion Spark Plug Co. 
102. Charter Consolidated 
103. Chase Manhattan Bank 
lOh. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co. 
105. Chemical Construction Corp. 
106. Chesebrough-Pond's Inc. 
107. Chicago Bridge and Iron Co. 
103. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co. 
109. Christiani and Nielsen Corp. 
110. Chrysler Corp. 
111. Citibank N.A. 
112. Cities Service Co. 
113. Clark Equipment 
Llk. Clark, Oil and Refining 
115. Coca-Cola Export Corp. 
116. Colgate-Palmolive International, 
Inc. 
117. Collier Macmillan International 
118. Collier-Macmillan, Ltd. 
11 ?. Collins Radio Group 
120. Colloids, Inc. 
"•21. Columbia Broadcasting System 
122. Columbus McKinnon Corp. 
123. Combustion Engineering 
lll. Computer Sciences Corporation 
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125. Connell Bros. Co. Ltd. 
126. Consolidated Equip, and Mfg. Co. 
127. Consultant Systemation 
128. Continental Corp. 
129. Continental Grain Co. 
130. Continental Illinois National Bank 
and Trust 
131. Continental Insurance Co. 
132. Control Data Corp. 
133. Corn Products Co. 
13*». Crane-Glenfield, Ltd. 
135- Crovn Cork and Seal Co., Inc. 
136. Cunnings Diesel Int. Ltd. 
137. Cutler Hammer International 
138. Cyanamid International 
139. Dames and Moore 
1*»0. Dana 
1**1. Dart Industries 
1**2. Dean Export International Ltd. 
1**3. Deere and Co. 
lLi*. De Leuw, Cather and Co. International 
Investments 
1*»5. Del Monte Corp. 
lU6 . De Witt International Corp. 
ll*7. DKJ Industries Inc . 
lL8. Diamond H. Svitsches Ltd. 
1*»9. Diner's Club International, Ltd. 
150. Diversey Corporation 
151. Dobbs-Life Savers International 
152. Dolein Corp. 
153. Donaldson Co. Inc. 
15*». Doughboy Industries, Inc. 
155. Dow Chemical Co. 
156. Dow Corning International 
157. Dresser Industries Inc. 
158. Dubois-Dearborn-Vestol Chemical Co. 
159. Dun and Bradstreet Co. 
loO. Dunlop 
161. Du Pont Chemical Co. 
162. Duroplastic Penta Industries 
163. E.C. De Witt and Co. 
l6L. East Newark Industrial Center 
16?. Eastern Stainless Steel Corp. 
I06. Eastman Kodak Co. 
167. Echlin Manufacturing Co. 
163. Enico Corp. 
169. Electric Storage Battery 
170. Electro-Kite Co. 
171. Eli Lilly and Co. 
172. Eltra Co. 
173. Emery Air Freight Corp. 
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171*. Encyclopaedia Brittanica Inc. 
175. Engelhard Hanovia 
176. Engelhard Minerals and Chemicals 
Corp. 
177. Enda Drug Corp. 
178. Envirotech Corporation 
179. Ernst and Ernst 
180. ESN Inc. 
loi. Essex Corp. of America 
132. ESSO Africa 
103. Eutectic Welding Alloys Corp. 
l8U. Ewing, McDonald and Co. 
185. Max Factor and Co. 
186. Fairbanks, Morse and Co. 
187. Fand M Systems Company 
188. Farrell Lines Inc. 
139. Federal-Mogul Corp. 
190. Ferro Corp. 
191. Fiberglass, Ltd. 
192. Firder Inc. 
193. Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. 
19k. First Consolidated Leasing Corp. Ltd. 
195. First National Bank of Boston 
19b. First National- Bank of Chicago 
197. Flintkole Co. 
198. Fluor Co. 
199. FMC Corp. 
200. FNC3 Services Corp. 
201. Ford Motor Co. 
202. Forsyth Udvin Ltd. 
203. Fram Corp. 
20k. Fruehauf 
205. George A. Fuller Co. 
206. Galion 
207. Gardner-Denver Co. 
208. Gates Robber Co. 
209. General Electric Co. 
210. General Foods Corp. 
211. General Motors 
212. General Signal Corp. 
213. General Tyre and Rubber Co. 
2lk. George Angus Co. 
215. Geosource Inc. 
216. J. Gerber and Co., Inc. 
217. A.J. Gerrard and Co. 
218. Getty Oil Co. 
219. Gilbert and Barker Manuf. 
220. Gillette Co. 
221. Gillsevey Co. 
222. Glair and Kestler Co. 
223. Glidden-Durkee 
22k. Goodyear Tyre and Rubber Co. 
225. W.R. Grace and Co. 
226. Grant Advertising Inc. 
281 
227. Graver Tank and Mfg. Co. 
223. Grolier Inc. 
229. Gulf Oil Corp. 
230. Hammond Corp. 
231. Hamischfeger International Corp. 
232. Harsco 
233. Haskins and Sells 
231*. Halliburton Co. 
235. Heinemann Electric Co. 
236 . Helena Rubinstein Inc. 
237. Heller (Walter E.) Inter. 
233. Hertz Rent-A-Car Co. 
239. Heublein International 
2^0. Hevitt-Robins Inc . 
2Ul. Hewlett Packard International 
2b2. Holiday Inns of America 
21*3. Home Products International, Ltd. 
2UL. Honeywell Inc. 
2U5 . Honeywell Information Systems Inc. 
2b6. Hoover Co. 
2U7. Howe Richardson Scale Co. 
2l*8. Hussman Refrigerators Co. 
2l*9. Huster Co. 
250. Hydro-Air International 
251. IBM World Trade Corp. 
252. Industrial Chem. Products 
253. INA Corp. 
251*. Infilco Division of Fuller Co. 
255. Ingersoll-Rand Co. 
25o. Innont Corp . 
257. Insurance Company of North America 
258. Interchemical Corn. 
259. International Banking Corp. 
260. International Bank of Reconstruction 
and Development 
261. International Bus Machines 
262. Int. Flavors and Fragrances Inc. 
263. Int. Group of Companies 
26b. Int. Harvester Co. 
265. International Latex Corp. 
266. International Minerals and Chemicals 
267. International Nickel 
268. International Packers Ltd. 
269. International Staple and Machine Co. 
270. International Telephone and Telegraph 
Corp. 
271. Interpublic Group of Companies Inc. 
272. Irving Chute Co. Inc. 
273. Jeffrey-Gallion Mfg. Co. 
2jb. Johns-Manville International Corp. 
275• Johnson and Johnson 
276. S.C. Johnson and Son Inc. 
277. Joy Manufacturing Co. 
278. Kaiser Industries 
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279. Kellogg Co. 
280. Kelly-Springfield lyre and Co. 
281. Kendall Co. 
282. Kennedy Van Saun Mfg. and Engineering 
Corp. 
283. Placid Oil 
28k. Keystone Abestos Corp. 
285. Kidder, Peabody and Co., Inc. 
286. Kimberley-Clark Corp. 
287. King Resources 
288. Koret of California 
289. Lakeside Laboratories Inc. 
290. E.J. Lavino and Co. 
291. Lease Plan International Corp. 
292. Leo Burnett Co. 
293. A.R. Lilly and Son 
29^ . Link-Belt Co. 
295. Litton Industries 
296 . Litvin Corp. 
297. Loftus Engineering Co. 
298. Lovable Co. 
299. Lubrizol Corp . 
300 . Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., Inc. 
301. Lykes Youngstown Corp. 
302. Mack Trucks Worldwide 
303. Macmillan Inc. 
30U. Mahon International Inc. 
305. P.R. Mallory and Co. 
306. Manhattan Shirt Co. 
307. Manufacturers Hanover Trust 
308. Maremount Corp. 
309. Masonite Corp. 
310. Master Mechanics Co. 
311. McGraw-Hill Inc. 
312. McKee Arthur G. and Co. 
313. Measurex Corporation 
31*». Mechanite Metal Corp. 
315. Merck, Sharp and Dohme International 
316. Mekan Entreprises 
317. Merell National Laboratories 
318. Metro-Goldvyn-Mayer Inti. Inc. 
319. Meyer Mfg. Co. (Geo J.) 
320. Middle West Service Corp. 
321. Midlands Oil 
322. Miles Laboratories Inc. 
323. Millburg Industrial Painters 
32U. Mine Safety Appliances Co. 
325. Minerals and Chemicals Philipp Corp. 
326. Minnesota Mining and Mfg. Co. 
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327. Mohavk Data Sciences 
328. Mobil Oil Corp. 
329. Monarch Cinnabar 
330. Mono Containers 
331. Monsanto Co. 
332. Moore-McCormack Lines , Inc . 
333. Morgan Guarantee and Trust 
334. Morrison Knudson 
335. Motorola Inc. 
336. MSD 
337. Mand T Chemicals Inc. 
338. Muller and Phipps International Corp 
339. Nalco Chemicals 
340. Nashua Corporation 
341. National Cash Register Co. 
342. National Chemsearch 
343. National Standard Co. 
344. National Starch and Chemical Corp. 
345. National Trust and Savings Assoc. 
346. Navarro Exploration Co. 
347. Nevmont Mining Corp. 
348. New Wellington 
349. A.C. Nielsen International, Inc. 
350. North American Rockwell 
351. Norton Co. 
352. Nuclear Corp. of America 
353. Oak Industries, Inc. 
35V* Ocean Drilling and Exploration 
355 • Ocean Science and Engineering Inc. 
356. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp. 
357. Oshkosh Truck Corp. 
358. Otis Elevator Co. 
359. Ovens Corning 
360. Owens-Illinois 
361. Ozite Corp. 
362. Pacific Oilseeds Inc. 
363. Robert Page and Assoc. 
364. J.J. Palmer and Co. 
365. Pan American World Airways Inc. 
366. Parke, Davis and Co. 
367. Parker Hannifin Corp. 
368. Parker Pen Co. 
369. Pegasus International Corp. 
370. Pepsi Cola International 
371. Performed Line Products 
372. Perking-Elmer Corp. 
373. Permatex Co. Inc. 
374. Perth Products 
375. Pfizer International 
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376. Phelps Dodge Corporation 
377. Philip Morris Inc. 
373. Philips Petroleum Co. 
379. Pillsbury Co. 
380. Pioneer Systems 
331. Pipe Line Technologists Inc. 
382. Pizza Inn Inc. 
383. Placid Oil 
38U. Playtex International 
385 . Plough Inc. 
386. P.M. Products 
387. Precision Valve Corporation 
388. Preload Engineering Corp. 
389. Premix Asphalt Co. 
390. Orentice-Hall Publishers Inc. 
391• Prestolite ^International 
392. Price Waterhouse and Co. 
393. Proctor and Gamble Co. 
391». Publicker International Inc. 
395. Publishers Co. Inc. 
396. Radio Corp. of America 
397. Ramsey Engineering Co. 
398. Reader's Digest 
399. Reichhold Chemicals, Inc. 
1*00. Reliance-Toledo 
1*01. Remington Rand 
1*02. Revlon Inc. 
1*03. Rexnord Inc. 
LOU. Rheem International Co. 
1*05. Rheem Mfg. 
l+06 Richardson Merell Inc. 
1*07 . Richelieu Corp . Inc . 
1*08. Riker Laboratories 
1*09. Ritepoint Corp. 
1*10. Ritter Pfandler Corp. 
1*11. River Brand Rice Mills Inc. 
1*12. R.M.B. Alloys 
1*13. A.H. Robbins Co. Inc. 
1*11*. H.H. Robertson Co. 
1*15. A.A. Robins Co.' Inc. 
I*l6. Rockwell International 
1*17. Rockwell Standard 
1*18. Rohm and Haas Co. 
1*19. Royal Crown Cola Co. 
1*20. Ruth and Strong Ltd. 
1*21. Samincorp Inc. 
1*22 . Sobering Plough Corp . 
1*23. Schlesinger Organization 
1*21*. Schlum'oerger Ltd. 
1*25 . Scholl Inc . 
1*26. W.F. Schrafft and Sons 
1*27. Scripto Inc. 
1*28. G.D. Searle and Co. 
1*29. Seaway Associates Inc. 
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1+30. Security Resources 
1*31. Servac Laboratories 
1*32. Sheffield Corp. 
1*33. Shell Oil Co. 
l*3l*. US Shulton Inc. 
1*35. Simplicity Pattern Co. Inc. 
1*36. Singer Seving Machine Co. 
1*37. Skelly Oil Co. 
1*38. Skil Corp. 
1*39. Smith Klein and French Lab. 
1*1*0. A.O. Smith Corp. 
1*1*1. Soutvire Co. of Georgia 
1*1*2. Sperry-Rand Corp. 
1*1*3. Sperry Vickers 
1*1*1*. Square D. Co 
1*1*5. Squibb (E.R.) and Sons 
1*1*6. Standard Brands Inc. 
1*1*7. Standard Oil Co. of California 
1*1*8. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey 
1*1*9. Standard Pressed Steel Co. 
1*50. Stanley Works 
1*51. C.V. Starr and Co. 
1*52. States Marine Lines 
1*53. Stauffer Chemical Co. 
l*5l*. Steiner Co. 
1*55. Sterling Products Inc. 
l*5o. Stove-Woodvard Co. 
1*57. St. Regis Paper Co. 
1*58. D.A. Stuart Oil Co. 
1*59. Sun Oil Co. 
1*60. Sybron Corp . 
l*6l. Symington Wayne Corp. 
1*62. Systematics Services Pty. 
1*63. Tampax Inc. 
1*61*. Tanatex Chemical Corporation 
1*65. Taylor Instrument Co. 
1*66. Tec'nnicon Corp. 
1*67. Tedd-Hill Products 
1*68. Tedd McKune Investments 
1*69. Tenneco International 
1*70. Texas Gulf Inc. 
1+71. Thermo-Electric Co. Inc. 
1*72. Thompson Remco 
1*73. Texaco Inc. 
U7I*. J. Walter Thompson Co. 
1*75 . Thor Power Tool Co. 
1*76. Tidewater Marine Service 
1*77 . Tidewater Oil Co. 
1*78. TRW Inc. 
1*79. Three M ( 3M) Corp. 
1*80. Time International 
l*8l. Timken Co. 
1*82. Titan Industrial Corp. 
1*83. Tokheim Corp. 
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43L. Toledo Scale Cor?. of Ohio 
485. Touche, Ross, Bailey and Smart 
International 
486. Transalloys Ltd. 
487. Trane Co. 
488. Trans World Airlines Inc. 
489. Triton Chemicals Ltd. 
490. Tuco Ltd. 
491. Twentieth Century Fox Films Corp. 
492. Twin Disc Incorporated 
493. Underwood 
49L. Unimark International 
I95. Union Carbide Corp. 
496. Uniroyal Inc. 
497. United Aircraft Corp. 
498. United Artists Corp. 
499. United Cargo Corp. 
500. United Shoe Machinery Corp. 
?01. United States Filter Corp. 
502. United States Gypsum Co. 
503. US Industries 
304. United States Steel Corp. 
505 - Universal Leaf Tobacco 
?06. Universal Mineral Discoveries 
307. Upjohn Co. 
508. Valeron Corporation 
509. Valvoline Oil Co. 
310. Van Dusen Aircraft Supplies Ltd. 
311. The Vendo Co. 
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512. Vick Chemical Inc. 
513. Vick International 
511*. Wallace International 
515. Warner Bros., Inc. 
516. Warner-Lambert Pharmaceutical Co 
517. J.R. Watkins Products Inc. 
518. Wayne Pump Co. 
519. Western Airlines Inc. 
520. Western International Hotels 
521. Western Knapp Engineering Co. 
522. Westinghouse Air Brake Co. 
523. Westinghouse Electric Intl. Corp 
52U. West Point Papperoll Inc. 
525. Weyerhaeuser Co. 
526. Whinney Murray Ernst 
527. White Motor Corp. 
528. Whitney Co. 
529. Wilbur-Ellis Co. 
530. H.B. Wilson Co. 
531. Woolvorth F.W. 
532. Worldtronic Inc. 
533. Worthington Air Conditioning Co. 
53k. Wyeth International Ltd. 
535. Xerox Corp. 
536. XM World Trade, Inc., One World 
Trade Center 
537. X-Ray International Ltd. 
538. Arthur Young and Co. 
539. ZOE 
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Proposed New Racial Constitution of South Africa 
The resolution was adopted by 141 votes to none, with 7 
abstentions (resolution 38/11). 
In favour : 
Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, 
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, 
Barbados, Benin. Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, 
Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist 
Republic, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, 
Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, 
Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, 
Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El 
Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia. Fiji. Finland. 
France, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, 
Greece, Guinea, Guinea-3issau. Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, 
Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic 
of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Ivory Coast. Jamaica, Japan, 
Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic. 
Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 
Madagascar. Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, 
Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia. Morocco, 
Mozambique, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, 
Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, 
Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and 
Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, 
Singapore, Solomon Islands. Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, 
Sudan; Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden. Syrian Arab Republic, 
Thailand. Togo. Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia. Turkey, 
Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic 
of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania. Upper Volta, 
Uruguay, Vanuatu. Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen. Yugoslavia, 
Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
Against: None 
Abstaining: Belgium, Germany, Federal Republic of, Luxembourg, 
~ Netherlands, Portugal, United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland. United States of America 
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Situation in South Africa 
The resolution was adopted by 124 votes to 16, with 10 
abstentions (resolution 38/39A). 
In favour: 
Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, 
Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, 
Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, 
Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Chpe Verde, 
Central African Republic, Qiad, China, Colombia, Comoros, 
Gongo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Chechoslovakia, Democratic 
Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, 
Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, 
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Bonduras, Hungary, 
India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, 
Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, lao People's Democratic Republic, 
Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, 
Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, 
Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, 
Niger, Nigeria, cman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, 
Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint 
Iiicia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and 
Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, 
Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Ianka, Sudan, 
Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and 
TObago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist 
Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab 
Sairates, united Republic of Cameroon, united Republic of 
Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, 
Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
Against: Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Federal Republic 
of, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Paraguay, Portugal, united Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland, united States of America 
Abstaining: Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Guatemala, Ireland, ivory 
Ooast, Malawi, Spain, Sweden 
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Programme of Action Against Apartheid 
The resolution was adopted by 128 votes to 2, with 22 
abstentions (resolution 38/39B). 
In favour: 
Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, 
Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, 
Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, 
Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Central 
African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, 
Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic 
Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, 
Fiji, France, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, 
Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, 
Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic 
of} , Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao 
People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, 
Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, 
Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, 
Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, 
Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, 
Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon 
Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Syrian Arab 
Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, 
Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United 
Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper 
Volta, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, 
Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
Aaainst: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United 
States of America 
Abstaining: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Botswana, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Iceland, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Lesotho, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Swaziland, Sweden 
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Effects of Apartheid on the Countries of Southern Africa 
The resolution was adopted by 146 votes to 2, with 4 
abstentions (resolution 38/39C). 
In favour: 
Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, 
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, 
Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, 
Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist 
Republic, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Giad, 
Ciile, Ciina, Oolombia, Comoros, Oongo, Oosta Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, 
Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, 
Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, 
Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, 
Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Giana, Greece, Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, 
Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, 
Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's 
Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 
Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, 
Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, 
Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, 
Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, 
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint 
Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Lome and 
Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, 
Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, 
Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, 
Togo, Trinidad and TObago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian 
Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 
United Arab Etirâtes, united Republic of Cameroon, united 
Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, 
Viet t«un, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
Against; 
Paraguay, United States of America 
Abstaining: 
Germany, Federal Republic of, Guatemala, Malawi, united Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
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Sanctions Against South Africa 
The resolution was adopted by 122 votes to 10, with 18 
abstentions (resolution 38/39D). 
In favour : 
Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, 
Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, 
Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, 
Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Central 
African Republic, Chad, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, 
Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic 
Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, 
Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, 
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, 
India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, 
Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, 
Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, 
Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, 
Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, 
Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, 
Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and 
Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, 
Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, 
Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist 
Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab 
Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of 
Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, 
Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
Against: 
Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Japan, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America 
Abstaining: 
Australia, Austria, Botswana, Denmark, Finland, Greece, 
Guatemala, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Ivory Coast, Lesotho 
Malawi, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Swaziland, Sweden 
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Programme of Work of the 
Special Committee Against Apartheid 
The resolution was adopted by 149 votes to 1, with 2 
abstentions (resolution 38/39E). 
In favour: 
Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, 
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, 
Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, 
Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist 
Republic, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, 
Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, 
Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, 
Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, 
Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, 
Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, 
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, 
India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, 
Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao 
People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan 
Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, 
Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, 
Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, 
Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, 
Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, 
Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome 
and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, 
Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain,. Sri Lanka, Sudan, 
Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, 
Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian 
Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 
United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United 
Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, 
Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
Against: 
United States of America 
Abstaining : 
Germany, Federal Republic of, United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland 
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Relations Between Israel and South Africa 
The resolution was adopted by 106 votes to 18, with 17 
abstentions (resolution 38/39F). 
In favour: 
Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and 
Barbuda, Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, 
Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, 
Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, 
Central African Republic, Chad, China, Comoros, Congo, 
Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, 
Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial 
Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic 
Republic, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, 
Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), 
Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic 
Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 
Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, 
Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, 
Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New 
Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, 
Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, 
Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, 
Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, 
Turkey,' Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab 
Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic 
of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, 
Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
Against; Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Iceland, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland, United States of America 
Bahamas, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Fiji, 
Guatemala, Haiti, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Malawi, 
Panama, Paraguay, Portugal, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Spain 
Abstaining: 
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Military and Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa 
The resolution was adopted by 122 votes to 9, with 17 
abstentions (resolution 38/39G). 
In favour: 
Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, 
Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, 
Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, 
Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, 
Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, 
Comoros, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic 
Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, 
Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran 
(Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, 
Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan 
Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, 
Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, 
Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, 
Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, 
Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, 
Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, 
Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, 
Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, 
Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian 
Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, 
United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Vanuatu, 
Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
Against: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, 
Italy, Paraguay, Portugal, United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland, United States of America 
Abstaining : Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Guatemala, 
Iceland, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Japan, Luxembourg, Malawi, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden 
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Investments in South Africa 
The resolution was adopted by 140 votes to 1, with 9 
abstentions (resolution 38/391). 
In favour: 
Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, 
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, 
Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist 
Republic, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, China, 
Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, 
Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, 
Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El 
Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, 
Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, 
Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, 
Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic 
of), Iraq, Ireland, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, 
Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan 
Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, 
Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, 
Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, 
Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, 
Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, 
Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon 
Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, 
Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist 
Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab 
Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of 
Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet 
Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
Against: 
United States of America 
Abstaining : 
Botswana, Canada, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, 
Britain ândYNo°“«„I'it°ïand "*UVi' “nited K1"9d°” °f °reat 
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Oil Embargo Against South Africa 
The resolution was adopted by 130 votes to 6, with 14 
abstentions (resolution 38/39J). 
In favour: 
Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, 
Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, 
Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, 
Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Central 
African Republic, Chad, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, 
Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic 
Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, 
Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic 
Republic, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, 
Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic 
Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, 
Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan 
Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, 
Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, 
Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, 
Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, 
Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent 
and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi 
Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, 
Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, 
Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo., Trinidad and 
Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist 
Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab 
Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of 
Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela. Viet 
Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
Aaainst: 
Belgium, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Luxembourg, 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United 
States of America 
Abstaining : 
Australia, Austria, Botswana, Canada, Greece, Italy, Ivory 
Coast, Japan, Lesotho, Malawi, New Zealand, Norway, 
Portugal, Swaziland 
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Apartheid in Sports 
The resolution was adopted by 145 votes to 1, with 6 
abstentions (resolution 38/39K). 
In favour: 
Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, 
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, 
Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, 
Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet 
Socialist Republic, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, 
Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic 
Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, 
Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic 
Republic, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, 
Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran 
(Islamic Republic ofl, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Ivory Coast, 
Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's 
Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, 
Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, 
Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, 
Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, 
Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, 
_Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao 
Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra 
Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri 
Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab 
Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, 
Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United 
Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper 
Volta, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, 
Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
Aoainst: United States of America 
Abstaining: Denmark, Germany, Federal Republic of, Iceland, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland 
APPENDIX C 
Sullivan Principles for U.S. Firms 
Operating in South Africa 
*fhe Sullivan Principles, first drawn up by the Reverend Leon Sullivan in 
March 1977, have been amplified twice—in July 1978 and in May 1979. The 
text of the principles as amplified in May 1979 follows. 
PRINCIPLE I. 
Nonsegregation of the races in all eating, comfort, and work facilities. 
Each signator of the Statement of Principles will proceed immediately to: 
• Eliminate all vestiges of racial discrimination. 
• Remove all race designation signs. 
• Desegregate all eating, comfort, and work facilities. 
PRINCIPLE II. 
Equal and fair employment practices for all employees. 
Each signator of the Statement of Principles will proceed immediately to: 
• Implement equal and fair terms and conditions of employment. 
• Provide nondiscriminatory eligibility for benefit plans. 
• Establish an appropriate comprehensive procedure for handling and resolv¬ 
ing individual employee complaints. 
• Support the elimination of all industrial racial discriminatory laws which 
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impede the implementation of equal and fair terms and conditions of em¬ 
ployment, such as abolition of job reservations, job fragmentation, and ap¬ 
prenticeship restrictions for blacks and other nonwhites. 
• Support the elimination of discrimination against the rights of blacks to 
form or belong to government-registered unions, and acknowledge generally 
the right of black workers to form their own union or be represented by trade 
unions where unions already exist. 
PRINCIPLE III. 
Equal pay for all employees doing equal or comparable work for the 
same period of time. 
Each signator of the Statement of Principles will proceed immediately to: 
• Design and implement a wage and salary administration plan which is 
applied equally to all employees regardless of race who are performing equal 
or comparable work. 
• Ensure an equitable system of job classifications, including a review of the 
distinction between hourly and salaried classifications. 
• Determine whether upgrading of personnel and/or jobs in the lower echelons 
is needed, and if so, implement programs to accomplish this objective expe¬ 
ditiously. 
• Assign equitable wage and salary ranges, the minimum of these to be well 
above the appropriate local minimum economic living level. 
PRINCIPLE IV. 
Initiation of and development of training programs that will prepare, in 
substantial numbers, blacks and other nonwhites for supervisory, 
administrative, clerical, and technical jobs. 
Each signator of the Statement of Principles will proceed immediately to: 
• Determine employee training needs and capabilities, and identify employees 
with potential for further advancement. 
• Take advantage of existing outside training resources and activities, such 
as exchange programs, technical colleges, vocational schools, continuation 
classes, supervisory courses, and similar institutions or programs. 
• Support the development of outside training facilities, individually or col¬ 
lectively, including technical centers, professional training exposure, cor¬ 
respondence and extension courses, as appropriate, for extensive training 
outreach. 
• Initiate and expand inside training programs and facilities. 
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PRINCIPLE V. 
Increasing the number of blacks and other nonwhites in management 
and supervisory positions. 
Each signator of the Statement of Principles will proceed immediately to: 
• Identify, actively recruit, train, and develop a significant number of blacks 
and other nonwhites to ensure that as quickly as possible there will be 
appropriate representation of blacks and other nonwhites in the manage¬ 
ment group of each company. 
• Establish management development programs for blacks and other non¬ 
whites, as appropriate, and improve existing programs and facilities for 
developing management skills of blacks and other nonwhites. 
• Identify and channel high management potential blacks and other nonwhite 
employees into management development programs. 
PRINCIPLE VI. 
Improving the quality of employees’ lives outside the work environment 
in such areas as housing, transportation, schooling, recreation, and 
health facilities. 
Each signator of the Statement of Principles will proceed immediately to: 
• Evaluate existing and/or develop programs, as appropriate, to address the 
specific needs of black and other nonwhite employees in the areas of housing, 
health care, transportation, and recreation. 
• Evaluate methods for utilizing existing, expanded, or newly established in- 
house medical facilities or other medical programs to improve medical care 
for all nonwhites and their dependents. 
• Participate in the development of programs that address the educational 
needs of employees, their dependants, and the local community. Both indi¬ 
vidual and collective programs should be considered, including such activi¬ 
ties as literary education, business training, direct assistance to local schools, 
contributions, and scholarships. 
• With all the foregoing in mind, it is the objective of the companies to involve 
and assist in the education and training of large and telling numbers of 
blacks and other nonwhites as quickly as possible. The ultimate impact of 
this effort is intended to be of massive proportion, reaching millions. 
APPENDIX D 
SALES OF STOCK BY COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES 
Following is a rundown of actions by colleges or universities that have 
decided to sell stock in corporations active in South Africa. 
ANTIOCH UNIVERSITY: The board of trustees of Antioch University 
voted in May 1978 to dispose of ail its South Africa-related investments. 
At that time, the school held stock in four companies active in South 
Africa. The market value of the shares was not made public, but Edward 
Richards, chairman of the trustees' Finance Committee, told IRRC that it 
was somewhere in "the significant six-figure range." The decision to 
divest was made in accordance with 1963 guidelines that require the board 
to consider social and moral issues in its financial affairs. 
AMHERST COLLEGE; In November 1977, one month after the 
Amherst board of trustees announced its selective divestment policy, 
Treasurer Kurt Hertzfeld wrote to all the companies in Amherst's 
portfolio with operations in South Africa and requested information about 
their activities in that country. In March 1978, the college sold some 
50,000 shares of Blue Bell, a clothing manufacturer, after the company 
failed to provide a "positive response" to Amherst's inquiry about the work 
conditions of its black employees, according to Hertzfeld. With the 
exception of Blue Bell's reply, the board was satisfied with the responses 
and has not sold any other South Africa-related stock. Hertzfeh told 
IRRC that the funds released by the sale of the Blue Bell 
stock—approximately $1 million—were reinvested in short-term cash 
equivalents. 
BOSTON UNIVERSITY; Boston University is disposing of all its South 
Africa-related bonds and non-voting stock and withdrawing deposits from 
banks that lend to the South African government. The gradual 
$6.6-million divestiture was announced in April 1979. 
According to Boston University's policy, holding non-voting stock in 
companies active in South Africa places the school "in the position of 
benefiting financially in these cases from companies doing business in 
South Africa without the offsetting advantages of voting stock." Bayley 
Mason, special assistant to the president of Boston University, told IRRC 
that sale of non-voting stock was "a logical prerequisite to defending our 
voting holdings." He added, "we don't anticipate any loss" from the sale of 
the securities. 
BRANDEIS UNIVERSITY; In 3une 1978, the governing board of 
Brandeis University authorized the sale of a $50,000 fixed income 
instrument held in Crocker National Bank after the bank displayed "a lack 
of responsiveness" to the school's inquiries about its lending policies to 
South Africa, according to a university official. The sale was made in 
compliance with an investment policy established in December 1977 that 
called for selective divestment of holdings in firms that refuse to disclose 
adequate information about their South African operations. 
More recently, Brandeis sold a $350,000 Ford Motor Co. bond. The 
school sold the bond as the first step in carrying out the investment policy 
announced in April 1979 which states that the university must sell its 
holdings in a company that causes "severe social injury" in South Africa if 
the school owns no voting shares in the company. University Treasurer 
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Lester Loomis told IRRC that Ford's truck sales to the South African 
police and military fell within the board's definition of "sevére social 
injury." The sale did not entail any financial loss for the university, 
according to Loomis. 
CARLETON COLLEGE: Carleton College sold 9,000 shares of Wells 
Fargo stock worth approximately $285,000 and a $10,000 Wells Fargo bond 
in Tune 1979 because of that bank's policy on making loans to the South 
African government. The decision came after several rounds of 
correspondence with Wells Fargo and is in compliance with an October 
1978 policy that authorizes the prudent divestiture of holdings in banks 
that engage in such lending. 
The Carleton policy also calls for prudent divestiture of stock in 
corporations active in South Africa that do not adopt the Sullivan 
principles or a similar code. The school is now reviewing its holdings in 
companies that operate in South Africa but have not signed the Sullivan 
principles. 
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY; Columbia University announced in March 
1979 that it sold some $2.7 million worth of stock in three banks because 
of their positions on making loans to the South African government. The 
banking corporations were Detroit Bank Corp., Manufacturers National 
Bank of Detroit and Rainier Bancorporation of Seattle. According to the 
school, the sale was made without financial loss and the funds have been 
reinvested in other banking institutions. 
The divestment was carried out in compliance with Columbia's policy 
on holding stocks in banks and companies doing business in South Africa. 
Under that policy, the school will sell its investments and withdraw 
deposits in banks "which provide new or continuing access to capital 
markets for the government of South Africa and which do not announce 
their intention to cease such activities." According to William 3. McGill, 
Columbia's president, the decision to sell stock in the two Detroit banks 
was made after each had declined for policy reasons to disclose whether it 
had extended credit to South Africa and if it had plans for future loans. 
McGill said that the sale of Rainier stock was prompted by the bank's 
decision to continue to make loans to the South African government. 
HAMPSHIRE COLLEGE; In the spring of 1977, Hampshire's board of 
trustees voted to sell all of the school's common stock—valued at 
approximately $200,000—until the school could devise an investment 
policy that incorporated appropriate guidelines on social responsibility. 
This action followed student protests against Hampshire's holding of 
$39,000 worth of stock in four companies with subsidiary operations in 
South Africa. The money raised from the liquidation of the school's 
portfolio was invested in firms with no South African commercial ties. 
However, in August 1978 the college's money managers bought three 
issues of stock in companies with South African ties. Once college 
officials realized the new purchases were South Africa-related, they 
requested and received information on the three companies' operations 
there. In March 1979 the Finance Committee of the board voted to 
instruct the college's money managers to dispose of all holdings in South 
Africa-related corporations and to avoid all such securities in the future. 
HOWARD UNIVERSITY: Howard University's first South 
Africa-related investment policy was established in March 1978 and 
excluded from the school's portfolio all companies that had not signed the 
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Sullivan principles. However, "using the Sullivan principles as a standard 
just dickVt work over here," said Caspa Harris, university treasurer. 
"Practically speaking, we couldn't know who abided by the principles and 
who didn't." In November 1978 the university changed its policy so that it 
no longer holds stock in any companies doing "substantial business" in 
South Africa. Since that time, the university has sold about $1.8 million 
of South Africa-related securities (about 13 percent of its $19-million 
endowment) and has not incurred a financial loss from the sales. 
‘UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS: The board of regents of the 
University of Massachusetts—in response to increasing student and faculty 
concern—decided in October 1977 to sell all of the school's South 
Africa-related holdings. The divestment decision affected some $631,000 
worth of stock in 21 companies, representing approximately half of the 
school's equity portfolio. Robert Brand, the university's treasurer, told 
IRRC that all of the affected stock was sold within 90 days of the board's 
decision, as specified in its divestment resolution. He estimated that the 
school suffered a total net loss of $90,000 after all transactions were 
completed. Funds from the sale of South Africa-related securities were 
reinvested in firms with high growth potential that are not doing business 
in South Africa, according to Brand. 
MIAMI UNIVERSITY: In April 1978, the governing board of Miami 
University in Ohio adopted a resolution calling for the sale of all stock 
owned by the school in companies active in South Africa and asking the 
school to cease doing business with these firms. At the time, Miami's 
portfolio contained investments in two companies—Union Carbide and 
Warner-Lambert—identified as having South African operations. These 
investments had a combined value of approximately $160,000, 
representing about 3 percent of the university's $5.5-miliion endowment 
fund. 
The board rescinded its divestment- decision in June 1978 after 
hearing a report from a special committee established to examine the 
financial and legal ramifications of such action. In a legal opinion 
prepared by James Irwin, a lawyer assigned by the Ohio attorney general's 
office to be the school's special counsel on the matter, the trustees were 
advised that their decision to sell South Africa-related stocks on 
ideological grounds would probably violate state statutes on prudent 
investment of public funds. Irwin also said it was probably illegal under 
Ohio law far the school to discriminate against certain firms in its 
business dealings. 
A Miami official told IRRC that, following the board’s original 
decision to divest, the school had heard from several companies that were 
strongly critical of the trustees' action. The firms, he said, had hinted 
that Miami might be excluded from their recruitment programs and that 
grants and gifts might be withheld to express disapproval of the school's 
investment policy. The official said that the companies' responses—as 
well as general community reaction to the trustees' original 
resolution—were important considerations in the board's decision to drop 
its divestment plans. The board has not adopted an alternative policy for 
Miami’s South Africa-related holdings. 
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN; In March 1979, the board of regents of 
the University of Michigan voted to sell its stock in Black <5c Decker after 
the company refused to supply certain information regarding its 
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operations in South Africa. The decision follows guidelines established in 
March 1978 that call for divestment of "stock in any firm that fails 
to...abide by the school's bank policy (no new loans to the South African 
government except where detrimental to apartheid) or adhere 
satisfactorily to the Sullivan principles." 
The regents' vote was cast after review of the university's 
correspondence with the 47 corporations doing business in South Africa in 
which it holds stock. As in all its letters to portfolio companies, the 
university asked Black & Decker to "(1) affirm the Sullivan principles, (2) 
endorse political, economic and social rights for all its employees in South 
Africa, and (3) make regular reports to publicly disclose corporate 
progress in these matters." 
Black <!c Decker officials responded that "Our company does not 
subscribe to the Sullivan code and does not report to Dr. Sullivan's 
organization as we do not believe that the company's policies should be 
dictated by, nor the company report to, any special interest group, 
regardless of the merit of the group's objectives....It is company policy to 
be governed by the 'Golden Rule' and we insist on treating our employees 
fairly....We have been, are, and will be doing the best we can to improve 
the lot of our employees in all countries where we have operations without 
interfering in the internal social and political affairs of the host countries." 
On the basis of that response, the regents decided to sell the 
university's 14,613 shares of Black & Decker stock. University investment 
officer Norman Herbert reports that the university will not incur any 
financial loss from the sale. 
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY; The board of trustees of Michigan 
State University voted in March 1978 to sell all South Africa-related 
holdings unless designated companies "have adopted and are implementing 
positive measures to withdraw" from that country. 
Divestiture was scheduled to begin on Dec. 1, 1978, but was delayed 
by controversy over the board's decision. In August 1978, university 
general counsel Leland W. Carr 3r. submitted a written opinion to the 
trustees which warned that they might encounter significant legal 
difficulties if they enforced the special policy on South Africa-related 
investments. He recommended they seek further advice on the financial 
feasibility of their policy from outside investment counselors. 
In October, the trustees asked the university's money manager, 
Scudder, Stevens & Clark, whether it would be possible to manage the 
university's portfolio prudently under the terms of the new policy. The 
firm told the school in early December that it could probably reinvest the 
portfolio in stocks of comparable quality, but the same return on 
investment could not be guaranteed. The board then reaffirmed the policy 
it had announced in March. 
Meanwhile, MSU had infocmed its portfolio companies with South 
African ties of its policy, and no company said it would withdraw from 
that country. Therefore, on Dec. 8, 1978, the university trustees resolved 
to commence prudent, total divestiture of the approximately $8.5 million 
worth of stock the diversity held in firms doing business in South Africa. 
According to a divestment procedure agreed upon in March 1979, 
Scudder, Stevens & Clark is to sell the equities in three blocks. The firm 
is to dispose of the poorest performers among the affected stocks first, 
the average performers second, and the best performers last. 
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A university official told IRRC in fall 1979 that Scudder had already 
sold the first two blocks of stock and that only the "big winners"—three 
companies out of the original 13 in the Michigan State portfolio that were 
South Africa-related—remained to be sold. He said the university 
experienced a net loss on the sale of the first block, and a "modest" net 
gain on the sale of the second, so that "the school is almost breaking even 
so far." The official commented that the net loss was attributable more 
to holding the poor performers to begin with than to the divestment 
decision. "Whether our South Africa investment policy is costing us 
money will only become apparent when we see how the alternative 
investments perform," he concluded. 
OHIO UNIVERSITY: In February 1978, the board of trustees of Ohio 
University in Athens, Ohio, voted to sell all of the university's common 
stock in firms doing business in South Africa. The sales took place 
gradually in order to minimize the financial impact of the transactions on 
the school. William Kennard, the university's treasurer, told IRRC that 
the board’s decision affected holdings in four firms—Mobil, International 
Telephone and Telegraph, TRW, and Monsanto—with an estimated 
combined market value of about $38,000. The stocks accounted for 
approximately 1.3 percent of the university's $3-million endowment fund. 
The funds freed by the sales have been invested in companies that 
have no direct commercial connections with South Africa, according to 
Kennard. 
OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY; In November 1978, Ohio State University 
sold some 10,000 shares of stock in International Flavors & Fragrances 
after the company failed to respond to an inquiry by the school about its 
activities in South Africa. The shares had an estimated market value of 
$250,000. 
The sale was made in accordance with a policy on South 
Africa-related investments adopted in April 1979 by the school's board of 
trustees, committing it to sell its holdings in firms that fail to 
demonstrate adequate progress in carrying out the Sullivan principles. At 
that time, Ohio State sent questionnaires to all of its portfolio companies 
to determine if they had business operations in South Africa and—if they 
were involved in that country—to determine the extent of their activities 
and their progress in upgrading employment practices for blacks there. A 
university spokesman told IRRC that follow-up letters and phone calls 
were made to companies that failed to respond to the school's 
questionnaire. In the case of International Flavors ic Fragrances, he said 
that Ohio State had attempted to communicate with the company several 
times on its South African activities but had not received a substantive 
answer. He said the firm finally told the school that it is not its policy to 
disclose this sort of information and that that response prompted Ohio 
State's decision to divest. 
Follow-up communication with other companies that had not 
responded to the school's original inquiry has resulted in satisfactory 
assurances from the firms that they are in active compliance with the 
Sullivan principles, the official told IRRC. 
UNIVERSITY OF OREGON: Under strong student pressure, the 
Oregon State Board of Higher Education voted at its November 1977 
meeting to sell its stock in 27 companies doing business in southern 
Africa. The securities had a total estimated market value of $6 million. 
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The decision applied to any firm operating in South Africa, Namibia and 
Rhodesia that has more than 50 employees or . that has direct investment 
or sales in excess of $500,000 in those countries. 
Following the board's action, however, the state's attorney general, 
James A. Redden, ruled that only the Oregon Investment Council, an 
agency charged with overseeing most of the state's investment 
accounts—including that of the Board of Higher Education—could 
authorize divestment. At most, Redden said, the board could recommend 
action to the Investment Council but it had no power to issue investment 
commands. In his written opinion on the divestment issue, he said 
political and moral considerations could play only a limited role in state 
investment decisions. "It is inappropriate and irrelevant for the 
investment managers to consider any factors other than the probable 
safety of, and the probable income from, the investments as required by 
the statutes (on prudent investing). Only if the investment managers 
determined that political factors affected either the safety of or return 
on investments could those factors be considered in making investment 
decisions," Redden wrote. 
In November 1978, the Associated Students of Oregon filed suit 
contesting Redden’s ruling. The case, Associated Students et al. v. Hunt 
et al„ will be concerned with (1) whether the "prudent man" rule prohibits 
trustees from using other than fiduciary criteria when they make 
investment decisions; (2) whether the State Board of Education can issue 
policy directives to the university system's money managers; and (3) 
whether it is permissible for state agencies to make investment decisions 
with foreign policy implications. 
Redden's legal opinion and the pending court challenge to it have not 
completely derailed the regents' March 1977 decision. University 
Chancellor of Administration Freeman Holmer told IRRC that the suit had 
had "little influence" on the school's investment practices. "Our 
investment managers are aware of the regents' divestment decision and 
the discussion surrounding it," said Holmer. "They decided it was prudent 
to avoid stocks in companies doing substantial business in South Africa 
that do not subscribe to the Sullivan principles." 
SMITH COLLEGE; In October 1977, Smith sold 42,014 shares of stock 
it held in Firestone Tire & Rubber after the college decided that Firestone 
had not been sufficiently responsive to questions by the Smith board of 
trustees about the company's activities in South Africa. The shares had a 
market value of $687,728. 
The previous May, about 600 Smith students, as well as a number of 
staff and faculty members, had petitioned the board to sponsor and 
support shareholder resolutions at companies in which it owns stock that 
have South African subsidiaries, asking the firms to withdraw their 
operations from that country. If the resolutions failed, the petition said, 
the college should sell its holdings in those companies, which were 
identified as Caterpillar Tractor, General Motors, International Business 
Machines and Firestone. 
The trustees did not agree to initiate shareholder resolutions, but 
they did write to the chairmen of the four companies asking questions 
about South Africa activities and communicating their strong support for 
the Sullivan principles. According to Roger Murray, then chairman of 
Smith's Investment Committee, the trustees received satisfactory 
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responses from IBM, Caterpillar and General Motors, but "in the case of 
Firestone, the location of a new plant next to reserved living spaces, 
which had been a particular concern of Smith students, was not covered in 
the response." Subsequently, "although we directed additional questions to 
Firestone about the plant location, we did not receive from them the 
information we needed to evaluate the matter,” he said. As a result, the 
shares were sold. 
TUFTS UNIVERSITY: In October 1977, Tufts sold 11,000 shares of 
Citicorp because its bank subsidiary, Citibank, had made direct loans to 
the South African government after the Soweto riots in 1976. The 
sale—made public in February 1978—was "in accordance with university 
policy that forbids investment in a corporation if their normal practices 
are discriminatory," according to Tufts' president Jean Mayer. The 
university's treasurer, C. Russell de Burlo, said that the school's 
investment policy was not the only factor in the decision to sell, and cited 
the declining value of Citicorp's stock as another major consideration. 
In line with its revised investment policy calling for divestiture of 
stock in companies not adhering to the Sullivan principles, Tufts has 
disposed of its stock in a non-signatory company that did not adequately 
respond to the school's requests for information on the firm's South 
African operations. The Treasurer's office representative, Robin 
Dushman, would not identify the company involved, saying "we're not 
making a big thing of this." 
VASSAR COLLEGE: At the same time the governing board of Vassar 
College enacted a policy of selective divestiture of South Africa-related 
holdings, it announced the sale of approximately $4.2 million worth of 
bonds it held in five banks that made direct loans to the South African 
government and its agencies. The bonds were held in Bank of America, 
Manufacturers Hanover Trust, First National Bank of Chicago, Irving 
Trust, and the Export-Import Bank. The sale was made in accordance with 
Vassar's policy requiring the sale of holdings in banks that lend to the 
South African public sector. 
UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON: In November 1978, the board of 
regents of the University of Washington voted to sell the university's 
holdings in Dresser Industries, an energy technology corporation that does 
business in South Africa. The decision was made in accordance with a 
resolution passed in April 1978 that calls for corporate adherence to the 
Sullivan principles. 
After passing the resolution, the university sent letters to its South 
Africa-related portfolio companies requesting that they adopt the Sullivan 
principles. Almost all the companies responded affirmatively. Dresser 
Industries, however, responded that: "Since we operate in over 100 
countries, we do not adopt statements of principle for each country. Our 
worldwide policy, which applies in each country in which we operate, is to 
be a good corporate citizen and to operate uider the laws and customs of 
each host country. This, in our view, is the only way we can continue to 
do business throughout the world." (According to University of 
Washington's assistant vice president for finance, W.C. Adkisson, the 
letter went on to indicate that Dresser "is pursuing job training programs 
to improve South African blacks' capabilities to improve their conditions, 
though the number of blacks affected by these programs was not 
supplied.") 
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"The board of regents felt the situation in South Africa was special 
enough to warrant a separate statement to govern corporate activities in 
South Africa," Adkisson told IRRC. "Dresser's lack of a special statement 
of policy or interest in developing one doesn't conform to our resolution. 
We felt we were keeping faith with our constituencies by divesting." 
Adkisson reported that the university's Dresser holdings, valued at 
$148,636 when purchased, were sold at a slight profit; the university 
received $153,615 after transaction costs for their sale. 
UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN: In accordance with a 1973 Wisconsin 
law that prohibits the state university from holding investments in 
companies '*which practice or condone through their actions discrimination 
on the basis of race, religion, color, creed or sex," the board of regents of 
the University of Wisconsin voted in February 1978 to sell, all of the 
school's South Africa-related holdings purchased after the law's 
enactment. The school has since divested its $30-million endowment fund 
of $10.2 million worth of stocks and bonds in more than 24 companies that 
do business in South Africa. 
The board's decision to divest climaxed a prolonged legal controversy 
that had started in May 1977 when the state attorney general, Bronson 
LaFollette, informally advised the regents in a letter to sell the 
university's securities in firms doing business in South Africa. The 
attorney general's recommendation to divest was based on the state law 
prohibiting the university from knowingly investing grant money and gifts 
in companies that practice discrimination. The letter to the board was 
prompted by growing student concern over the University of Wisconsin's 
stock holdings in companies operating in South Africa. 
In the summer of 1977, the board solicited another interpretation of 
the statute from a law professor at the university. The new opinion 
questioned the constitutionality of the law, stating that the discriminatory 
clause was "invalid if read literally so as to improperly interfere with 
commerce and international trade" and that matters involving overseas 
investments were beyond the jurisdiction of the state attorney general. 
With both legal opinions in mind, the board voted in October 1977 to 
sell all stock in those companies doing significant business in South Africa 
that had not yet adopted the Sullivan principles. The regents defined 
"significant business" as having more than 250 employees in a company's 
South African operations. Under this policy, the university sold its stock 
in one company—Dresser Industries—according to Charles Stathas, the 
university's legal counsel. 
In January 1978, however, the state attorney general reaffirmed his 
position, calling for comprehensive divestment of all South Africa-related 
securities in a lengthy legal brief to the president of the University of 
Wisconsin system. In the brief, LaFollette stated that the "no 
discrimination" standard is the "emphatic embodiment of the public policy 
of the State of Wisconsin against unlawful discrimination" and urged the 
board of regents to "leave the ultimate determination of the 
constitutionality of the 'no discrimination' clause to the courts." Not 
wanting to become involved in a protracted court battle, the regents 
elected to comply with the law and sell their holdings in companies that 
violated it. 
YALE UNIVERSITY: Yale University decided to sell $1.7 million 
worth of J.P. Morgan <5c Co. stock in May 1979. At the same time Yale 
311 
terminated a short-term lending agreement with the bank and announced 
it would not make any further investments in Morgan. 
Yale's decision was made in accordance with its South African 
investment policy, which calls for divestment of stock in banks that lend 
to the South African government. Yale's Advisory Committee on Investor 
Responsibility, which recommended the sale, concluded: "Yale holds that 
a line ought to be drawn at loans to the South African government, even if 
a particular loan could be said to be of direct benefit to the blacks...." 
David K. Storrs, Yale's director of investments, told IRRC that loans 
support the South African government by providing it with capital. Even 
if the capital is used for the benefit of blacks, he said, a loan frees an 
equivalent amount of capital that the government can use for repressive 
purposes. 
The Yale Advisory Committee described Morgan's lending policy as 
one that "considers all factors it regards as relevant to a loan's prudence 
but does not categorically exclude the possibility of making loans directly 
to the South African government or its instrumentalities." Calling this a 
policy "that honorable and morally concerned persons could reasonably 
have arrived at," the committee nonetheless recommended divestment. 
Although "divestiture is of little practical consequence and hence is 
almost entirely symbolic," the committee wrote, "symbols and gestures 
are important in the realm of moral and humane concerns, and are to be 
taken seriously." 
APPENDIX E 
SUMMARY CHART ON PUBLIC FUND DIVESTMENT 
Since 1976, binding measures restricting public fund investment related to South 
Africa have been enacted in 7 states, 28 cities, 3 counties and one U.S. Territory 
(Virgin Islands). These measures mandate a total of 1.8 billion dollars in divest¬ 
ment from U.S. corporations and banks involved in South Africa. Below is a summary 
chart of the binding measures that have been passed. 
STATE NATURE OF LAW DATE ENACTED AMT. AFFECTED 
Connecticut Divestment from companies that sell 
strategic products or services to 
the South African govt, or are not 
in top two categories of Sullivan 
Principles. 




Iowa Divestment of pension and educa¬ 
tional funds from all companies 
investing in South Africa not in 
top two categories of Sullivan 
Principles; and from those that 
supply strategic products to the 
South African military or police; 
and from banks with loans to S.A. 
or companies doing business there. 
May 31, 1985 $110 million 
Maryland 1) No deposit of state funds in 
banks making loans to the South 
African govt, or national compa¬ 
nies . 





STATE NATURE OF LAW 
Maryland 2) Moritorium on investment of 
state funds in companies which 
invest in S.A. but do not meet top 
two categories of Sullivan Princi¬ 
ples; Maryland-National Capital 
Park and Planning Commission has 
adopted a policy barring trans¬ 
actions with firms doing business 
in or with S.A. 
Massachusetts Divestment of all state pension 
funds from firms doing business 
in South Africa. 
Michigan 1) No deposits of state funds in 
banks making loans to South 
Africa. 
2) Public educational institu¬ 
tions required to sell all 
investments in companies doing 
business in South Africa. 
Nebraska Divestment of pension funds not 
meeting highest rating of 
Sullivan Principles. 
Wisconsin Investment of state educational 
funds in corporations doing 
business in South Africa vio¬ 
lated the state civil rights act. 
DATE ENACTED AMT. AFFECTED 
April/June 1985 Not determined 
January 4, 1983 $ 90 million 
1980 Not determined 
1982 Not determined 
April 9, 1984 Not determined 





STATE NATURE OF LAW DATE ENACTED AMT. AFFECTED 
Virgin Islands 
(Territory) 
Territorial Senate passed bill to 
divest territorial pension fund 
of South Africa linked holdings 
within two years. 
October 1984 Not determined 
(Total size of 
fund, $35 million 
S.A.-linked part 
not specified.) 
CITY/COUNTY NATURE OF LAW DATE ENACTED AMT. AFFECTED 
Amherst (MA) Town Council voted to divest from 
companies doing business in South 
Africa or producing nuclear 
weapons. 
October 1984 Not determined 
Atlantic City (NJ) Divestment within two years of 
city funds in companies operating 
in South Africa and banks with 
loans to South Africa. 
April 1983 Not determined 
Berkeley (CA) Binding referendum removed funds 
from banks doing business in or 
with South Africa. 
April 17, 1979 $ 12 million 
Boston (MA) Prohibition on investment of city 
funds in any bank with outstanding 
loans to South Africa or Namibia 
or any company doing business in 
these countries. 
January 7, 1985 $ 11 million 





AMT. AFFECTED CITY/COUNTY NATURE OF LAW DATE ENACTED 
Cambridge (MA) Cambridge Retirement Board will 
make no new investments in com¬ 





Divestment of pension funds from 
firms that have not signed the 
Sullivan Principles. 
December 1984 
Cincinnati (OH) Divestment of city funds from all 
companies which do business in 
South Africa. 
January 16, 1985 
Cuyohoga County 
(OH) 
County Investment Board banned 
from investing public funds in 
banks lending to the South 
African government. 
March 12, 1985 
Davis (CA) No further investment in banks 
doing business in South Africa. 
1980 
East Lansing (MI) City Council measure for 
selective purchasing to favor 
companies not linked to South 
Africa. 
August 3, 1977 
Grand Rapids (MI) City Commission prohibits deposit 
of idle funds in banks loaning to 
South African government or to 
companies doing business in 
South Africa. 
October 26, 1982 
Not determined 
$700,000 - 










CITY/COUNTY NATURE OF LAW 
Hartford (CT) Prohibition of investments of 
city pension funds in firms 
operating in South Africa that 
have not signed the Sullivan Prin¬ 
ciples . 
Madison (WI) Ordinance on selective purchasing 
urges city to seek contracts with 
firms not in South Africa; 
investment in South Africa was an 
enforceable reason for ending the 
contract. 
Miami (FL) Divestment ordinance for with¬ 
drawal of city funds from U.S. 
firms in South Africa or Namibia 
and from banks lending to the 
South African or Namibian govern¬ 




No investment of county pension 
fund in South African related 
holdings. 
Newark (NJ) 1) Ordinance mandating divestment 
from banks or companies with loans 
or investments in South Africa or 
Namibia to be carried out within 
two years. 
2) A ban on city purchasing from 
companies operating in South 
Africa or Namibia. 
DATE ENACTED AMT. AFFECTED 
1980 Not determined 
December 1976 Not determined 
February 14, Not determined 
1985 
March 1985 Not determined 





CITY/COUNTY NATURE OF LAW 
New Orleans (LA) All city agencies must report to the 
New Orleans City Council on their 
deposits in banks doing business 
with the South African government 
or companies doing business in 
South Africa; and a recommendation 
that no city funds remain on 
deposit in these banks. 
New York (NY) 1) NYC Employee Retirement System 
adopts 5-year phased divestment 
plan from companies operating in 
South Africa. 
2) City Council prohibits deposit 
of city funds in banks which make 
loans to the South African govern¬ 
ment or which advertise or promote 
the Krugerrand. 
3) A ban on city purchases of 
South African goods and severe 
restrictions on purchases from U.S. 
firms which sell to the South 
African military, police, prisons 
or Ministry of Cooperation. 
Oakland (CA) City Council bans new investments 
of idle funds in financial insti¬ 
tutions doing business with South 
Africa. 
DATE ENACTED AMT. AFFECTED 
May 22, 1985 Not determined 
March 15, 1985 $665 million 





CITY/COUNTY NATURE OF LAW 
Philadephia (PA) Divestment ordinance providing 
for withdrawal within two years 
of city pension funds from any 
companies in South Africa or any 
bank making loans to the govern¬ 
ment of South Africa or Namibia. 
Pittsburgh (PA) Pension Board voted to adopt 
divestment policy affecting 
funds in corporations doing 
business in South Africa. 
Rahway (NJ) Ordinance prohibits deposit of 
city funds in banks with loans 
to the South African government, 
national companies, or to any 
corporation operating in South 
Africa. 
Richmond (VA) No further investment of public 
funds in companies doing business 
in or with South Africa. 
Rockland County 
(NY) 
Ban on deposit of county funds in 
Barclays Bank due to its operations 
in South Africa and support of 
British rule in Northern Ireland. 
San Francisco (CA) City Retirement Board votes to 
fully divest city pension funds 
from companies operating in South 
Africa; to be implemented over 
two years. 
DATE ENACTED AMT. AFFECTED 
June 4, 1982 $100 million 
January 17, 1985 Not determined 
June 1984 Not determined 
June 10, 1985 Not determined 
1984 Not determined 





CITY/COUNTY NATURE OF LAW 
San Jose (CA) No further buying of securities 
issued by the South African 
government, South African com¬ 
panies or U.S. firms with South 
African subsidiaries; and no 
further links to banks that 
invest in or do business with 
South Africa or its companies 
or that lend money to U.S. com¬ 
panies operating in South Africa 
Santa Cruz (CA) Ordinance prohibiting the invest 
ment of public funds in banks 
doing business in or with South 
Africa. 
Stockton (CA) Divestment of state funds from 
South Africa linked holdings. 
Washington, D.C. City Council ordinance to divest 
D.C. pension fund from South 
Africa related holdings over two 
years. 
Wilmington (DE) Divestment of pension funds from 
companies doing business in 
South Africa. 
Youngstown (OH) City Council ordinance mandates 
withdrawal of city funds from 
banks investing in South Africa 
or in institutions related to 
the South African or Namibian 
government. 
DATE ENACTED AMT. AFFECTED 
June 1985 Not determined 
November 8, 1983 Not determined 
June 1985 Close to $1 
million 
October 4, 1983 $70-80 million 
July 18, 1982 $400,000 







Africa Research Group. Race to Power: The Struggle for 
Southern Africa. New York: Anchor Books, 1974. 
African Information Service, ed. Return to the Source : 
Selected Speeches of Amilcar Cabral. New York: 
Monthly Review Press, 1973. 
Babbie, Earl R. Survey Research Methods. Belmont, Cali¬ 
fornia: Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc., 1973. 
Baker, James E.; O'Flaherty, J. Daniel; and St. Jorre, 
John de. Public Opinion on American Attitudes 
Toward South Africa. Washington, D.C. : Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 1979. 
Baran, Paul. The Political Economy of Growth. Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1973. 
Baran, Paul, and Sweezy, Paul. Monopoly Capital. Harmonds¬ 
worth: Penguin, 1968. 
Barnet, Richard. The Roots of War. New York: Penguin 
Books, 1972. 
Bender, David L., ed. American Foreign Policy. Minnesota: 
Greenhaven Press, 1981. 
Brewer, Anthony. Marxist Theories of Imperialism: A Critical 
Survey. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980. 
Bukharin, Nicolai. Imperialism and World Economy. London: 
Merlin, 1972. 
Bundy, Colin. The Rise and Fall of the South African 
Peasantry. Berkeley, California: Universityof 
California Press, 1979. 
Burns, Emile, ed. The Marxist Reader. New York: Avenel Books, 
1982. 
Cabral, Amilcar. Revolution in Guinea. New York: Monthly 
Review Press, 1972. 
320 
321 
Carter, Gwendolyn M., and O'Meara, Patrick, ed. Inter¬ 
national Politics in Southern Africa. Bloomington, 
Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1982. 
 . Southern Africa: The Continuing Crisis. Blooming¬ 
ton^ Indiana : Indiana University Press, 1979. 
Colligan, Paddy. Soweto Remembered: Conversations with 
Freedom Fighters. New York: World View Publishers, 
1976. 
Danaher, Kevin. In Whose Interest? A Guide to U.S.-South 
Africa Relations. Washington, D.C.: Institute for 
Policy Studies, 1984. 
Davis, David. African Workers and Apartheid: Fact Paper on 
Southern Africa, No. 5. London : International Defense 
and Aid Fund, T978. 
Dougherty, James E., and Pfaltzgraff, Robert L., Jr. Con¬ 
tending Theories of International Relations. New 
York: Harper and Row Publishers, Inc., 1981. 
El-Khawas, Mohammed A., and Cohen, Barry. The Kissinger 
Study of Southern Africa, National Security Study 
Memorandum 39. Westport, Connecticut : Lawrence Hill 
and Company, 1976. 
Emerson, Rupert. Africa and United States Policy. Englewood 
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967. 
Fann, K.T., and Hodges, Donald C., eds. Readings in U.S. 
Imperialism. Boston: Porter Sargent Publishers, 
1971. 
Freire, Paulo. Pedagogy of the Oppressed. New York: The 
Continuum Publishing Corporation, 1984. 
Gann, L.H., and Duignan, Peter. South Africa: War, Revolu¬ 
tion, or Peace? Stanford^ California : Hoover Insti- 
tute Press, 1978. 
Garshon, Arthur, ed. Crisis in Africa: Battleground of East 
and West. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1981. 
Gerhard, Gail M. Black Power in South Africa: The Evolution 
of an Ideology. Berkeley, California: University of 
California Press, 1978. 
Harsch, Ernest. South Africa: Challenge and Hope. Philadel¬ 
phia: American Friends Service Committee, 1982. 
322 
Harsch, Ernest. South Africa: White Rule, Black Revolt. 
New York: Monad Press, 1980. 
Hero, Alfred 0., Jr., and Barrat, John. The American and 
South Africa: Publics, Elites, and Policymaking 
Processes. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, T978. 
Hilferding, Rudolf. Finance Capital. Paris: Editions de 
Minuit, 1970. 
Hodgart, Alan. The Economics of European Imperialism. New 
York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1977. 
Holsti, K. J. International Politics: A Framework for 
Analysis. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 
Inc., 1983. 
Houser, George M. United States Policy and Southern Africa. 
New York: The Africa Fund American Committee on 
Africa, 1974. 
Jackson, Henry F. From the Congo to Soweto: U.S. Foreign 
Policy Toward Africa Since 1960. New York: William 
Morrow and Company, Inc., 1982. 
Johnson, Smith et al. Political Research Methods: Foundations 
and Techniques. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 
1976. 
Kegley, Charles W., Jr., and Wittkopf, Eugene R. American 
Foreign Policy: Pattern and Process. New York: 
St. Martin's Press, 1979. 
Kiernan, V.G. America: The New Imperialism. London: Zed 
Press, 1980. 
Klein, Beate. Bricks in the Wall : An Update on Foreign Bank 
Involvement in South Africa. New York: World Council 
of Churches, 1981. 
Kolko, Gabriel. The Roots of American Foreign Policy. 
Boston: Beacon Press, 1969. 
Kozlov, G.A., ed. Political Economy: Capitalism. Moscow: 
Progress Publishers, 1977. 
LaGuma, Alex, ed. Apartheid: A Collection of Writings on 
South African Racism by South Africans. New York: 
International Publishers, 1971. 
Lemarchand, Rene, ed. American Policy in Southern Africa: 
The Stakes and Stance. Washington, D.C.: University 
Press of America, 1978. 
323 
Lenin, V.I. Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism. 
New York : International Publishers, 1939. 
Leonard, Richard. Companies in South Africa: A Survey of 
United States Companies. New York: The Africa Fund, 
1978 . 
 . South Africa at War: White Power and the Crisis 
in Southern Africa. Westport, Connecticut: Lawrence 
Hill and Company, 1983. 
Litvak, Lawrence et al. South Africa: Foreign Investment 
and Apartheid. Washington: Institute of Policy 
Studies, 1978. 
Luxemburg, Rosa. The Accumulation of Capital. London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1951. 
Magdoff, Harry. The Age of Imperialism. New York: Monthly 
Review Press, 1969 . 
Magubane, Bernard M. The Political Economy of Race and Class 
in South Africa. New York: Monthly Review Press, 
1979. 
Mandel, Ernest. Marxist Economic Theory. New York: Monthly 
Review Press, 1968. 
Marx, Karl, and Engels, Frederick. Communist Manifesto. New 
York: International Publishers, 1932. 
Massachusetts Association of Concerned Scholars, ed. U.S. 
Military Involvement in Southern Africa. Boston: 
South End Press, 1978. 
Mazrui, Ali A. The African Condition. London: Cambridge 
University Press, 1980. 
Mills, C. Wright. The Power Elite. New York: Oxford Univer¬ 
sity Press, 1956. 
Morgenthau, Hans J. Politics Among Nations. New York: Alfred 
A. Knopf, Inc., 1978. 
Myers, Desaix, III et al. U.S. Business in South Africa. 
Bloomington, Indiana : Indiana University Press, 
1980. 
Nabudere, Dan. The Political Economy of imperialism. London: 
Zed Press, 1977. 
Nkrumah, Kwame. Class Struggle in Africa. New York: Inter- 
national Publishers, 1970. 
324 
Palmberg, Mai. The Struggle for Africa. London: Zed Press, 
1982. 
Parenti, Michael. Democracy for the Few. New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1980. 
Plano, Jack C., and Olton, Roy. The International Relations 
Dictionary. Santa Barbara^ California: ABC-Clio, 
Inc., 1982. 
Ramsamy, Sam. Apartheid: The Real Hurdle—Sports in South 
Africa and the International Boycott. London : Inter¬ 
national Defense and Aid Fund for Southern Africa, 
1982. 
The Report of the Study Commission on U.S. Policy Toward 
Southern Africa. South Africa: Time Running Out. 
Berkeley, California : University of California 
Press, 1981. 
Seidman, Ann, and Seidman, Neva. Outposts of Monopoly 
Capitalism. Westport, Connecticut : Lawrence Hill 
and Co., 1980 . 
 . South Africa and U.S. Multinational Corporations. 
Westport, Connecticut : Lawrence Hill and Company, 
1977. 
Thompson, Leonard, and Butler, Jeffrey, eds. Change in Con¬ 
temporary South Africa. Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1975. 
Thompson, Leonard, and Prior, Andrew. South African Poli¬ 
tics . New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982. 
Wolfe, Alan. The Limits of Legitimacy: Political Contradic¬ 
tions of Contemporary Capitalism. New York: The 
Free Press, 1977. 
Zehar, Renate. Frantz Fanon: Colonialism and Alienation. 
New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974. 
Periodicals 
"American Committee on Africa's 1982 Program." Interna¬ 
tional Mobilization Against Apartheid and for the 
Liberation of Southern Africa 3 (August 1982): 67 
"Anti-Apartheid Groups Take Aim at Davis Cup." Africa News 
X (February 20, 1978): 4. 
325 
"Anti-Apartheid Protests in U.S. Cities." Africa News 
XXIV (March 25, 1985): 10. 
"Anti-South Africa Protest Set for Davis Cup." Africa News 
X (March 13, 1978): 10. 
Baker, Pauline. "South Africa's Strategic Vulnerabilities: 
The 'Citadel Assumption' Reconsidered." The African 
Studies Review XX (September 1977): 89-99. 
Barron, Deborah D., and Immerwahr, John. "The Public Views 
South Africa: Pathways Through a Gathering Storm." 
Public Opinion (January/February 1979): 54-58. 
"Battle Over Sanctions." Africa News XI (July 24, 1978): 5-8. 
Biermann, Werner. "U.S. Policy Toward Southern Africa in 
the Framework of Global Empire." Review of African 
Political Economy 17 (January-April 1980) : 14-23. 
Bratton, Camille A. "A Matter of Record: The History of the 
United States Voting Pattern in the United Nations 
Regarding Racism, Colonialism and Apartheid, 1946- 
1976." Freedomways 17 (1977): 150-159. 
Burns, Maxine Isaacs. "Visitors to Pretoria." Africa Report 
20 (1975): 49-50. 
Cohen, Barry. "U.S. Imperialism and Southern Africa." Review 
of African Political Economy 9 (May/August 1978): 
82-89. 
"Congress: Apartheid No. UNITA Yes?" Africa News XXIV 
(June 17, 1985): 1-2. 
Conrad, Thomas. "Legal Arms for South Africa." Nation 21 
(January 1984): 1-5. 
Crocker, Chester A. "South Africa: Strategy for Change." 
Foreign Affairs 59 (Winter 1980-81): 325-350. 
 . "South Africa: The Hard Questions." America, 
3-10 August 1983, pp. 48-50. 
"The Divestment Debate." World Press Review (June 1985): 
42. 
"Divestment Pressure Escalates." ACOA Action News 19 
(Spring 1985): 1-6. 
El-Khawas, Mohammed. "Partners in Apartheid: U.S. Economic 
and Military Linkages with South Africa." Journal 
of Southern African Affairs 11 (July 1977) : 338- 
339. 
326 
"Ending U.S. Corporate Investments in South Africa." 
International Mobilization Against Apartheid and 
for the Liberation of Southern Africa 1 (June 1980) 
3. 
"The Indian Ocean: The U.S. Responds." Africa Confidential 
20 (May 9, 1979): 3-4. 
Jackson, Henry F. "South Africa: Reagan's Policy Rupture." 
Africa Report (September/October 1981): 9-13. 
Jorre, John de St. "Constructive Engagement: An Assessment. 
Africa Report (September/October 1983): 45-51. 
Karis, Thomas. "Toward a Policy Built on Truth: Realism, 
South Africa and the U.S." Christianity and Crisis 
13 (March 13, 1978): 50-55. 
Klare, Michael T. "The Corporate Gunners: South Africa's 
U.S. Weapons Connections." Nation, 28 July-4 August 
1979, pp. 17-21. 
Klare, Michael and Prokosch, Eric. "Evading the Embargo: 
How the U.S. Arms South Africa and Rhodesia." 
Issue IX (Spring/Summer 1979): 44-49. 
 . "Evading the Embargo: Illicit U.S. Arms Transfers 
to South Africa." Journal of International Affairs 
35 (Spring/Summer 1981): 62-70. 
. "Getting Arms to South Africa." Nation, 8-15 July 
1978, pp. 11-15. 
Kumalo, Dumisani. "Busting Pretoria's Propaganda Ring." 
ACOA Action News 17 (Spring 1984): 1-4. 
Lawrence, Robert. "Reagan's Africa Arsenal." Southern 
Africa (November/December 198 0) : 19-21~ 
Lockwood, Edgar. "National Security Memorandum 39 and the 
Future of the United States Policy Toward Southern 
Africa." Issue IV (1974): 59-64. 
Magubane, Bernard. "Economic Relations Between South Africa 
and the United States." Issue III (Winter 1973): 
1-4. 
McHenry, Donald F. "Statement on South Africa and Namibia." 
Issue V (1975): 61-65. 
. "United States Policy Toward Africa." Issue V 
(1975): 70-71. 
327 
Mugomba, Agrippah. "The Militarization of the Indian Ocean 
and the Liberation of Southern Africa." Journal of 
Southern African Affairs IV (July 1979): 261-276. 
Murapa, Rukudzo. "The Political Economy of the U.S. Policy 
in Southern Africa." The Review of Black Political 
Economy 7 (Spring 1977): 238-265. 
"National Activities Against Apartheid." International 
Mobilization Against Apartheid and for the Libera¬ 
tion of Southern Africa 2 (May 1981) : 6"! 
"News from Anti-Apartheid Movements." International 
Mobilization Against Apartheid and for the Libera¬ 
tion of Southern Africa 2 (December 1981): 6T 
Ntalaja, Nzongola. "Imperialism and the Liberation Struggle 
in Southern Africa." Issue IX (Spring/Summer 1979): 
14-16. 
Nzuwah, Mariyawanda. "An Index of Selected Resolutions 
Documents and Declarations of the United Nations 
on Southern Africa." Journal of Southern African 
Affairs IV (April 1979): 187-247. 
Oudes, Bruce. "Southern African Policy Watershed." African 
Report (November/December 1974): 47-48. 
"Protests Continue on Loans to South Africa." Africa News 
X (April 3, 1978): 10-11. 
Samoff, Joel. "Transnational, Industrialization, and Black 
Consciousness." Journal of Southern Africa Affairs 
3 (October 1978): 497-498. 
Saul, John S., and Gelb, Stephen. "The Crisis in South 
Africa." Monthly Review (July/August 1981): 146- 
147. 
Seidman, Ann. "Why U.S. Corporations Should Get Out of 
South Africa." Issue IX (Spring/Summer 1979): 39- 
47 . 
Setai, Bethuel. "The Role of International Companies in the 
Economy of South Africa." The Review of Black 
Political Economy 8 (Spring 1978) : 351-363. 
"South Africa and the Corporations: Investment Under Fire." 
Africa News IX (December 5, 1977): 6-11. 
"South Africa Under the NATO Umbrella." Africa Report 
(September/October 1976): 16-19. 
328 
"Strategie Sales to South Africa Reach New High." Africa 
News XXIII (October 22, 1985): 1-5. 
"Students in U.S. to Launch Drive Against South Africa." 
Africa News XXI (October 17, 1983): 1-3. 
Toler, Deborah. "Constructive Engagement: Reactionary 
Pragmatism at Its Best." Issue XII (Fall/Winter 
1982): 11-18. 
"U.S. Anti-Apartheid Upsurge." The Black Scholar 16 
(November/December 19857": 1-45. 
"U.S./South Africa: Student Protests on Rise." Africa 
News XX (May 6, 1985): 7-8. 
Vayrynen, Raimo. "The Role of Transnational Corporations 
in the Military Sector of South Africa." Journal 
of Southern African Affairs 5 (April 198071 199- 
247. 
"World Parliament of the Peoples for Peace Falls for 
Sanctions Against the Apartheid Regime." Inter¬ 
national Mobilization Against Apartheid and for 
the Liberation of Southern Africa 1 (November 1980): 
1-7. 
Newspapers 
Anderson, Jack. "Embargo on South Africa Called Farce." 
Washington Post, 30 May 1981, p. 8. 
The Associated Press. "DAR Urges Ties, Trade with South 
Africa." Atlanta Constitution, 18 April 1985, 
p. 3A. 
 . "Jackson, Falwell Debate South Africa." Atlanta 
Journal, 5 September 1985, p. 6A. 
 . "Reagan Gets Tougher with South Africa: Limits 
Placed on Loans, Computers, Nuclear Data." Atlanta 
Constitution, 10 September 1985, p. 1. 
Bryant, Barbara. "Council Split on South Africa Resolution." 
Birmingham Times, 10-15 January 1985, p. 1. 
Catalinotto, John. "Giant Protests Open New Phase of 
Anti-Apartheid Struggle in U.S. Workers World, 
22 August 1985, pp. 1-6. 
Collins, Chris. "Senate Approves South Africa Sanctions, 
New U.S. Gold Coin." USA Today, 12 July 1985, p. 5A. 
329 
DeWitt, Karen. "Apartheid Protests to Span USA." USA 
Today, 4 October 1985, p. 3A. 
Grangenois, Mereille, and McGowan, John T. "Jackson Gets 
Visa, Will Visit South Africa." USA Today, 4 
December 1984, p. 4A. 
Kilpatrick, James J. "South African Bills Ignore Our Own 
Nation's History." Atlanta Constitution, 18 July 
1985, p. 16. 
Kohn, Alfie and Marsden, Eric. "Protests, Sanctions: The 
Tools of Change." USA Today, 7 June 1985, p. 7A. 
Marshall, Steve. "Protests Don't Rock South African Envoy." 
USA Today, 21 December 1984, p. 14A. 
Martin, David C., and Walcott, John. "Smuggling Arms to 
South Africa." Washington Post, 5 August 1970, 
p. Bl. 
McQuay, Timothy. "Capital Sit-In Launches South Africa 
Protest." USA Today, 13 November 1984, p. 3A. 
Neumann, Johanna. "Reagan's Advisers Stick by South Africa." 
USA Today, 19 August 1985, p. 1. 
Quinn, John C. "Opinion—The Debate: South Africa." USA 
Today, 10 June 1985, p. 12A. 
 . "U.S. Must Confront South Africa on Apartheid." 
Atlanta Constitution, 17 January 1985, p. 11. 
"Quotables." Atlanta Constitution, 10 August 1985, p. 2A. 
United Press International. "South Africa is Praised by 
Rev. Falwell—Moral Majority Leader Vows Support 
to Botha." USA Today, 20 August 1985, p. 1. 
Public Documents 
Congressional Research Service. Southern Africa: U.S. 
Regional Policy at a Crossroad? Washington, D.C.: 
The Library of Congress, 1985. 
Report of Committee on Foreign Relations on U.S. Corporate 
Interests in Africa. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govern¬ 
ment Printing Office, 1978. 
330 
Report of J. Daniel Flaherty to the Congressional House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs on Public Opinion 
Poll on American Attitudes Toward South Africa. 
96th Congress, 1st Session. Washington, D.C. : U.S. 
Government Printing Office, October-November 1979. 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Yearbook 
of World Armaments. Uppsala: International Peace 
Research Institute, 1978. 
U.N. Center Against Apartheid. Directory of North American 
Non-governmental Organizations Engaged Against 
Apartheid. New York: United Nations, 1984. 
 . Final Communique of the Summit Meeting of Front¬ 
line* States, Arusha, United Republic of Tanzania, 
29 April 1984. New York: United Nations, 1984. 
 . List of Companies with Investment and Interests in 
South Africa. New York: United Nations, 1978. 
 . Register of Entertainers, Actors and Others Who 
Have Performed in Apartheid South Africa. New York : 
United Nations, 1983. 
 . Resolutions on Apartheid Adopted by the United 
Nations General Assembly in 1983. New York: United 
Nations, 1984. 
 . Some Important Developments in the Movement for a 
Cultural Boycott Against South Africa. New York: 
United Nations, 1983. 
 . Transnational Corporations with Major Investments 
in South Africa. New York: United Nations, 1982. 
 . United States and South Africa: Extract from the 
Annual Report of the United Nations Special Committee 
Against Apartheid in 1983. New York: United Nations, 
1983. 
U.N. Center for Transnational Corporations. The Activities 
of Transnational Corporations in the~Industrial 
Mining and Military Sectors of Southern AfricaT New 
York: United Nations, 1980. 
U.S. Bureau of Mines. Mineral Commodities Summaries. Washing¬ 
ton, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978. 
 . Mineral Industries of Africa. Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976. 
331 
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on African Affairs. Imple¬ 
mentation of the U.S. Arms Embargo. 93rd Congress, 
1st Session. Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1973. 
 . Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. U.S. 
Policy Toward South Africa. 94th Congress, 2nd 
Session. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1976. 
 . Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. U.S. 
Policy Toward South Africa. 96th Congress, 2nd 
Session. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1980. 
 . Senate. Subcommittee on African Affairs. U.S. 
Policy Toward South Africa. 94th Congress, 1st 
Session. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1975. 
U.S. Department of Commerce. Survey of Current Business. 
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1978. 
U.S. Department of Interior. Mining and Minerals Policy. 
Washington, D.C.: U.S~ Government Printing Office, 
1977. 
U.S. Department of State. American Policy Current Documents 
1981. Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 1984. 
 . Confidential Diplomatic Cable Reveals Black 
Hostility to U.S. Investment in South Africa. Wash¬ 
ington^ D.C.: Department of State, 1978. 
 . The Trade Debate. Washington, D.C.: Department of 
State, 1978. 
U.S. South African Embassy. Process of Constitutional Change 
Underway in South Africa. Washington, D.C.: South 
African Embassy, 1984. 
